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Research in psychological adjustment to multiple sclerosis (MS) suggests that the 
way individuals appraise their condition can have an impact upon their psychological 
well-being and adjustment to their condition. Such research has influenced the 
development of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) interventions in this 
population. In recent years, Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) has 
gathered increasing interest in relation to chronic health conditions. ACT does not 
target the content of thought, but rather focuses on the contexts in which thought 
occurs (i.e. how individuals relate to their experiences).  
 
Aim and Primary Hypothesis: 
A cross sectional design was used to compare the extent to which cognitive 
appraisals and ACT constructs (‘acceptance’ and ‘cognitive fusion’), mediate the 
relationship between physical symptoms of MS and psychological adjustment 
outcomes. It was hypothesised that in comparison to cognitive appraisals, ACT 
constructs would serve as stronger mediators of the relationship between physical 
symptoms of MS and outcome measures. This study also piloted a newly adapted 
measure of MS related acceptance, the Multiple Sclerosis Acceptance Questionnaire 
(MSAQ).  
 
Method and Results: 
Participants (N = 133) completed self-report measures of: MS symptom severity, 
various cognitive constructs (cognitive appraisals and ACT constructs), symptoms of 
psychological distress, and satisfaction with life. Multiple mediation analysis was 
then used to compare competing mediational hypotheses. In comparison to all 
measures of cognitive appraisals, the ACT constructs tended to be stronger mediators 
of the relationship between symptoms and outcome measures (both psychological 
distress, and satisfaction with life). There was also some evidence for appraisals of 
 10 




This research suggests that ACT constructs may be relevant to the process of 
psychological adjustment to MS, and that ACT based interventions may be worthy of 
investigation in this population. The newly adapted MSAQ also shows preliminary 




1.1 Overview of current research 
 
Multiple sclerosis (MS) is the most common neurological disease among younger 
adults. There is currently no cure. The disease typically causes progressive physical, 
and often cognitive, disability which can have a deleterious impact on individuals’ 
quality of life (QoL) and psychological well being.  
 
Research in psychological adjustment to chronic health conditions, such as MS (e.g. 
Dennison et al., 2009), has shown that the beliefs that individuals form in relation to 
their health condition, the way they appraise their difficulties, and the coping 
strategies they employ, can have an impact on their psychological well-being and 
adjustment to their condition. In line with such underlying theory, psychological 
interventions based on cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) are increasingly being 
developed to target some of the typical problems associated with MS, including 
depression and fatigue (Dennison et al., 2010). Such interventions are particularly 
relevant given evidence that poor emotional well-being may be associated with 
neurological progression of the disease, as psychological states can impact on 
immune functioning (Kern & Ziemssen, 2008). 
 
In relatively recent years, Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes et al., 
1999) and other ‘third wave’ or ‘contextual’ psychological therapies have gathered 
increasing interest. Put simply, ACT does not target the content of thought as more 
traditional CBT does, but rather focuses on the contexts in which they occur (i.e. how 
individuals relate to their experiences). ACT has a growing evidence base in terms of 
its efficacy in improving psychological outcomes and treatment adherence among 
various chronic health conditions (Hayes et al., 2006; Ost, 2008; Powers et al., 2009; 
Ruiz, 2010). Despite difference at the level of theoretical underpinning and 
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technique, ACT appears to show preliminary promise as an effective alternate 
treatment to traditional CBT for various problems. 
 
The current research employed a cross sectional design to investigate the possible 
relevance of ACT processes in a MS population. By having participants complete 
self-report measures of: MS symptom severity, various cognitive constructs 
(cognitive appraisals, and the ACT constructs of ‘acceptance’ and ‘cognitive 
fusion’), symptoms of psychological distress, and subjective well-being, it was 
possible to carry out multiple mediation analysis (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) to 
explore the extent to which different cognitive constructs mediated the relationship 
between symptoms of MS and psychological outcome measures. It was hypothesised 
that ACT constructs would be stronger mediators of the relationship between 
symptoms of MS and outcome measures, in comparison to cognitive appraisals.  
 
1.2  Multiple Sclerosis 
 
1.2.1   Defining Multiple Sclerosis (MS) 
 
MS is the most common neurological disorder among younger adults, affecting 
approximately 85,000 individuals in the United Kingdom (Graham, 2002; as cited in 
Thomas et al., 2009). MS is a progressive and disabling disease, with typical onset 
occurring between the ages of 20-40, affecting women and men in a ratio of 3:2. The 
aetiology of the disease is relatively poorly understood, but the current opinion ‘is 
that it is an autoimmune disorder affecting genetically susceptible individuals’, with 
the disease process involving ‘inflammation and demyelination of the central 
nervous system’ (Thomas et al., 2009, p.2). 
 
Three basic types of MS can be distinguished (Thomas et al., 2009): 
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1) Relapse-remitting: characterised by stable phases alternating with relapses (when 
symptoms worsen or return). The duration of periods of remission and relapse are 
hugely variable. 
 
2) Secondary progressive: following an initial stage of relapse-remitting course, a 
more progressive phase begins characterised by a steady worsening of the condition.  
 
3) Primary progressive: the disease is steadily worsening from the first onset of 
symptoms. 
 
While some improvement in symptoms can be gained from disease-modifying 
medication during relapses in the disease (Goodin, 2008), there is no known cure. 
 
1.2.2   Symptoms and impacts of the disease 
 
Thomas et al. (2009) summarise the symptoms of MS as including loss in function 
of: the limbs, balance, bladder or bowel control, and eyesight due to optic neuritis. 
Other typical symptoms include sexual dysfunction, fatigue, pain, cognitive 
dysfunction (including processes of concentration, memory, reasoning and 
judgement), and mood disorders (Mohr & Cox, 2001). 
 
The increasing disability associated with MS has associated ‘psychosocial 
consequences, including disruptions to life goals, employment, income, relationships, 
leisure activities, and daily living activities’ (Dennison et al., 2009, p.142). MS can 
impact significantly upon individuals’ sense of self, and symptoms of anxiety and 
depression are highly prevalent. Among people with multiple sclerosis (PwMS), 
depression has a lifetime prevalence of approximately 50 per cent (Sa, 2007), while 
approximately 35 per cent is reported for anxiety disorders (Korostil & Feinstein, 
2007). 
 
Thomas et al. (2009) suggest there may be multiple aetiologies for depression in MS. 
While depression may be a psychological reaction to the disease in some instances, it 
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may also result from immune dysregulation and brain lesions (Fassbender et al., 
1998). Mohr (2002) has suggested that stress may be associated with the 
development of new brain lesions in MS, and that autoimmune activity may be 
increased by depression (Mohr, Goodkin et al., 2001). 
 
1.2.3   Typical Psychological Interventions in MS 
 
Given the high prevalence of mood disorders among PwMS, and the negative impact 
that they can have on QoL and disease activity, there is a need for effective 
psychological interventions for individuals with MS. Reviews of psychological 
interventions in MS (Malcomson et al., 2007; Thomas et al., 2009), however, noted 
that the evidence base is limited. 
 
A series of studies by Mohr and colleagues (Mohr, Boudewyn et al., 2001; Mohr et 
al., 2005; Mohr et al., 2000) has investigated the efficacy of CBT interventions for 
depression in MS. Their intervention has included typical CBT techniques such as 
behavioural activation and cognitive restructuring, along with additional focus on 
problems such as pain, fatigue and relationship difficulties commonly experienced by 
PwMS. Dennison and Moss-Morris (2010) observed that while each study had 
limitations, such as low sample sizes and high attrition rates, CBT has proved an 
effective intervention for reducing depression in comparison to treatment as usual 
(TAU) (Mohr et al., 2000), the anti-depressant Sertraline, supportive/expressive 
group psychotherapy (Mohr, Boudewyn et al., 2001), and individual 
supportive/expressive psychotherapy (Mohr et al., 2005).    
 
A study by Van Kessel and colleagues (Van Kessel et al., 2008) found CBT to be 
highly effective in treating MS related fatigue. Outcomes in the CBT group were 
significantly superior to the comparison group who received relaxation training 
alone. Post therapy, effect sizes in the CBT group were large (Hedges g = 3.03), with 
participants even showing lower levels of fatigue than healthy controls.  
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Mohr and colleagues (in preparation; as cited in Dennison & Moss-Morris, 2010) are 
currently conducting a trial investigating the efficacy of a CBT based stress 
management program developed specifically for PwMS. The study will conduct 
brain scans at two-month intervals during treatment to ascertain whether their 
intervention slows neurological progression of the disease compared to a TAU 
control group. 
 
The review of psychological interventions in people with MS carried out by 
Malcomson et al. (2007) concluded that there was some evidence for ‘the value of 
education/information, goal-setting, homework assignments, exercise, discussion 
forums, and multidisciplinary team support’ (p.1-2). Due to the selection criteria for 
studies, their conclusions were based only on 3 studies. They excluded all others due 
to weaknesses in study design, and incomplete reporting of methodological details. 
The Cochrane review conducted by Thomas et al. (2009) included 16 Randomised 
Controlled Trials (RCTs), and concluded that psychological interventions have 
potential to be helpful for individuals with MS in many ways. They cautiously 
suggested that CBT can help individuals cope with, and adjust to, MS and help if 
they become depressed. 
 
1.3  Psychological adjustment to chronic health conditions 
 
While numerous models have been developed to explain the process of psychological 
adjustment to chronic health conditions, the following discussion will focus on just 
two such models: the Stress and Coping Model (SCM) developed by Lazarus and 
Folkman (1984), and the model of self-regulation, often referred to as the ‘Common 
Sense Model’ (CSM), developed by Leventhal et al. (1984). The focus on these 
models is due to the dominant influence they have had in this field, along with their 





1.3.1  The Stress and Coping Model (SCM) 
 
Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) SCM is a generic model of stress and coping, which 
is applicable to a range of stressful contexts, though it has been widely applied to the 
understanding of adjustment to chronic health conditions. This model posits that 
adjustment to chronic health conditions is influenced by: firstly, individuals’ 
appraisals of stressors, and secondly, the coping strategies they employed in response 
to these stressors (Dennison et al., 2009). In the SCM, appraisal and coping are 
conceptualised as mediators of emotional response. The SCM is represented 







Figure 1 :  The Stress and Coping Model  
(reproduced from Folkman & Lazarus, 1988). 
 
1.3.1.1  Appraisals 
 
Lazarus and Folkman define cognitive appraisal as a process of categorising an 
encounter (between a person and a given environment) with respect to its 
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Primary appraisals are evaluations of an event’s personal significance, thus an event 
may be classified as ‘irrelevant’, ‘benign-positive’, or ‘stressful’. The Secondary 
appraisal involves the evaluation of what an individual believes they can do to cope 
with a given stressor, and thus guides the use of coping strategies. 
 
Lazarus and Folkman suggest that primary and secondary appraisals interact together 
in shaping the degree of stress, and the strength and quality of the resultant emotional 
reaction. For example, if a stressor is appraised as highly threatening, and the 
individual believes they are powerless and helpless to deal with it, this will result in a 
high degree of stress. 
 
1.3.1.2  Coping 
 
The aforementioned appraisal process, and its attendant emotions, in turn influences 
the coping strategies an individual may employ. Lazarus and Folkman conceptualise 
coping as the ongoing cognitive and behavioural processes employed by an 
individual to manage the internal and external demands placed on them. They 
differentiate between ‘problem focussed’ and ‘emotion focussed’ coping. Problem 
focussed coping involves acting in the external environment to change the person-
environment relations (e.g. learning new skills, or finding alternate means of gaining 
gratification), often altering the source of stress, while emotion focussed coping 
involves the regulation of internal states, so includes strategies such as avoidance, 
minimisation, distancing, selective attention, positive comparisons, and interpreting 
positive value from primarily negative events (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).  
 
1.3.1.3   Reappraisal 
 
Lazarus and Folkman emphasise that the reappraisal does not differ qualitatively 
from the initial appraisal, but simply occurs later in the process, and refers to an 
appraisal based on new information in the environment, including an evaluation of 
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the individual’s coping efforts. Reappraisal can in turn lead to a change in emotion 
quality and intensity. 
 
1.3.1.4  Evidence for the relevance of appraisal and stress 
perception to adjustment to Multiple Sclerosis. 
 
A small number of studies have sought to investigate the link between appraisals of 
MS related stressors and subsequent adjustment (Dennison et al., 2009). Adjustment 
has been found to be related to type of appraisal after severity of MS symptoms has 
been taken into account (Pakenham, 1999; Pakenham et al., 1997; Wineman et al., 
1994), with ‘threat’ appraisals appearing to be the most significantly associated with 
poor adjustment. Wineman et al. (1994) found appraisals to account for 29 per cent 
of the variance in emotional well-being, while Pakenham and colleagues found 
appraisals to account for between 6-14 per cent of variance in measures of 
psychosocial adjustment (Pakenham, 1999; Pakenham et al., 1997).  
 
A recent study conducted by Dennison et al. (2009) reviewed eleven studies which 
investigated the associations between the subjectively experienced degree of stress 
experienced by PwMS, and adjustment. Across the studies they found an association 
between perceived stress and adjustment outcomes including depression, anxiety 
disorders, psychopathology, satisfaction with life, quality of life, and social 
adjustment.  
 
1.3.2 The Common Sense Model (CSM) of Illness Representations 
 
While the SCM is a generic model of emotional regulation, the CSM (Leventhal et 
al., 1984) is concerned specifically with how individuals cope with illness and health 
threats. According to the CSM, the cognitive representations individuals form in 
relation to their illness influence their coping strategies and emotional responses. 
Thus, illness representations are conceptualised as having an influence on adherence 
to medical treatment and outcome. 
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The CSM is a “parallel” processing model, in that individuals form both cognitive 
and emotional representations of their illness (Hagger & Orbell, 2003), as shown in 




Figure 2:  The Common Sense Model of Illness Representations  
(reproduced from Leventhal et al., 1992) 
 
On the basis of ‘Illness stimuli’, which may include lay information about the 
disease, information given by external sources, as well as somatic and symptomatic 
information, individuals form cognitive and emotional representations of their health 
threat. The individual will then select and implement coping strategies directed 
towards the management of these cognitive and emotional representations. The CSM 
postulates that on the basis of illness representations, the coping procedures 
employed will aim to reduce the symptoms experienced and the level of perceived 
threat (the cognitive representation), while also reducing the emotional distress 
associated with the given health condition (the emotional representation). Thus, the 
procedures employed are tailored to the illness representations. Leventhal et al. 
(1992) give the example of how coping with a minor infection (involving 
representations of an exogenous cause, short timeline, and low perceived threat) may 
suggest coping procedures such as taking antibiotics to combat the infection, 
 
Illness Stimuli 
(inner or outer) 
Emotional 
representation 
















drinking fluids to flush out the system, and resting to restore energy levels. 
Alternatively, a more serious condition such as colon cancer (potentially involving 
representations of internal cause, longer timeline, and high perceived threat) may 
necessitate different coping procedures, such as eating a high fibre diet over a long 
period to clear the intestine of toxins, attempts at positive thinking to boost the 
immune system, specialist medical help, and seeking social contact in order to 
express emotions and receive support. It is important to note that, according to the 
CSM, coping strategies employed are likely to be perceived as correct and necessary 
by the individual in relation to their illness representations, even if they are 
considered unlikely to impact upon control of the health condition from an objective 
standpoint.  
 
The actual behaviours which can constitute ‘coping’ are highly varied. Hagger and 
Orbell (2003) conducted a meta-analysis of the studies investigating the CSM across 
different conditions. Their content analysis of coping procedures (captured by 
different self-report measures across studies) resulted in categorisation under the 
following general headings: avoidance/denial, cognitive reappraisal, expressing 
emotion, problem focussed coping (i.e. taking observable behavioural steps to 
confront and solve problems, both in general and in relation to health threats), and 
seeking social support. Hagger and Orbell (2003) concluded from their meta-analysis 
of 45 empirical studies that illness representations and coping strategies do tend to 
correlate in theoretically predictable ways.  
 
Coping strategies are, in turn, appraised for their effectiveness in dealing with the 
cognitive and emotional representation of the health threat. As Figure 2 illustrates, 
the CSM is highly dynamic. The different stages of the CSM do not affect each other 
uni-directionally or sequentially; it is a more fluid system. The coping strategies 
employed, and their effectiveness, impact upon illness representations and coping 
strategies subsequently employed (Leventhal et al., 1984; Leventhal, et al. 1992) in a 
cyclical manner. Illness episodes typically change over time. Somatic sensations of 
illness fluctuate, and new information about the illness can become available from 
friends, media, medical professionals, and from the success or failure of coping 
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strategies. For example, a client suffering from chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease (COPD) could be advised that some of their symptoms (e.g. light headedness, 
shaky legs, and uncomfortable feelings in chest) could be attributable to anxiety in 
some instances. If the individual entertained this as a possibility and incorporated this 
information into an illness representation, this could influence coping strategies 
employed (e.g. reappraisal of symptoms, use of relaxation techniques). If these 
coping strategies were appraised as successful, and coherent with the new illness 
representation, this would likely reduce the somatic symptoms of anxiety since they 
would no longer be perceived as threatening and attributable to COPD, providing 
further feedback for the modification of illness representations and choice of future 
coping strategies. 
 
Research across a number of different illness conditions (Hagger & Orbell, 2003) has 
supported a structure of illness representations consisting of five cognitive 
dimensions: (1) identity – the label of the disease, and the individual’s understanding 
of symptoms; (2) timeline –  acute, cyclic, or chronic; (3) consequences – physical, 
social, economic, emotional etc.; (4) causes – beliefs about the cause of disease (e.g. 
injury, infection, genetic weakness); (5) controllability and/or cure – the individual’s 
belief in themselves and health professionals to influence the condition (Fowler & 
Bass, 2006; Leventhal et al., 1992). Research has demonstrated that there are 
important inter-relationships between each of these five components, suggesting that 
illness representations are best understood as groups of beliefs or schemata, rather 
than single cognitions (e.g. Moss-Morris, 1998; as cited in Vaughan et al., 2003). 
Evidence suggests that certain illness representations are related to coping strategies 
and treatment adherence, including carrying out self care activities, and seeking 
appropriate medical help (Hampson et al., 1990), along with other outcome variables 




1.3.2.1    Illness representations and their relation to adjustment in 
Multiple Sclerosis 
 
Relatively few studies have directly investigated the illness representations of 
PwMS, and their relation to outcome. Jopson and Moss-Morris (2003) used a well 
validated measure of illness perceptions, the Illness Perceptions Questionnaire-
Revised (IPQ-R; Moss-Morris et al., 2002), and found that illness representations 
played a significant role in individuals’ adjustment to MS. The illness representations 
that appeared most associated with poorer outcomes involved attributing wide 
ranging symptoms to the disease itself, having low levels of perceived personal 
control over the disease, perception of severe consequences, believing it had a 
cyclical timeline, belief that psychological factors caused MS, and a lack of coherent 
understanding of MS (Dennison et al., 2009). Jopson and Moss-Morris (2003) 
acknowledge various limitations of their study, including the cross sectional design 
making it impossible to discern the direction of relationships between variables. It is 
possible, for example, that individuals could become depressed for social reasons, 
and that depression could then cause changes in their illness representations. The 
authors suggest, given evidence for the addressing of negative cognitions alleviating 
depression, that the relationship between illness representations and mood is likely to 
be reciprocal. Contrary to the authors’ assertion, however, the evidence base for the 
addressing of cognitions as alleviating depression is somewhat questionable 
(Longmore & Worrell, 2007; see later discussion in section 1.4.5.1). A relative 
strength of Jopson and Moss-Morris’s (2003) study was that the analysis controlled 
for disease severity, which along with self reports included one objective measure. 
 
A similar piece of cross sectional research carried out by Vaughan et al. (2003), 
using the Illness Perception Questionnaire (IPQ; Weinman et al., 1996) and a variety 
of outcome measures, found that holding perceptions of a strong illness identity (i.e. 
attributing many symptoms to the condition), severe illness consequences, and low 
levels of control over the effects of disease tended to have the greatest number of 
relationships with poorer outcomes. Spain et al. (2007) also found illness perceptions 
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to correlate with health related QoL in a MS population. The ‘identity’, 
‘consequences’ and ‘control/cure’ subscales of the IPQ tended to correlate with the 
greatest number of outcome measures. 
 
1.3.2.2  Other symptom related cognitions and their relation to 
adjustment in Multiple Sclerosis 
 
Various illness cognitions, other than stress appraisals and illness perceptions as 





A study carried out by Shnek et al. (1997) found a positive correlation between 
perceptions of helplessness and symptoms of depression in PwMS, after controlling 




Benefit finding is conceptualised as an adaptive process with individuals reporting a 
variety of benefits or gains from facing adversity, such as perceptions of personal 
growth, improvements in interpersonal relationships, or a change in priorities or 
goals. Pakenham (2005) investigated benefit finding in a MS population, using a 
longitudinal design. This study measured, among other factors, benefit finding (with 
subscales of ‘personal growth’ and ‘family relations growth’), along with positive 
and negative adjustment measures. After controlling for other variables, benefit 
finding was found to have strong direct effects on positive outcomes, but no direct 
effect on distress or subjective perceptions of health. Benefit finding also showed an 





While ‘acceptance’ of illness is widely believed to be beneficial for adjustment, 
relatively few studies have directly investigated this in a MS population. Harrison et 
al. (2004) found lower acceptance of disability to be associated with more negative 
impacts on the marital relationship over time. The operational definition of 
acceptance of disability used in this study was when individuals come to ‘believe 
their physical differences are part of who they are’ (p.272.).  
 
More recently, Stuifbergen et al. (2008) investigated acceptance in relation to a 
variety of outcome measures while developing the 10-item ‘Acceptance of Chronic 
Health Conditions Scale’ (ACHCS). They used a large sample of 822 PwMS. It is 
important here, particularly in relation to later discussion (see chapter 1.4.3.1.), to 
note the definitions of acceptance used by Stuifbergen et al. (2008), which underpin 
their scale:  
 
“Emotional acceptance involves the affective internalization of the functional implications of 
the impairment into the self-concept [emphasis added], as well as behavioural adaptation and 
social reintegration into the individual’s life” (pp.101-102.) 
 
“Acceptance as defined here does not imply passive resignation to a hopeless situation of 
loss, but rather a belief [emphasis added] that one’s chronic condition has been integrated 
into the complexity of one’s life.”(p.103.) 
 
The notion of a change in the self-concept and beliefs suggests that acceptance, by 
these definitions, involves a change in cognitive content. Higher scores on the 
ACHCS were found to correlate significantly with various outcome measures, 
including: higher perceived QoL, higher perceived health, and lower levels of 




1.3.3   Synthesis of research into the process of adjustment to MS 
  
The literature reviewed thus far illustrates that the SCM (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) 
and the CSM (Leventhal et al., 1984) have been highly influential models in how 
researchers have conceptualised the process of adjustment to chronic health 
conditions. The ways in which individuals appraise their symptoms, the challenges 
they face, and their ability to cope, appear to influence the quality of their 
adjustment. Perhaps the central concept is that the content of individuals’ thoughts 
regarding their illness has a significant bearing on outcome, so are thus potentially 
viable targets for intervention.  
 
Dennison et al. (2009) recently proposed a provisional ‘working model of adjustment 
to MS’. Their model is largely based on Beck’s (1976) cognitive model of emotional 
disorders, and also posits the psychological correlates of successful adjustment based 
on their review of the literature. The model proposed by Dennison et al. (2009) is 
represented diagrammatically in Figure 3 below. In line with Beck’s original 
conception, the upper portion of the model illustrates how early experiences shape 
individuals’ beliefs about themselves and others, which in turn influence how they 
relate to the world. Ongoing symptoms of MS constitute ‘critical events’ which 
disrupt individuals’ emotional equilibrium, and impact upon their general well-being. 
The lower half of Figure 3 summarises the cognitive, behavioural, and social factors 
which Dennison et al. (2009) found, through their review of the literature, to have the 
greatest influence upon adjustment outcomes. Some of these factors (listed in the 
bottom half of Figure 3) have been covered in the preceding discussion, while others 






Key beliefs about self and others 
Values Goals Behaviours 
CRITICAL EVENTS 
e.g. Developing MS symptoms, Diagnosis, Relapse, Illness Progression 
Disrupts emotional equilibrium and current quality of life 
SUCCESSFUL ADJUSTMENT 
(less distress and interference/impact of 
MS on life) 
 
Factors helpful for adjustment: 
 
Cognitive Factors 
- coping by using positive re-
appraisal 
- perceived control over generic life 
situations 




- benefit finding 
- self-efficacy regarding generic life 
situations 




- coping using problem-focussed 
strategies or seeking social support 
- Health Behaviours 
 
Social/environmental factors 
- High perceived social support 
- Positive relationship/interactions 
with family/spouse 
ADJUSTMENT DIFFICULTIES 
(disproportionate distress and impact of 
MS on life) 
 
Factors unhelpful for adjustment: 
 
Cognitive Factors 
- high perceived stress 
- coping through wishful thinking or 
avoidance 
- uncertainty about illness 
- appraisal of MS as threatening 
- dysfunctional cognitions/cognitive 
errors & biases 
- helplessness 
- perceived barriers to health behaviours 
- unhelpful illness/symptom 
representations 
- unhelpful beliefs about pain 
 
Behavioural Factors 
- coping through avoidance 
- unhelpful responses to symptoms 
(avoidance/resting) 
 
Figure 3:   A working model of adjustment to Multiple Sclerosis 
(reproduced from Dennison et al., 2009). 
 28 
The model proposed by Dennison et al. (2009) holds many commonalities with 
recent models of adjustment developed by other researchers (e.g. Sharpe & Curran, 
2006; Walker et al., 2004). Sharpe and Curran’s (2006) model is also essentially 
based on Beck’s (1976) model of emotional disorders, viewing the chronic illness as 
a stressor which disrupts emotional equilibrium. It affords illness representations 
quite a central focus, as adjustment is conceptualised as the process of individuals 
incorporating their illness representations into adaptive views of themselves and the 
world in order to facilitate active coping and positive health behaviours. The authors 
suggest that individuals may go through a ‘hierarchical’ series of re-appraisals in 
order to restore emotional equilibrium, starting with perhaps re-appraising the illness 
itself, or potentially progressing as far as attempts to change more core schema and 
goals if necessary.  
 
Similarly, Walker et al. (2004) describe a ‘biopyschosocial’ model of adjustment to 
chronic illness, which is heavily influenced by Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) SCM. 
Their model also acknowledges that an individual’s early experience and personality 
characteristics will tend to influence how they tend to appraise and cope with a 
health threat, which in turn will influence their affect and physical health. 
 
The psychological correlates of adjustment to MS identified by Dennison et al. 
(2009) are consistent with the conclusions of De Ridder (2008) who reviewed the 
literature pertaining to adjustment to chronic illnesses. De Ridder identified four key 
cognitive and behavioural processes associated with positive adjustment, 
recommending that clients should ‘remain as active as is reasonably possible, 
acknowledge and express their emotions in a way that allow them to take control of 
their lives, engage in self-management, and try to focus on potential positive 
outcomes of their illness’ (De Ridder, 2008, p.1). 
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1.4  Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) and 
Mindfulness: ‘The Third Wave’ of behavioural therapy. 
 
The following discussion focuses on the underlying theory, and applications to date, 
of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes et al., 1999) and Mindfulness 
based approaches. These approaches are sometimes referred to as being part of the 
‘third wave’ of behavioural therapies on the premise that the evolution of behaviour 
therapy can be separated into three generations: traditional behaviour therapy, CBT, 
and a third generation of more recent ‘contextualistic approaches’ (Hayes, 2004). 
The primary focus of the discussion will be on ACT, as it is most relevant to the 
current research, while mindfulness will also be afforded brief coverage as it has 
strong theoretical associations with ACT. 
 
When the terms ‘CBT’, cognitive therapy (CT), or ‘traditional CBT’ are used in the 
following discussion, they will refer to Beckian (Beck et al., 1979) approaches to 
treatment, which could be considered as part of the ‘second wave’ of behaviour 
therapy. 
 
1.4.1   Philosophical underpinnings of ACT 
 
ACT is rooted in a pragmatic philosophy known as ‘functional contextualism’ (FC). 
Contextualism views the psychological events of an individual as ‘interacting in and 
with historically and situationally defined contexts’ (Hayes et al., 2006, p.4).  Put 
more simply, this standpoint suggests that no psychological or behavioural events 
should be considered in isolation, as their meanings are dependent on the context in 
which they occur. Hayes (1995) argues that from this perspective no psychological 
events (i.e. cognitions, emotions, behaviour) can be meaningfully described as 
causing one another directly, but only as influencing each other within certain 
contexts, giving the example of a spark only appearing to ‘cause’ an explosion in the 
context of other setting conditions such as oxygen and sufficient combustible 
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material being present.  ACT theorists therefore aim to understand the functions of 
behavioural events within the full context in which they occur.  
 
The specific goal of FC is stated as the prediction and influence of psychological 
events with precision, scope, and depth (e.g. Vilardaga et al., 2009). FC employs a 
‘pragmatic truth criterion’ (Hayes, 1993). According to the pragmatic truth criterion, 
the degree to which analyses work in relation to specified goals is the degree to 
which those analyses should be considered ‘true’. If this philosophy is adhered to by 
ACT researchers with fidelity, then research and clinical practice are only judged by 
the extent to which they serve the goal of predicting and influencing psychological 
events with precision, scope, and depth, as opposed to their ‘truth’ in regards to any 
other objective reality. Hayes, Strosahl, Bunting et al. (2004) state that FC and the 
pragmatic truth criterion are not any more correct than other approaches, they are 
merely clear statements of the underlying assumptions adopted by researchers and 
practitioners.  
 
This philosophy is reflected in ACT in a number of ways. Perhaps most notably for 
the current discussion, interventions are focused towards events that ACT proponents 
believe can be directly influenced.  Hayes (1995) asserts that psychological events by 
definition cannot be directly influenced, because they are the dependent variables 
(DVs) of psychology; only Independent variables (IVs), the environment in the case 
of psychology, can be directly influenced. As Hayes et al. (2006) explain, from an 
ACT perspective ‘thoughts and feelings do not cause other actions, except as 
regulated by context’ (p.4). ACT, therefore, claims to have a contextualistic focus, 
seeking to change contexts that link psychological domains, rather than directly 
seeking to change their content (Hayes et al., 1996).  
1.4.1.1 Potential Criticisms of ACT’s Underlying Philosophy 
 
ACT’s adoption of FC has drawn criticism from some quarters. In drawing 
comparisons between itself and other branches of mainstream psychology such as 
traditional behaviourism or CBT, ACT proponents (e.g. Hayes, 1995)  have tended to 
accuse other approaches of ascribing to more mechanistic philosophies in 
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establishing causality between events (e.g. that a thought can cause a feeling or 
behaviour). It has been argued, however, that the dichotomies drawn between 
mechanistic and more contextualistic approaches may be somewhat illusory. Marr 
(1993) gives examples of how descriptions of mechanism are inherently contextual, 
as descriptions of component parts can only have any meaning when in relation to 
other elements, in the context of the wider system in which they exist. Thus, 
mechanistic accounts may already imply contextualism. Marr (1993) also suggests 
that the boundaries drawn between supposed DVs (i.e. psychological events) and the 
IV (i.e. the environment) by ACT researchers may be somewhat arbitrary, as these 
could be classified differently by different researchers. If the logic of ACT 
proponents is followed, a re-labelling of ‘context’ as a DV could render it immune to 
direct influence. It is also problematic that ‘context’ tends to be defined in somewhat 
vague fashion (Staddon, 1993) by ACT proponents, rendering discussion on the topic 
difficult to comprehend.  
 
The adoption of FC is a statement of personal values on the part of a researcher, and 
represents a relativistic stance towards truth. Indeed, a functional contextualistic 
approach makes no claims to analysis being ‘true’ in relation to any objective reality. 
Ruiz and Roche (2007) suggest that there are risks in such a stance. Firstly, they 
suggest that distinctions between ‘contextualists’ and ‘non-contextualists’ may make 
it difficult to have effective or comprehensible dialogues regarding theoretical 
positions, research findings, and methodologies. Secondly, the pragmatic truth 
criterion may preclude wider discussion about the moral character of a given 
research program. Ruiz and Roche suggest that researchers ascribing to FC are 
effectively declaring themselves accountable only to their own personal moral 
values, rather than those of a wider society or scientific community (other than that 
of fellow ACT researchers). Ruiz and Roche raise concern that if research is carried 
out solely to meet personally held analytic goals, there may be potential risks of it 
serving researchers’ own personal welfare, rather than that of wider society.  
 
It is noteworthy that while FC makes very explicit reference to the importance of 
‘context’, such consideration is surely not exclusive to ACT practitioners. Clinical 
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psychologists, including those who would describe themselves as primarily 
employing a CBT approach, commonly employ an inclusive and holistic approach to 
formulating the problems described by individuals, which surely involves 
consideration and manipulation of ‘context’. ACT researchers stated aim to 
understand the functions of behavioural events in their full context sounds by no 
means unique. It is possible that statements of fundamental differences in 
philosophical underpinning between ACT and CBT may serve a purpose for ACT in 
appearing to differentiate itself from CBT, and give a seemingly strong and clearly 
formulated foundation, when differences between ACT and CBT at the level of 
applied research and clinical practice are more limited. If this is indeed the case, it 
would render the underpinning of FC somewhat superfluous in terms of real 
influence on research and practice.  
 
Finally, ACT’s philosophical underpinnings are drawn upon in the rationale for 
excluding cognitive restructuring from treatment (see later discussion in section 
1.4.5), asserting that cognitions cannot be directly influenced, because they are DVs. 
The basis for this claim appears somewhat unclear. While perhaps cognitions cannot 
literally be influenced directly, it is possible that relatively direct methods (e.g. 
offering evidence that strongly and directly contradicts an assumption) could have a 
sudden and modifying influence on cognitive content. Labelling cognitions as a DV, 
and thus immune to direct influence, may be a somewhat convenient or even 
pedantic use of philosophical underpinning to support ACT practice. 
 
While ACT’s adoption of FC as an underlying philosophy may carry potential 
difficulties, there is perhaps some merit in clearly stating the goals and assumptions 
on which any scientific endeavour is based, so these assumptions can be clearly 
understood and debated. An awareness of FC may also make the rationale for some 
of the supposedly unique features of ACT somewhat clearer (Hayes, Strosahl, 
Bunting et al., 2004). 
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1.4.2   Relational Frame Theory 
 
Relational Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes et al., 2001) is a modern behavioural account 
of human language and cognition. The RFT research programme is widely regarded 
as being particularly complex and difficult to grasp (e.g. Gross & Fox, 2009; Palmer, 
2004).   
 
As described by Hayes et al. (2006): ‘According to RFT, the core of human language 
and cognition is the learned and contextually controlled ability to arbitrarily relate 
events mutually and in combination, and to change the functions of specific events 
based on their relations to others.’ (p.5) One commonly cited (e.g. Hayes et al., 
2006) example of these principles is how children in the United States (US) come to 
understand the relative values of coinage. The example is outlined here with the use 
of British coinage. Young children will know that in a physical sense a two pence 
coin (2p) is bigger than a five pence coin (5p), this is known as a non-arbitrary 
relation. Children will later learn that 5p is bigger than 2p by social attribution (an 
arbitrary relation). This arbitrary relation is mutual (i.e. if 5p is bigger than 2p, then 
2p is smaller than 5p), combinatorial (i.e. if 20p is bigger than 5p, and 5p is bigger 
than 2p, then 20p is bigger than 2p) and alters the function of related events (i.e. if 5p 
was used to buy sweets, 20p would subsequently be preferred even though it hadn’t 
used for this purpose before). The transformation of stimulus functions is highly 
significant for RFT and ACT, as it indicates that stimuli can acquire behavioural 
functions based solely on their participation in verbal relations with other events 
(Gross & Fox, 2009) rather than through direct experience.  
 
Hayes et al. (2001) argue the primary implications of RFT in the area of 
psychopathology are that: (1) some of the processes of verbal learning and problem 
solving can also lead to psychopathology, (2) learning is additive and cannot readily 
be undone, (3) attempts to directly change specific aspects of a cognitive network 
may have the unintended effect of elaborating it, (4) contextual features control the 
impact of cognitive networks, so it should be possible to reduce their impact without 
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changing their form (Hayes et al., 2006), by manipulating the context. Hayes, 
Masuda et al. (2004) describe such problematic contexts as including ‘those in which 
private events need to be controlled, explained, believed, or disbelieved, rather than 
being experienced.’ (p.5) 
 
RFT has created intense debate within the field of behaviour therapy. One review, for 
example, described RFT theorising as unintelligible, ambiguous and contradictory 
(Burgos, 2003). The debate over RFT is highly technical and has spanned many 
years, but was recently summarised by Gross and Fox (2009). One criticism 
(Osborne, 2003) is that RFT is not truly ‘post-Skinnerian’ as it relies on many of the 
same fundamental principles of Skinner’s account (e.g. that relational responding is 
the result of differential reinforcement), though these principles are fully credited by 
Hayes et al. (2001). It has variously been suggested that RFT does not offer a new 
behavioural principle or theory, as relational framing can be accounted for by a 
complex chain of other existing behavioural principles (Burgos, 2003; Malott, 2003; 
Salzinger, 2003). Palmer (2004) criticised RFT for theoretical confusion over 
whether relational frames are part of the history that bring about behaviour (a 
process), or a class of behaviour themselves (an outcome). These criticisms, among 
others, have been countered (Hayes et al., 2003; Hayes & Barnes-Holmes, 2004) by 
the authors of RFT in depth which is beyond the scope of the current discussion. 
Proponents of RFT argue that it does offer new behavioural principles at the level of 
process and outcome. 
 
1.4.3  An ACT conceptualisation of Psychopathology: Psychological 
Inflexibility and the ACT hexaflex 
 
On the basis of RFT, ACT views psychopathology as primarily being the result of 
‘psychological inflexibility’, which can be defined as ‘the way that language and 
cognition interact with direct contingencies to produce an inability  to persist or 
change behaviour in the service of long-term valued ends’ (Hayes et al., 2006, p.6). 
Put more simply, the way in which an individual relates to their internal mental 
experiences can hinder their ability to engage in valued living. An ACT model of 
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psychological inflexibility can be seen below in figure 4, which consists of six 




















   
 
Figure 4:  An ACT/RFT model of psychopathology 
(reproduced from Hayes et al., 2006) 
 
Cognitive fusion refers to the tendency for individuals to become fused with or 
excessively ‘caught up’ in their thoughts, so thoughts have an unduly strong 
influence over behaviour (Hayes et al., 1999). Experiential avoidance is the attempt 
to alter the form or frequency of private events, even if this requires engaging in 
undesired or maladaptive behaviours (Hayes et al., 1996). Dominance of the 
conceptualised past and feared future and attachment to the conceptualised self are 
closely related to cognitive fusion, as they refer to the tendency to become fused with 
verbally based conceptualisations of the past, future, and the self. Lack of values 
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psychological inflexibility, whereby the individual becomes less engaged in valued 
living. 
 
These six processes of psychopathology can be contrasted with the six more positive 
psychological processes which ACT seeks to strengthen, as summarised in Figure 5 
below. The processes in Figure 5 are effectively the opposite of those in Figure 4. 



























Figure 5:  A model of the positive psychological processes ACT seeks to 
strengthen (reproduced from Hayes et al., 2006) 
 
1.4.3.1  Acceptance 
 
‘Acceptance involves the active and aware embrace of those private events 











Self as Context 
Mindfulness and Acceptance 
Processes 
Commitment and Behaviour 
Change Processes 
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or form’ (Hayes et al., 2006, p.7). The word ‘willingness’ is sometimes used 
interchangeably with ‘acceptance’ in ACT, since acceptance from an ACT 
perspective is a willingness to experience difficult thoughts and feelings in the course 
of behaving consistently with ones values.  It is important to note that an ACT 
definition of acceptance differs from other conceptualisations used in adjustment 
literature, such as the definitions of Stuifbergen et al. (2008) quoted earlier (see 
section 1.3.2.2.). Such definitions of acceptance require a change in the content of 
thought, while in ACT, acceptance involves change in how individuals relate to their 
experiences, and in what behaviours then become possible through that change in the 
context of relating to private events. 
 
1.4.3.2  Cognitive Defusion 
 
Defusion techniques aim to alter the undesirable functions of thoughts, reducing their 
literal quality, as opposed to attempting to change their content (Hayes et al., 2006). 
Thus rather than a thought (e.g. “I am no good”) being taken as literally true, it may 
be experienced more objectively as a thought (i.e. “I am having the thought that I am 
no good”). Defusion techniques tend to reduce the believability, or attachment to, 
private events rather than necessarily changing their form or frequency. Defusion 
techniques aim to reduce the capacity of unwanted private events to regulate or 
control behaviour.   
 
1.4.3.3  Being Present 
 
ACT encourages ‘ongoing contact with psychological and environmental events as 
they occur’ (Hayes et al., 2006, p.9), so individuals are more able to react flexibly to 




1.4.3.4.  Self as context 
 
ACT utilises perspective taking exercises that encourage contact with a transcendent 
sense of self, or self as context. Such exercises aim to help clients ‘distinguish 
between the content of consciousness and the person as a perspective-taking context 
for that content, in the hopes that this will reduce attachment to the conceptualized 
self’ (Hayes et al., 2011, p.156). 
 
1.4.3.5  Values 
 
‘Values are chosen qualities of purposive action’ (Hayes et al., 2006, p.9). In ACT, 
values are described as directions in which to live (rather than ‘goals’), so can never 
be fully finished or attained. For example, one could never ‘finish’ being a good 
parent, if that is a chosen value. 
 
1.4.3.6  Committed Action 
 
ACT encourages individuals to develop wide patterns of behaviour in relation to 
chosen values (Hayes et al., 2006). Committed action can involve the establishment 
of short, medium and long-term goals in relation to chosen values. 
 
1.4.3.7.  The Goal of ACT: Psychological Flexibility 
 
The six ACT processes all serve to promote psychological flexibility, which Hayes et 
al. (2006) define as ‘the process of contacting the present moment fully as a 
conscious human being and persisting or changing behavior in the service of chosen 
values’ (p.9). The six core ACT processes are overlapping and interrelated. While 
initiating behaviour change in the pursuit of chosen values will often bring clients 
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into contact with perceived difficulties and obstacles, other ACT processes (i.e. 
acceptance, defusion etc.) are intended to help individuals address these.  
 
1.4.4   Mindfulness 
 
Mindfulness is typically an important element of interventions in ACT and other 
‘third wave’ therapies. The practice of mindfulness has evolved from various 
meditation techniques utilised in Buddhist meditation practice (Hanh, 1976; as cited 
in Bishop, 2004). Mindfulness has been defined in various ways by different authors. 
For example, Kabat-Zinn (2003) defines mindfulness as ‘the awareness that emerges 
through paying attention on purpose, in the present moment, and nonjudgmentally to 
the unfolding experience moment by moment.’ (p.145). Fletcher and Hayes (2005) 
suggest that mindfulness can be usefully defined from an ACT/RFT perspective as 
being ‘the defused, accepting, open contact with the present moment and the private 
events it contains as a conscious human being experientially distinct from the content 
being noticed.’ (p.322.), effectively defining mindfulness as being comprised of the 
four ACT process relating to private events (as illustrated in Figure 5). 
 
1.4.5  Current debate between traditional CBT and the ‘third wave’ 
therapies 
 
The emergence of the ‘third wave therapies’ has produced intense debate between its 
proponents, and researchers with an orientation towards more traditional CBT. The 
following summary of the debate will adopt a structure similar to that adopted by 
Arch and Craske (2008) who outlined the main dichotomies in terms of underlying 




1.4.5.1  Mediators of therapeutic change: CBT mechanisms vs. 
ACT mechanisms 
 
For any therapy, it is often supposed that the components of that therapy are 
responsible for therapeutic gains demonstrated. While ACT and Mindfulness 
supposedly work by enabling individuals to change the way they relate to their 
thoughts and emotions, CBT purports to change cognitive content to impact upon 
emotional experiences (Beck, 1993). These assertions can be tested by certain study 
designs, such as component analyses (testing the different components of a treatment 
against each other) and mediational analyses (testing whether the posited processes 
of a given therapy mediate the outcome).  
 
Evidence for mechanisms of CBT as mediating therapeutic change 
 
Jacobson et al. (1996) conducted the first component analysis of CBT in the 
treatment of depression. They compared CBT with two other conditions representing 
its component parts: a ‘behavioural activation’ condition, and an ‘automatic 
thoughts’ condition (which included all elements of the behavioural activation 
condition, with the addition of negative automatic thought modification). This study 
had various strengths to its methodology (Longmore & Worrell, 2007). In each 
condition, treatment was provided by four experienced therapists. A year was 
devoted to piloting treatment conditions, and writing detailed manuals for each 
condition. A sample of sessions were taped and listened to by a rater (who was blind 
to the treatment condition) to monitor treatment adherence. Surprisingly perhaps, no 
significant differences were found in levels of depressive symptomatology between 
the three conditions, either immediately post treatment, or at 6-month follow-up. The 
authors acknowledge that this result was obtained despite their expectancy that the 
full CBT condition would be the most effective treatment. The authors concluded 
that the results raised questions over the mechanisms of change proposed by Beckian 
CBT (Jacobson et al., 1996). This study did have some minor limitations, such as the 
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descriptions of treatment conditions being relatively broad. It could be argued that 
the behavioural activation condition had some cognitive elements, such as the 
imaginal rehearsal of activities. Also, elements of treatment were added in a 
sequential manner (i.e. the full CBT condition started with behavioural activation and 
added cognitive elements later in treatment), so it could be argued the elements 
added last could be expected to add the least benefit (if behavioural and cognitive 
interventions act on related mechanisms). The findings of this study were later 
replicated by the same research group (Dimidjian et al., 2006) with a large sample (N 
= 241). Full CBT was found to be no more effective than a simpler behavioural 
activation (BA) condition, and BA was even found to be more effective than full 
CBT for the most severely depressed clients.  
 
Studies investigating the cognitive mediators of therapeutic change have also found 
surprisingly little evidence to support the Beckian Cognitive model. Jacobson et al. 
(1996) issued participants with the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ; Hollon 
& Kendall, 1980) and the Expanded Attributional Style Questionnaire (EASQ; 
Peterson & Villanova, 1988) to investigate whether changes in cognitive content 
mediated outcomes. No such relationship was found. A meta-analysis conducted by 
Oei and Free (1995) investigated the link between change in cognitions and change 
in symptoms of depression between different forms of therapy (different 
psychological and pharmacological therapies). It was found that changes in cognitive 
style occurred across all active therapy, not just CBT.  
 
A review (Longmore & Worrell, 2007) of thirteen CBT component analyses, and 
evidence for the mediating effect of cognitive change on outcomes, concluded that 
there is ‘a worrying lack of empirical support for some of the fundamental tenets of 
CBT.’ (p.185.) and that the need to challenge or modify the content of thought in 
CBT is largely unsupported.  
  
There is, however, some evidence of cognitive change mechanisms mediating the 
effects of CT. DeRubeis et al. (1990) compared two groups of participants suffering 
from major depressive disorder: one receiving CT, and the other receiving 
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pharmacotherapy alone. It was found that scores on measures of cognitive content at 
mid-treatment did predict changes in depression between mid-treatment and post-
treatment in the group receiving CT, but not in the pharmacotherapy alone group.   
 
Hofmann (2008) contends that Longmore and Worrell’s (2007) review of the 
literature reaches biased and mistaken conclusions regarding the evidence for 
cognitive changes mediating symptom change. Hofmann argues that cognition can 
mediate change through other means than Beckian cognitive challenge alone, giving 
the example of behavioural strategies such as exposure potentially altering cognitive 
content (e.g. fear expectancy). Such a line of argument is difficult to dispute, as it 
becomes impossible to isolate cognitive change techniques for study (i.e. if a 
behavioural intervention becomes a cognitive technique). Hofmann (2008) also 
suggests that the test for mediation is more complex than authors often realise, that 
the appropriate statistical tests have only recently been suggested, and that 
recommended methodologies for detecting a mediational relationship (Kraemer et 
al., 2002) are very rarely employed, such as measures being administered at 
appropriate time points. 
 
Evidence for mechanisms of ACT as mediating therapeutic change 
 
The study of mediating variables has been far more common in ACT outcome 
studies. Hayes et al. (2011) state that of all RCTs of ACT, around two thirds have 
published mediational analyses, and across these ‘about 50 per cent of the between-
group differences in follow-up outcomes can be accounted for by the mediating role 
of differential post levels in psychological flexibility and its components’ (p.157). 
Only a small selection of these studies can be reviewed here. 
 
One technique used in ACT to measure cognitive defusion has been to use existing 
CBT process measures, such as the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS; Weissman, 
1979) or ATQ, but to ask participants to make an additional rating on how believable 
they find the given thought. Hayes et al. (2006) conducted a reanalysis of data from 
the first RCT on ACT (Zettle & Hayes, 1986). The original article had compared an 
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early version of ACT with CT among depressed clients, delivered in a 12-week 
individual protocol. ACT was found to be superior to CT on depression outcome post 
treatment and at 2-month follow-up. The two groups did not differ on their scores on 
the ATQ, a measure of depressogenic thought frequency, but they did differ for 
scores on how believable they found the thoughts when they were occurring, with the 
ACT group finding the thoughts less believable. The reanalysis conducted by Hayes 
et al. (2006) found that the believability of depressogenic thought mid-treatment 
mediated the superior outcomes in ACT achieved in this study. Similar findings were 
produced by Zettle et al. (2011), who conducted a reanalysis of the second RCT in 
ACT (Zettle & Rains, 1989), which compared 12-week group programmes of CT 
and ACT with depressed clients. At two month follow-up, the differential impact of 
ACT versus CBT (in favour of ACT) on symptoms of depression was mediated by 
differential levels of the believability of thoughts (using the DAS) as measured post 
intervention, rather than the level of dysfunctional attitudes or occurrence of 
depressive thoughts. Scores on the DAS did not mediate outcomes for the CBT 
condition, and CBT did not change scores on the DAS any more so than ACT. These 
reanalyses are notable, as they are two of the very few studies which have compared 
ACT and CBT directly, and provide evidence for mediating variables for both 
treatment conditions. Similarly, in a study investigating ACT for psychosis, 
Gaudiano et al. (2010) found that the differential benefits of ACT on hallucination 
related distress were mediated by differential post intervention levels of the 
believability of the hallucinations, and not their frequency. 
 
In a review of the literature, Hayes et al. (2006) cite evidence for the mediating 
effects of ACT variables in positive treatment outcomes for many other conditions 
including: smoking cessation, coping with end stage cancer, frequency of seizures in 
epilepsy, distress experienced in chronic pain, and social phobia. It is worth noting, 
however, that a few of these studies tended to cite the Baron and Kenny (1986) 
criteria for testing mediating variables, rather than more rigorous modern methods 
(Kraemer et al., 2002), which require more complex design and statistical tests 
(Hofmann, 2008; Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Also, ACT measures have sometimes 
been developed for assessment or tracking individual change, and therefore lack the 
 46 
robust demonstration of psychometric properties that would give greater confidence 
in their use in research. The Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ; Hayes, 
Strosahl, Wilson et al., 2004) and Acceptance and Action Questionnaire II (AAQ-II; 
Bond et al., in press) are, however, particularly well validated ACT process 
measures. 
 
1.4.5.2  Treatment of thoughts: Cognitive restructuring vs. 
Cognitive defusion 
 
While traditional CBT focuses on restructuring or modifying the content of thought, 
ACT favours an approach encouraging cognitive defusion and acceptance. 
 
ACT proponents argue (e.g. Hayes et al., 2006) that a focus on changing the content 
of thought can have the paradoxical effect of making a thought more salient and 
distressing. Research on the effect of thought suppression (e.g. Wegner, 1994) has 
been cited to support this assertion, suggesting that the approach of CBT can 
encourage avoidance and suppression of thought (Hayes et al., 1999). This has been 
strongly disputed by proponents of traditional CBT. For example, Leahy (2008) 
describes the notion that the challenging of thought may be deleterious to clients as 
‘a remarkable and alarming claim—one that has absolutely no basis in 
reality.’(p.149) Experimental studies conducted by Gross (2002) have used 
‘cognitive reframing’ as a comparison condition to suppression, and found that such 
cognitive reframing does not produce the same outcomes as suppression, but rather 
tends to have a positive effect in reducing the intensity and behavioural expression of 
negative emotion. 
 
Arch and Craske (2008) highlight that CBT and ACT approaches to cognition are 
similar in some ways, including encouraging clients to face previously avoided 
experiences. They speculate that both cognitive restructuring and defusion may 
operate through similar mechanisms based on exposure, and that cognitive 
restructuring may be similar to defusion, in that clients are encouraged to gain some 
distance from their thoughts. This similarity has been observed by other CBT 
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proponents. Leahy (2008), for example, suggested that CBT already includes 
defusion, but refers to it as ‘distancing’. An important distinction, however, is that 
‘distancing’ in CBT is encouraged only as a first step towards the goal of changing 
the content of thought to make it less distorted and more realistic (Beck et al., 1979), 
while defusion does not involve changing cognitive content. The results of 
mediational analyses, such as those described earlier (e.g. Zettle et al., 2011) do 
however support the assertion that defusion (as measured by the believability of 
thought) is an active and distinct treatment component in ACT, and that it is 
differentially active in ACT compared to CBT. 
 
It is worth noting that ACT techniques cannot entirely avoid contact with, or 
evaluation of, the content of thought. Arch and Craske (2008) suggest that for 
individuals to know which thoughts to defuse from, some initial appraisal of thoughts 
must take place, and that thinking is therefore paradoxically required as a first step in 
avoiding getting tied up in thought.  
 
Experimental paradigms may be helpful in distinguishing the mechanisms and 
differential effectiveness of cognitive restructuring and defusion. Such research 
could include measuring behavioural avoidance and physiological reactivity rather 
than relying exclusively on self report measures (Arch & Craske, 2008), for example 
comparing physiological reactivity under an ‘exposure with cognitive restructuring’ 
condition versus ‘exposure with cognitive defusion techniques’.  
 
1.4.5.3  Approach to emotional symptoms: Prediction and control 
vs. acceptance 
 
CBT has as one of its goals the prediction and control of emotional symptoms, while 
ACT advocates acceptance, which involves giving up the battle to control symptoms 
and instead to focus on behavioural goals, in the service of values, in the presence of 
unpleasant private events. In line with a CBT approach, there is evidence to suggest 
that perceptions of control over internal states and external events are predictive of 
positive coping and mental health (Skinner, 1995), even if control over these factors 
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is actually very limited. Acceptance techniques may, however, also promote clients’ 
sense of mastery and control over symptoms, though this is not ACT’s explicit 
intention. Similarly, acceptance related techniques such as mindfulness may serve to 
increase clients’ perceptions of predictability of symptoms, by increasing awareness 
of their own internal state and current environment (Arch & Craske, 2008). 
 
CBT may also contain elements that could readily be seen as consistent with an ACT 
consideration of emotional symptoms. Research into exposure therapy (e.g. Craske et 
al., 2008), has found that actual reduction in emotional distress is not predictive of 
overall outcome, but rather exposure may be best understood as increasing 
individuals’ ability to interact with feared stimuli without the usual effects on 
behaviour (i.e. escape or avoidance).  
 
Hofmann and Asmundson (2008) suggest that Gross’ (2002) process model of 
emotions provides a useful way to differentiate CBT and ACT’s treatments of 
emotions.  They suggest that while ACT focuses on response-focussed emotion 
regulation strategies, undermining clients’ experiential avoidance once an emotional 
response has been initiated, CBT adopts a more antecedent-focussed approach to 
emotional regulation, encouraging strategies such as the modification of situations 
and attentional focus, and reappraisals of emotional triggers before an emotional 
response is fully activated. It may, however, be overly simplistic of Hofmann and 
Asmundson to suggest that the techniques of CBT and ACT can be so neatly 
dichotomised in this way. Such a stance forgets the strong behavioural and pragmatic 
element of ACT interventions, and hence the possibility that the implementation of 
values consistent patterns of effective action may well include pro-active behaviours 
that could be termed ‘antecedent-focussed’. Conversely, it seems surprising that 
many CBT therapists would claim to be entirely antecedent focussed. CBT surely 
purports to help clients learn to cope with difficult emotions which have been 
initiated, rather than solely anticipate them so effectively, in an ‘antecedent-




1.4.5.4  Therapeutic goals:  Symptom reduction vs. valued living 
 
While CBT has symptom reduction as one of its primary goals, ACT focuses on 
clients engaging in more valued living. ACT practitioners tend not to focus explicitly 
on symptom reduction, but rather acknowledge it as a possible bi-product of relating 
to their experiences more flexibly and increasingly engaging in valued living (Harris, 
2009). Arch and Craske (2008) provide a discussion of this difference in therapeutic 
goals between the two approaches, and suggest the apparent dichotomy may not be 
so clear. While ACT targets valued living very explicitly, clients may also move 
towards valued living through CBT techniques such as exposure and behavioural 
activation. Behavioural activation may often involve taking committed action toward 
living in valued directions. Conversely in ACT, pursuit of valued living may lead to 
behavioural exposures and hence to reduction in symptoms.  
 
Arch and Craske (2008) speculate that there may be two pathways through which 
symptom reduction and valued living may mediate outcomes in therapy. Firstly, 
symptom reduction and control may mediate increases in values congruent activity, 
and secondly, values congruent activity may increase perceptions of control and 
diminish symptoms through exposure. If such pathways are indeed in operation, 
future research could possibly elucidate whether they are differentially active in ACT 
and CBT (Arch & Craske, 2008). 
 
1.4.5.6 Summary of ACT vs. CBT debate 
 
While there are a number of apparent dichotomies between CBT and ACT, a more 
thorough analysis suggests that there is, of course, overlap at the level of both theory 
and therapeutic technique between the two approaches (Arch & Craske, 2008). In 
light of the similarities between different psychotherapies (Wampold, 2007; as cited 
in DiGiuseppe, 2008), this is somewhat unsurprising. Hayes (2008) acknowledges 
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that there are areas of overlap between ACT and not only CBT, but also humanistic, 
existential, and analytic traditions as well. 
 
On reviewing the dialogue between ACT and CBT, it is striking that proponents of 
CBT repeatedly use observations of theoretical overlap to make statements intended 
to subsume ACT under the CBT moniker. For example, Hofmann and Asmundson 
(2008) state that ‘Acceptance strategies intended to counteract suppression 
(experiential avoidance) are simply another tool in the arsenal of the CBT therapist to 
combat emotional disorders. Although acceptance strategies are not routinely used in 
CBT, they are certainly compatible with the CBT model and have almost certainly 
been employed by experienced therapists in certain cases.’ (p.13) In opposition to 
this, it should be borne in mind that mediational analyses (e.g. Zettle et al., 2011) of 
CBT and ACT do appear to give preliminary support for the mechanisms of action 
being different between the two approaches, and ACT being effective due to the 
mechanisms it proposes. While Longmore and Worrell’s (2007) critique of CBT 
mediation studies was perhaps somewhat overstated, it does appear that the evidence 
base for the mediating effect of ACT constructs may be more compelling than that 
for CBT, despite the therapy’s comparatively recent evolution. 
 
CBT proponents appear to be shifting the underlying theory of their approach in 
directions more consistent with ‘third wave’ approaches, such as Arch and Craske 
(2008) changing the definition of exposure to one based on increasing ‘emotional 
tolerance’. Hayes (2008) argues that CBT’s attempts to incorporate ACT theory and 
practice are illustrative of the paradigm’s loose theoretical underpinning. Hayes goes 
as far as to argue that in opposing the development of ACT as a therapeutic 
approach, CBT has come to behave more as a ‘tribe’ than a theory. Influential CBT 
researchers’ (e.g. Hofmann, 2008; Leahy, 2008) attempts to argue that CBT already 
does all that ACT does, or that it can readily incorporate ACT techniques without 
any inconsistency in underlying theory, do not appear particularly credible, and give 
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the impression of unconditionally defending the dominant paradigm (Moran, 2008), 
while introducing further confusion over what CBT actually is (Hayes, 2008).  
 
Perhaps in an effort to defuse some of the tension between CBT and ACT, Hayes et 
al. (2011) have recently suggested that the term ‘third wave’ should perhaps be 
abandoned, as the implication of their superseding CBT has created conflict and 
tension. The authors suggest that the therapies previously referred to as ‘third wave’ 
should instead be termed ‘contextual CBT’, describing itself as ‘a distinguishable 
and emerging strand of thinking within CBT that has produced emerging consensus 
regarding the key variables in psychopathology and psychotherapeutic change.’ 
(p.162)  
 
Further research is undoubtedly necessary to further elucidate the mechanisms of 
change in each therapy, whether they target the same or different paths to 
psychopathology (DiGiuseppe, 2008), and shed light on the primary question: under 
what circumstances should therapy focus on the form of thought and emotion, or on 
how individuals relate to their experiences?  
 
1.4.6   The evidence base for ACT 
 
1.4.6.1  Summary of meta-analyses and reviews of ACT  
 
The following discussion of ACT outcomes will focus on the small number of 
reviews and meta-analyses of ACT outcome studies which have been carried out 
(Hayes et al., 2006; Ost, 2008; Powers et al., 2009; Ruiz, 2010). 
 
Hayes et al. (2006) carried out a review of 21 RCTs, which varied greatly in the 
target problems they addressed. By targeting the most clinically relevant outcome 
variables for analysis, and weighting the average effect sizes by the number of 
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participants who produce that effect, the authors found that ACT produced moderate 
between condition effect sizes (Cohen’s d), of 0.66 at post (N = 704) and follow-up 
(N = 519). The studies varied in what comparison/control condition was used. 
Further analysis showed that when ACT was compared to waiting list, placebo, or 
general treatment as usual (TAU) it was found to be superior with effect sizes of d = 
0.99 post treatment and d = 0.71 at follow-up, and ACT’s performance was also 
superior in comparison to structured interventions designed to impact the problem, 
with effect sizes of d = 0.48 post-treatment, and d = 0.63 at follow-up. In their 
analysis of the small number of articles directly comparing ACT with traditional CT 
or CBT, the authors found between condition effect sizes of d = 0.73 at post and  
d = 0.83 at follow-up in favour of ACT. While acknowledging that larger scale 
studies were necessary, Hayes et al. (2006) concluded that ACT may have superior 
outcomes to CBT. While the conclusions of this meta-analysis were highly positive 
regarding ACT’s effectiveness, it was conducted by the founder of ACT, Steven 
Hayes, and his colleagues, so therapy allegiance effects may be operating. 
 
A more critical analysis was later carried out by Ost (2008). Thirteen ACT RCTs met 
Ost’s inclusion criteria for analysis. In addition to meta-analytically assessing their 
efficacy, studies’ methodologies were also reviewed. Methodological quality was 
rated on a 22-item scale, based on one used previously by Tolin (1999; as cited in 
Ost, 2008). As well as rating each ACT study on this scale, Ost took the unusual step 
(Guadino, 2009) of matching each ACT study with a “twin” CBT study published in 
the same journal of the same year, so the CBT studies could also be rated and 
compared with their ACT counterparts. If no such appropriate twin study existed, a 
comparison study was selected from one of three major outlets for CBT research 
(Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, Behavior Therapy, or Behaviour 
Research and Therapy).  
 
In terms of effect sizes, Ost’s results were similar to those of Hayes et al. (2006). 
Overall, Ost found ACT to yield a mean effect size of d = 0.68 (compared to Hayes 
et al.’s d  =  0.66). More detailed analysis showed effect sizes of: d = 0.96 versus no 
treatment control condition, d = 0.79 versus treatment as usual, and d = 0.53 versus 
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active treatments, all in favour of ACT. On the methodology rating scale, however, 
ACT studies were found to have ‘significantly lower means than CBT-studies on the 
following items: Representativeness of the sample, Reliability of the diagnosis, 
Reliability and validity of outcome measures, Assignment to treatments, Number of 
therapists, Therapist training/experience, Checks for treatment adherence, and 
Control of concomitant treatments.’ (Ost, 2009, p.1) Primarily on the basis of the 
studies’ methodological weaknesses, Ost concluded that ACT did not meet criteria to 
qualify as an empirically supported treatment (EST; Chambless et al., 1998). Ost 
made numerous recommendations on how the methodologies of ACT studies could 
be improved in future, along with suggesting that an appropriate focus for future 
research would be to compare ACT directly with CBT for the most common 
psychiatric disorders (i.e. anxiety disorders, depression, eating disorders). 
 
Guadiano (2009) responded to Ost’s meta-analysis by arguing that comparing ACT 
and CBT studies was akin to comparing ‘apples and oranges’. Guadiano argued that 
ACT is at a far earlier stage of development compared to CBT, so studies are smaller 
scale and less funded, so cannot yet employ the same rigorous designs as CBT 
studies. He also pointed out that the ACT studies covered a diverse range of 
presenting problems (including psychosis, addiction, and personality disorder) while, 
the CBT ‘twin’ studies were limited to depression and anxiety disorders. The 
populations targeted in these ACT interventions are often more treatment resistant, 
and study designs are selected to be practicable in whatever context the research is 
taking place, so comparisons with selected CBT studies are perhaps unfair. Guadiano 
analysed the grant funding received by the ACT and CBT studies included in Ost’s 
analysis, and concluded that there were statistically significant (Z = 2.64, p = 0.008) 
differences between them, with ACT studies receiving an average of $111,428 each, 
and CBT studies receiving $495,242. Guadiano argued that differences in the stage 
of development of the therapies, research aims, and quantity of grant funding, could 




In reply to Guadiano, Ost (2009) argued that ACT’s being at an earlier stage of 
development as a therapy may not necessarily account for the use of less rigorous or 
sophisticated study designs, and that researchers should still aspire to using the most 
advanced techniques for evaluating outcome research that CBT has developed over 
the past decades, irrespective of the disorder being studied. He also argued that 
differences in research grant funding can only really be argued to be responsible for 
perhaps two methodological variables (‘reliability of diagnosis’ and ‘checks for 
treatment adherence’) where ACT scored lower than CBT, while the remaining six 
variables (such as the use of well validated measures) should be relatively 
independent of grant funding. On balance, while Ost rightly highlights some 
methodological areas where ACT research could be improved, his technique of 
‘matching’ ACT and CBT studies may be somewhat overly simplistic, as it fails to 
consider the wider context in which the research was carried out, and the reasons 
why a given methodology may have been selected.  
 
Powers et al. (2009) carried out a meta-analysis of the ACT literature, including five 
additional studies to the review by Ost (2008). Powers found ACT to be superior to 
waiting list and psychological placebos (Hedge’s g = 0.68), to TAU (g = 0.42), but 
not to be more effective than established treatments (g = 0.18). The finding that ACT 
was not superior to established treatments was somewhat contrary to the findings of 
Hayes et al. (2006) and Ost (2008). The authors explain this difference in findings 
not only due to the inclusion of more studies, but also due to a few differences in 
opinion about whether certain treatment conditions are appropriately classified as 
psychological placebo, TAU, or established treatment. They also state, however, that 
changing the grouping of these debatable studies did not change their eventual result. 
Powers et al. (2009) did not view the lack of any superiority over established 
treatments as a relative weakness, as this is quite commonly the finding when 
comparing treatments, or psychotherapies (e.g. Powers et al., 2008). The authors 
note, like Ost (2008), that the results of many ACT studies are difficult to interpret 
due to the comparison group being TAU. When there is no waiting list control or 
psychological placebo included, it is impossible to assess the efficacy of the TAU 
condition, and hence the comparison of ACT versus TAU becomes difficult to 
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interpret. Powers et al. (2009) recommend the inclusion of waiting list and /or 
psychological placebos as controls in future trials, and that ACT should be compared 
with ESTs in treating specific DSM-IV disorders. The authors appear to give an 
impartial and essentially positive review of the ACT literature. 
 
Levin and Hayes (2009) carried out a reanalysis of Powers et al.’s (2009) data, 
having been provided access to their entire database. They describe in a brief ‘letter 
to the editor’ how they corrected minor numerical errors and missing data for 3 
studies, and reclassified secondary or process variables as primary outcomes, and 
visa versa, as they saw appropriate for 11 studies. They also moved a study from 
TAU to active treatments, as they saw appropriate (viewing nicotine replacement 
patches and bupropion as an established treatment for smoking cessation, rather than 
TAU). Following these changes, they found ACT to be significantly superior to 
established treatments (g = 0.27; p = 0.03). Powers and Emmelkamp (2009) 
responded to Levin by stating that they stood by their decision to classify a nicotine 
‘patch’ as TAU, as they did not view it as comparable with other more active 
established treatments included in the analysis such as CBT, CT, systematic 
desensitisation, or twelve-step facilitation. Thus, they defended their original 
conclusion. It is difficult to discern the ‘winner’ of this debate. The arguments were 
stated very briefly in letters to the editor, which are not subjected to peer review, and 
the judgements under debate are ultimately subjective. On balance however, it is 
perhaps somewhat ambitious of ACT to purport to be ‘superior’ to CBT, the most 
well evidenced psychological treatment in history, while simultaneously 
acknowledging itself to be at an early stage of development. 
 
Finally, the most recent review of ACT literature was carried out by Ruiz (2010). 
Ruiz did not carry out a meta-analysis, but did conclude on the basis of those carried 
out (Hayes et al., 2006; Ost, 2008; Powers et al., 2009) that while ACT is established 
as being superior to control and TAU comparisons, further research is necessary to 
establish whether ACT is superior to established treatments, and that various 
methodological improvements should be made in comparison to many studies 
conducted thus far. Ruiz’s review reads as being quite overtly ‘pro ACT’. He notes 
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that the ACT research is impressively coherent, in that theoretical underpinnings of 
ACT are consistently supported by experimental and correlational studies, and are in 
turn mirrored by process analysis in outcome studies. Ruiz concludes that ‘In 
summary, ACT fundamental tenets seem to have a strong support in view of the 
correlational, the experimental psychopathology, and the outcome evidence.’ (p.148)  
 




Chronic pain is the health condition in which ACT has been most extensively 
researched to date. An ACT conceptualisation of chronic pain sees problems as 
arising for individuals when they engage in activities which produce short term relief 
from physical or psychological pain (such as remaining relatively inactive), but 
which prevent engagement in valued living in the longer term. With time, clients’ 
strategy of avoiding difficult psychological events produces a narrow and inflexible 
pattern of action, or psychological inflexibility (Wicksell, Renofalt et al., 2008). 
ACT for chronic pain differs from other established treatments in that it does not 
primarily aim to reduce pain intensity, but rather aims to reduce the distressing and 
disabling influences of pain on valued living (McCracken et al., 2005). 
 
While CBT is established as an effective treatment for chronic pain (e.g. Morley et 
al., 1999), McCracken et al. (2005) suggest that it has become something of a 
‘compound phrase for a broad array of approaches’, so it is difficult to carry out a 
detailed analysis of treatment elements, or the direction of therapeutic action. The 
research reviewed in this section will demonstrate that ACT shows promising results 
in terms of treatment outcome, and has begun to elucidate behavioural processes that 
may be involved in successful treatment. 
 
McCracken et al. (2005) reported the results of an ACT group intervention for 
chronic pain sufferers (N = 108), carried out in a three or four week long residential 
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or hospital based setting. It is worth noting that the participants in this study had 
severe and long standing problems with pain, and had typically not significantly 
benefited from previous interventions. Post intervention, improvements were found 
in emotional, social, and physical functioning, along with reduced use of healthcare 
resources. At three-month follow-up a majority of improvements were maintained. 
Furthermore, improvements in most outcomes tended to correlate with increases in 
‘acceptance’, as measured with the Chronic Pain Acceptance Questionnaire (CPAQ;  
McCracken et al., 2004), suggesting that mechanisms of treatment proposed by ACT 
may have been active in treatment. This study had various limitations. Not least, 
there was no active comparison condition, so each patient’s wait prior to 
commencing treatment acted as their comparison. 
 
A small RCT comparing an ACT intervention with medical treatment as usual 
(MTAU) was conducted by Dahl et al. (2004), for participants at a high risk of long-
term disability and sick leave due to stress and pain symptoms. Participants in the 
ACT condition (n = 11) received MTAU plus four one-hour weekly sessions of 
ACT, while those in the MTAU condition (N = 8) simply received medical 
consultations as required. Post intervention and at six-month follow-up, the ACT 
condition showed significantly fewer sick days, and tended to use fewer medical 
treatment resources relative to the comparison condition, while not showing any 
significant differences in levels of pain, stress or QoL. This finding is perfectly 
consistent with the expectations of an ACT intervention, whereby the symptoms 
themselves need not be altered to facilitate behaviour change. Limitations to this 
research included: a small and relatively specific sample (consisting mainly of 
females), the lack of an active or placebo comparison condition, and the absence of 
any ACT process measures, or means to monitor therapist adherence to the specified 
treatment. 
 
Results from experimental studies have also given support to the valuable role 
acceptance can play in living with pain. For example, Gutierrez et al. (2004) 
compared the ability of healthy participants to tolerate experimentally induced pain 
in a laboratory setting when given either: an acceptance based protocol (ACT), the 
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goal of which was to disconnect pain related thoughts and feelings from literal 
actions, or a control-based protocol (CONT) that focussed on changing or controlling 
pain-related thoughts and feelings’ (p.1). While the control-based protocol produced 
greater reductions in a self-report measure of pain, participants in the ACT group 
tended to demonstrate greater pain tolerance and lower believability of the pain, so 
were willing to persevere with the task for longer. The results of this, and other such 
experimental studies, are impressively coherent with the theory underlying ACT, and 
with the results in terms of process variables during outcome studies. 
 
While the evidence base for the effectiveness of ACT for chronic pain appears 
promising for its stage of development, along with evidence for the importance of 
acceptance as an important process variable, there is obviously a need for larger scale 
RCTs, with multiple comparison conditions (including traditional CBT as a treatment 
with proven efficacy). One recent RCT did directly compare the effects of group 
ACT and CBT interventions in a chronic pain population (Wetherell et al., 2011). 
Participants in the ACT condition demonstrated improvements in regard to pain 
interference, symptoms of depression, and pain related anxiety. Outcome measures 
did not show any significant differences between the ACT and CBT conditions, 
though participants in the ACT condition reported significantly higher levels of 
satisfaction with their intervention. 
 
It will be highly informative to continue research into the processes at work in both 
CBT and ACT. The need for such research is highlighted by the apparent 
contradiction in the literature at present, whereby evidence suggests strategies aimed 
at controlling pain can be unhelpful (e.g. McCracken et al., 2007), while CBT for 
chronic pain, which apparently advocates such strategies, has proven efficacy (e.g. 
Morley et al., 1999). One study design which could investigate this apparent paradox 
would be a RCT with the following three conditions: BA alone, BA plus CT, and full 
ACT. Such a design could elucidate the extent to which ACT and CBT are 






A study by Gregg et al. (2007) compared a one-day diabetes management workshop, 
providing education alone, with a condition which had an additional ACT element 
aimed towards using acceptance and mindfulness skills to improve coping with 
difficult thoughts and feelings in relation to diabetes. Both conditions were delivered 
in a single three-hour session. At three-month follow-up participants in the ACT 
condition were more likely to employ ACT consistent coping strategies, and reported 
improved diabetes related self-care. ACT participants’ glycated haemoglobin levels 
were also more likely to be in the target range. Mediational analysis showed that 
diabetes related acceptance (as measured with a version of the AAQ adapted 
specifically for this study) mediated the impact of treatment on glycemic control. The 
authors noted that an ACT approach may be well suited to this population, as 
engaging in self management behaviours (e.g. dietary control) may be likely to evoke 
distressing thoughts and feelings regarding their condition, which cannot be 
eliminated or suppressed. There were weaknesses to this study, including: the lack of 
any monitoring of adherence to treatment manuals, the delivery of the ACT 
intervention by a single clinician making therapist effects a possible confound, a 
relatively narrow range of self-management behaviours being assessed, and the use 




Two RCTs (Lundgren et al., 2006; Lundgren et al., 2008) investigated the impact of 
ACT for drug refractory epilepsy. The first study (Lundgren et al., 2006) compared 
the efficacy of nine group sessions of ACT and some behavioural seizure control 
technology, with a supportive therapy condition (designed to provide an equal 
amount of therapist attention while giving no active advice). Results showed that the 
ACT condition had significant effects on seizure frequency and duration, and QoL as 
compared to the comparison condition. One limitation of the study was that since the 
ACT condition also contained some seizure behaviour management techniques, it is 
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difficult to discern which elements of treatment were responsible for outcomes. It 
would have been preferable to have had seizure behaviour management techniques 
alone as an additional comparison condition, however, seizure frequency reduced 
before the delivery of the behavioural intervention, but after the beginning of the 
ACT intervention. A further RCT (Lundgren et al., 2008) compared an ACT 
intervention (again with some additional seizure behaviour management techniques) 
with a yoga comparison. While both groups demonstrated increased QoL and 
reduced seizure frequency over time, ACT was found to reduce seizure frequency 
more than yoga. In this study, the ACT and yoga conditions had many treatment 
elements in common, including: mindfulness training, acceptance of private events, 
discussion of losses and taking action towards valued life directions, and the 
involvement of significant others in treatment. With both interventions being 
relatively broad in their scope, it is again difficult to know what the active elements 
of treatment were. The inclusion of process measures (such as the AAQ) would have 
been helpful to this end. The results of these studies do give preliminary support, 
however, for ACT being effective in reducing seizure frequency and increasing QoL 




Gifford et al. (2004) investigated an ACT intervention for smoking cessation. The 
study compared an ACT intervention, which consisted of seven 50-minute individual 
sessions plus seven 90-minute group sessions (participants attending both sessions 
weekly for seven consecutive weeks), with Nicotine Replacement Therapy (NRT). 
While there were no differences between the groups post intervention, the ACT 
group showed better smoking outcomes at one year follow-up. While the differences 
between groups did not reach statistical significance in this relatively small sample 
(N = 76), at follow-up the participants who had experienced the ACT intervention 
were more than twice as likely to have stopped smoking compared to the NRT 
participants. Improvements in the ACT group were found to be mediated by 
improvements in acceptance related skills. While the results give preliminary support 
for the utility of ACT in smoking cessation, and for the authors’ hypothesis that 
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smoking may be maintained by experiential avoidance (as smoking can alleviate 
certain aversive internal states), it requires replication in a larger sample. The ACT 
intervention also appeared relatively labour intensive in terms of clinician time, with 
participants receiving quite extensive input in comparison with the NRT group. 
Future research could benefit from the inclusion of an attention placebo condition, 




Lillis et al. (2009) conducted a study investigating the effectiveness of ACT in 
improving the lives of obese individuals. The intervention did not target weight 
explicitly, but focussed on weight related stigmatising thoughts and distress, along 
with clarification of life values and fostering of behavioural commitments related to 
life values. The intervention was delivered in a one day six-hour workshop to 43 
individuals with at least six months experience of weight loss programs. The ACT 
condition was compared with a waiting list control. At three-month follow-up the 
ACT participants showed larger reductions in weight related stigma (as indicated by 
a measure developed specifically for this study), body mass, and higher perceived 
QoL. There were, however, no measures in place to monitor treatment adherence in 
this study, and three-month follow up is a relatively short time period in the context 




Only one published study to date has applied ACT with a MS population. Sheppard 
et al. (2010) investigated the effectiveness of a five hour ACT workshop focussed on 
teaching mindful acceptance, cognitive defusion, and value-guided action strategies 
to a group of individuals with MS (N = 15). Self report measures were completed pre 
intervention, and again at three-month follow-up. Measures focussed on: MS related 
symptomatology and impairment, emotional functioning, fatigue, and ACT process 
domains. The ACT process measures comprised the White Bear Suppression 
 62 
Inventory (Wegner et al., 1987), a measure of individuals’ tendency to suppress 
unwanted or aversive thoughts, and the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; 
Brown et al., 2003). The results showed significant improvements in the domains of 
depression, extent of thought suppression, impact of pain on behaviour, and QoL. 
There were no significant changes in physical symptoms or mindfulness. The authors 
observed that the intervention was, of course, not designed or expected to improve 
physical symptoms of MS, but nonetheless appeared to impact positively upon mood 
and overall QoL. While it was expected that scores on the MAAS would improve, 
the authors suggest that perhaps three-month follow-up was too short a time period 
for this skill to be learned, as mindfulness does require quite extensive practice. 
 
Sheppard et al. (2010) remarked that while more traditional CBT interventions in MS 
tend to have quite a specific focus (i.e. depression or fatigue), ACT has a very broad 
focus (targeting the functional underpinnings of multiple psychological problems), 
and thus may be suited to addressing the diverse challenges faced by PwMS. While 
this preliminary result suggests ACT merits further investigation in a MS population, 
there were various limitations to this study. Not least, this study had no control 
group, which would be an obvious inclusion in future research in larger samples. 
Also, the process measures were not completed mid-treatment, which is 
recommended when attempting to gather evidence for possible mediation. In the 
absence of a control group, some of the results may be attributable to demand 
characteristics of the research, although the authors suggest that the differential 
pattern of performance between different measures run counter to this possibility. 
 
One published study (Grossman et al., 2010) has investigated the effectiveness of 
Mindfulness training in a MS population. Grossman et al. (2010) compared a 
mindfulness intervention (N = 76) with TAU (N = 74) for PwMS. Those in the 
intervention group received eight weekly 2.5 hour group mindfulness classes, and 
one additional 7 hour session at week six. Participants were encouraged to carry out 
40 minutes daily mindfulness practice as homework. Those in the treatment as usual 
group simply received one neurology appointment pre-intervention, one at six-month 
follow-up, with additional appointments as required. Primary outcomes included 
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disease-specific and non disease-specific health related QoL, depression, and fatigue. 
Employing an intention-to-treat analysis, the results showed that non-physical 
primary outcome measures improved significantly more in the mindfulness group 
compared to TAU, with effect sizes (Cohen’s d) ranging from 0.4 to 0.9 post-
treatment and 0.3 to 0.5 at six-month follow-up. The authors suggest that their results 
show the effectiveness of mindfulness interventions for improving health related 
QoL in a MS population. In the absence of an attention placebo or any other more 
active treatment control condition, however, it remains possible that the benefits 
demonstrated may be partly attributable to social contact and support, or placebo 
effects. 
 
Grossman et al. (2010) also remarked how, in contrast to some CBT interventions for 
PwMS, mindfulness interventions have a potentially broad focus and impact, so may 
be particularly appropriate to be applied to the varied challenges faced by PwMS. 
This echoes the conclusions of Sheppard et al. (2010) regarding the potential 
appropriateness of ACT interventions for PwMS.  
 
1.4.7  The possible addition of ACT concepts to models of adjustment 
to Multiple Sclerosis 
 
Current models of adjustment to MS, such as that proposed by Dennison et al. (2009; 
see Figure 3), emphasise the importance of the beliefs that individuals form in 
relation to their health condition, the way they appraise their difficulties, and the 
coping strategies they employ. There has been an emphasis on the content of thought, 
which has guided to development of CBT interventions. 
 
While ‘acceptance’ has been investigated in a MS population (Harrison et al., 2004; 
Stuifbergen et al., 2008), the definitions of ‘acceptance’ in these studies have been 
based on changes in the content of thought (see section 1.3.2.2.). Thus, mainstream 
(or ‘non-ACT’) adjustment literature has not yet taken into account the possible 
relevance of ACT processes such as acceptance (defined as a ‘willingness’ to 
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experience aversive states in the course of pursuing valued living) and cognitive 
defusion. 
 
It is possible that ACT processes are significant mediators of adjustment which have 
not yet been investigated in this population. Dennison et al. (2009) suggest that ACT 
interventions may be particularly appropriate for PwMS since they do not involve 
challenging of thoughts about illness and symptoms; such thoughts may be accurate 
for PwMS, rendering CBT style verbal reattribution less appropriate. ACT 
techniques may be helpful in enabling PwMS to cope with unchangeable aspects of 
life that may be beyond personal control. 
 
1.5 Current research 
 
 
In influential models of adjustment to chronic health conditions, such as the SCM 
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) and the CSM (Leventhal et al., 1984), psychological 
processes, including appraisals of symptoms, are conceptualised as mediating the 
relationship between the experience of symptoms of illness and subsequent 
psychological adjustment. Consistent with these models, some appraisals of illness 
have been demonstrated to be significant variables in the process of psychological 
adjustment to MS (Dennison et al., 2010). The modification of unhelpful illness 
appraisals can, therefore, be one of the focuses for CBT interventions, the most 
popular form of psychological intervention applied in a MS population (Dennison et 
al., 2010). 
 
ACT offers an alternative perspective on adjustment to chronic health conditions. 
ACT proponents (e.g. Hayes et al., 2006) suggest that the way in which individuals 
relate to their internal experiences (such as their willingness to experience aversive 
states, and their level of ‘fusion’ with unwanted thoughts) in the course of pursuing 
valued living may be highly significant to the process of adjustment to chronic health 
conditions. Given this, it is possible that ACT processes (i.e. ‘acceptance’ and 
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‘cognitive fusion’) may also be important, with regard to the process of 
psychological adjustment to MS, in comparison to the content of illness appraisals. 
ACT processes have been found to be related to adjustment outcomes in individuals 
suffering from some chronic health conditions, and interventions targeting these 
processes show preliminary evidence for being effective (Ruiz, 2010). ACT 
interventions tend to focus on enabling individuals to relate differently to their 
experiences, as opposed to attempting to change their form or content, as can 
sometimes be the case in CBT. 
 
The relevance of ACT processes has not, however, been extensively researched or 
investigated in a MS population. If ACT processes were found to be significant 
variables in the process of adjustment to MS, this would potentially offer support for 
an alternative perspective on the process of adjustment to MS in comparison to 
existing models. Specifically, it is possible that the manner in which PwMS relate to 
unwanted experiences (i.e. symptoms of MS, thoughts relating to their illness, and 
negative affect) while engaging in valued activity may account for variance in 
adjustment outcomes which is independent of the actual content of illness appraisals. 
Such a finding could provide support for the possibility of ACT interventions 
meriting further investigation in a MS population. This study was, therefore, 
considered to be a useful step in investigating whether ACT processes appear to be 
significant variables in the process of adjustment to MS, when compared in the same 
analytic model with relevant illness appraisals. This is the first study to directly 
address this question. This study was considered helpful in ascertaining whether 
ACT can offer any new or alternate perspective on adjustment to MS, which could 
inform the development of appropriate interventions in this population. Such 
development is necessary to broaden the range of interventions available to this 
population. 
 
As psychological processes are conceptualised as mediating the relationship between 
the experience of symptoms of illness and subsequent psychological adjustment 
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Leventhal et al., 1984), it was considered appropriate to 
use multiple mediation analysis as a means to directly compare the extent to which 
 66 
illness appraisals and ACT processes serve as mediating variables. The approach to 
multiple mediation analysis developed by Preacher and Hayes (2008) was chosen as 
a robust technique for determining whether different psychological variables 
significantly mediate the relationship between symptoms of MS and psychological 
outcomes, while also providing a direct comparison of the relative size of the effect 
mediated by each variable. This approach is suited to comparing competing 
mediation hypotheses (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). In the current research, this method 
of analysis was suited to compare hypotheses regarding the relationship between 
symptoms of MS and adjustment outcomes being mediated by either illness 
appraisals or by ACT processes. A cross sectional design, using standardised self-
report measures (where possible) was chosen as a viable method of gathering data 
necessary for multiple mediation analysis. Questionnaires were selected to measure: 
MS symptom severity, illness appraisals, ACT processes, psychological distress, and 
satisfaction with life. This allowed the relationships between these variables to be 
explored as described above. 
 
In summary, the rationale for the current study is as follows: 
 
1. Previous research has suggested that appraisals significantly mediate the 
relationship between symptoms of illness and important outcomes such as 
distress and quality of life, both in people with chronic health problems in 
general and among PwMS specifically. 
2. Previous research has also suggested that ACT processes significantly mediate 
the relationship between symptoms of illness and outcomes such as distress and 
quality of life in people with chronic health conditions such as pain, though this 
has not been tested among PwMS. 
3. No study has yet compared the capacity of illness appraisals and ACT processes 
to mediate the relationship between physical symptoms and psychological 
outcomes in PwMS. 
4. The multiple mediation technique outlined by Preacher & Hayes (2008) allows 
such multiple mediation modelling. 
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5. The results of the current research can suggest multiple pathways by which 
symptoms of illness may influence outcomes, which may provide novel targets 





The current study aims to investigate the influence of two categories of 
psychological variable: cognitive appraisals and ACT processes (acceptance and 
cognitive fusion), on the relationship between symptoms of MS and subsequent 
psychological adjustment (i.e. psychological distress and satisfaction with life). 
Multiple mediation analysis (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) was chosen as the most 
appropriate statistical method for exploring the relationships between these variables. 
Such analyses can determine whether the psychological variables mediate the impact 
of MS symptomatology on adjustment, and compare the relative sizes of the effect 
mediated by each variable. This will be the first study to investigate the relationships 
between these variables in a MS population.  
 
1.5.2  Hypotheses 
 
1) Cognitive appraisals will mediate the relationship between MS symptoms and 
symptoms of psychological distress. 
 
2) ACT processes will mediate the relationship between MS symptoms and 
symptoms of psychological distress. 
 
3) Cognitive appraisals will mediate the relationship between MS symptoms and 
satisfaction with life. 
 
4) ACT processes will mediate the relationship between MS symptoms and 
satisfaction with life. 
 
5) In comparison to cognitive appraisals, ACT processes will tend to be stronger 
mediators of the relationship between MS symptoms and outcome measures.  
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This study employed a quantitative methodology, as this was considered most 
appropriate for the aims of the research. A cross-sectional design was used, with 
participants each completing a single pack of questionnaires. 
  
2.2 Participants  
 
Participants were clients with a diagnosis of MS known to the NHS services 
participating in the research: 
 
- Fife Rehabilitation Service (FRS), NHS Fife. 
- Community Rehabilitation and Brain Injury Service (CRABIS), Livingston, 
NHS Lothian. 
- Scottish Brain Injury and Rehabilitation Service (SBIRS), Astley Ainslie 
Hospital, Edinburgh, NHS Lothian 
- MS service, Department of Clinical Neurosciences, Western General 
Hospital, Edinburgh, NHS Lothian. 
 
2.2.1  Inclusion Criteria 
 
The principle inclusion criterion was for participants to be clients (minimum age 18) 




2.2.2  Exclusion Criteria 
 
 Individuals who had other co-morbid health problems which could introduce 
heterogeneity to the sample, either physical (e.g. additional acquired brain 
injury, arthritis, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease etc.) or psychiatric 
(e.g. psychotic disorders) in nature.  
 Individuals with impairment in intellectual functioning which could 
negatively impact upon their ability to give informed consent, or understand 
and complete the questionnaires. 
 Individuals with a grasp of the English language that could make it difficult 
for them to give informed consent, or understand and complete the 
questionnaires. 
 
2.3  Measures 
 
Self-report measures were decided to be most appropriate for the current study. 
Measures were carefully selected to measure theoretically relevant constructs while 
minimising response burden, and difficulty of completion, for PwMS who may have 
some deficits in cognitive functioning. 
  
2.3.1  Multiple Sclerosis Impact Scale (MSIS-29)  
Hobart et al. (2001, 2004) 
 
The MSIS-29 (see appendix 6.1) was developed as a self-report measure of MS 
symptoms. It has 2 subscales, measuring the physical (20 items) and psychological (9 
items) symptoms of the disease. Statements pertaining to individuals’ subjective 
experience of symptoms of MS are rated on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = “not at all”,  
5 = “extremely”). Though respondents completed the whole MSIS-29, only the 
‘physical’ subscale (MSIS-physical) was used in analysis. The ‘psychological’ 
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subscale (MSIS-psychological) showed strong theoretical overlap with outcome 
measures so could have confounded results. 
 
The authors of the MSIS-29 (Hobart et al., 2001) note that the lack of well validated 
measures of MS symptomatology has led to more generic measures such as the 36-
item Short-Form Health Survey (SF-36; Ware et al., 1993) often being employed 
with PwMS. Psychometric limitations of the SF-36 in a MS population include 
significant floor and ceiling effects, and limited responsiveness (Freeman et al., 
2000).  Generic measures can also sometimes neglect areas of impact which are 
disease specific. The MSIS-29 was developed by initially generating a large number 
of items (129) from interviews with PwMS, before item reduction analysis was 
carried out. 
 
The MSIS-physical shows good variability, low floor and ceiling effects, and good 
internal consistency (α ≥ 0.91) and test-retest reliability (r ≥ 0.87). Correlations with 
other measures, including the SF-36 and the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ-12; 
Goldberg & Hillier, 1979) support the validity of the MSIS-29. Effect sizes (g = 
0.82) for the MSIS-physical demonstrate good responsiveness to changes in 
symptoms (Hobart et al., 2001). Hobart et al. (2005) provide evidence for the MSIS-
physical being the most responsive self-report measure in detecting changes in 
physical symptomatology when compared with the GHQ-12, SF-36 and the 
Functional Assessment of MS (FAMS; Cella et al., 1996). Furthermore, support for 
the reliability, validity and responsiveness of the MSIS-29 was demonstrated by 
Costelloe et al. (2007) by having PwMS complete the MSIS-29 and the Expanded 
Disability Status Scale (EDSS; Kurtzke, 1983) at baseline and four-year follow-up. 
The EDSS is the measure of MS related disability most widely used by neurologists, 
so served as the ‘anchor measure’ with which to compare the MSIS-physical. The 
MSIS-physical was found to perform well over time, and the authors concluded it is 




2.3.2  Illness Cognition Questionnaire (ICQ) 
          Evers et al. (2001) 
 
The ICQ (see appendix 6.2) was designed to assess illness related cognitions across 
different chronic diseases. The ICQ is based on literature outlined earlier (e.g. 
Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Leventhal et al., 1984) which recognises illness 
cognitions as mediating the relationship between stress and illness. The ICQ consists 
of 3 subscales, based on 3 possible types of evaluations that can be made of a long-
term stressor: ‘helplessness’ (hereon referred to as ICQ-helplessness), attributing 
aversive meaning to the disease; ‘acceptance’, diminishing the aversive meaning; and 
‘perceived benefits’ (hereon referred to as ICQ-perceived-benefits), adding a positive 
meaning to the disease (e.g. “I have learned a great deal from my illness”). 
Respondents rate the extent to which they agree with each item on a four point Likert 
scale (1 = not at all, 4 = completely). 
 
The ‘acceptance’ subscale was not utilised in the current study. An ACT consistent 
conceptualisation of acceptance was considered to be better captured by other 
measures, so the ICQ ‘acceptance’ subscale was excluded in the interest of 
minimising item burden for respondents. It would, however, have been preferable to 
include the acceptance subscale to provide a measure of an alternative 
conceptualisation of ‘acceptance’. As discussed further in section 4.3.1, including 
only one conceptualisation of acceptance does introduce some inherent bias to the 
interpretation of results. Inclusion of the ICQ ‘acceptance’ subscale would have 
afforded more scope for the significance of an ACT conceptualisation to be 
disconfirmed, and for an alternate perspective on acceptance to be explored. 
Excluding the acceptance subscale obviously changed the order in which items were 
completed by respondents. This change in response-order could have subtle impacts 
upon the manner in which items are responded to (Krosnick & Alwin, 1987) in 
comparison to how they were answered among the normative sample, but such 
differences would hopefully be relatively minor. Fortunately, Evers et al. (2001) 
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provided separate normative data for each subscale of the ICQ, which facilitates their 
potential use independently of each other. 
 
The ICQ was originally developed with a sample of patients suffering from 
rheumatoid arthritis (N = 263) and MS (N = 167). The ICQ demonstrated good 
reliability in the MS sample, with α values of .88 for ICQ-helplessness, and .85 for 
ICQ-perceived-benefits. These subscales also showed evidence of concurrent and 
predictive validity in relation to measures of physical health, psychological health, 
and coping.  As expected, helplessness cognitions appear to have a maladaptive 
function, while perceived benefits appear to have an adaptive function in the physical 
and psychological health outcomes of PwMS. 
 
2.3.3.  The Brief Illness Perceptions Questionnaire (brief-IPQ) 
  Broadbent et al. (2006) 
 
The brief-IPQ (see appendix 6.3) was developed as a short version of the IPQ-R 
(Moss-Morris et al., 2002) to rapidly assess the cognitive and emotional 
representations of illness. Like the IPQ-R, it is theoretically based on Leventhal et 
al.’s (1984) model of illness representations (see chapter 1.3.2.).  The brief-IPQ 
requires participants to use an 11-point Likert scale (with value labels varying 
between items) to rate how they experience their illness in regards to the various 
dimensions, each represented with a single item. 
 
Illness representations in MS have previously been investigated with the IPQ-R 
(Jopson & Moss-Morris, 2003), and the brief-IPQ (Dennison et al., 2010). The brief-
IPQ was used in preference to the IPQ-R in this study to minimise item burden for 
participants. Moderate to good associations exist between equivalent dimensions of 
the brief-IPQ and the IPQ-R. The brief-IPQ has shown good predictive validity 
among a sample of patients recovering from myocardial infarction (MI), with scores 
on the ‘consequences’, ‘identity’, ‘concern’, ‘understanding’ and ‘emotional 
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response’ subscales at discharge relating to mental and physical functioning at three-
month follow-up (Broadbent et al., 2006) 
 
While respondents completed the whole brief-IPQ, not all subscales of the brief-IPQ 
were included in analysis. Only the following three subscales were included: 
 
IPQ-personal-control :  “How much control do you feel you have over your 
       illness?” 
IPQ-concern                :  “How concerned are you about your illness?” 
IPQ-understanding     :  “How well do you feel you understand your illness?” 
 
‘Personal control’ and ‘understanding’ have been highlighted in previous research 
using the IPQ (Vaughan et al., 2003) and IPQ-R (Jopson & Moss-Morris, 2003)  as 
being significant constructs in predicting adjustment outcomes among PwMS. The 
‘concern’ subscale is new to the brief-IPQ (so was not included in previous research 
investigating illness representations in MS), but appears to have good face validity in 
capturing appraisals of MS symptoms as threatening and stressful. Such cognitions 
have been highlighted by Dennison et al. (2009) as being associated with adjustment 
difficulties.  
 
The other subscales of the brief-IPQ were variously disregarded from analysis for 
appearing overly confounded with symptom or outcome measures, or for having low 
face validity in terms of their relevance for PwMS. The ‘consequences’ (the degree 
to which individuals perceive their illness as affecting their life) and ‘identity’ (the 
degree to which individuals believe they experiences symptoms of their illness) 
subscales were considered to be overly confounded with the MSIS, the measure of 
MS symptomatology. The ‘emotional’ subscale (the degree to which individuals 
believe their illness affects them emotionally) was considered to be overly 
confounded with the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & 
Snaith, 1983). The ‘timeline’ subscale (the length of time individuals believe their 
illness will continue) may have relatively limited relevance for a MS population 
when represented as a single item. MS inherently continues indefinitely. The timeline 
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subscale of illness representations would perhaps have more relevance for a MS 
population when measured with multiple items by the IPQ-R, which can capture 
beliefs of the disease being cyclical in nature. Finally, the ‘treatment control’ 
subscale (the extent to which individuals believe their treatment can ‘help’ their 
disease) has not been found to be strongly related to outcome measures in previous 
illness representation research (e.g. Jopson & Moss-Morris, 2003; Vaughan et al., 
2003). The influence of beliefs regarding ‘treatment control’ may also be partly 
captured by the ‘personal control’ subscale. The brief IPQ ‘personal control’ 
subscale actually correlates slightly more strongly with the ‘treatment control’ 
subscale of the IPQ-R (r = .34), compared to the correlation of the brief IPQ 
‘treatment control’ subscale with its IPQ-R counterpart (r = .32). 
 
Of course, illness representation research does typically include analysis of all 
subscales of the measure employed, so all elements of Leventhal et al.’s (1984) 
original model can be investigated. In the context of the current research aims, 
however, it was considered appropriate to select a small number of illness 
representations that have been demonstrated to be particularly relevant by previous 
research, and which avoid problems of confounding with other measures employed. 
When considered alongside the ICQ-helplessness and ICQ-perceived-benefits, the 
IPQ-personal-control, IPQ-concern, and IPQ-understanding subscales were 
considered to contribute appropriately to a wide and highly relevant selection of 
illness related appraisals. 
 
2.3.4.  The Acceptance and Action Questionnaire- II (AAQ-II)  
Bond et al. (in press) 
 
The AAQ-II (Bond et al., in press) is a revised version of the original Acceptance 
and Action Questionnaire (AAQ; Hayes, Strosahl, Wilson et al., 2004), developed to 
overcome psychometric shortcomings of the original version. The AAQ had been 
demonstrated to yield low alpha values for internal consistency, a problem thought to 




The AAQ-II is a unidimensional measure which assesses the construct of 
psychological inflexibility. Psychological inflexibility involves an individual being 
unwilling to experience aversive internal states in the interest of pursuing valued 
goals, so their behaviour becomes more focussed on altering the form and/or 
frequency of these internal events (Hayes et al., 1999). Respondents rate items in 
terms of their truth on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = never true, 7 = always true). 
 
While the AAQ-II was initially intended as a ten-item scale, the authors found that a 
seven-item version demonstrated the most satisfactory psychometric properties. 
From a diverse sample of 2,816 individuals, the AAQ-II demonstrated satisfactory 
structure, reliability and validity. Results demonstrated a mean α coefficient of .84 
(range .78-.88), and 3-month (.81) and 12-month (.79) test-retest reliability. The 
AAQ-II also shows expected relationships with constructs to which it is theoretically 
tied, including symptoms of depression, anxiety, and stress.  
 
Participants’ scores on the AAQ-II were not included in mediational analysis, but 
were used to calculate a Spearman correlation coefficient with the Multiple Sclerosis 
Acceptance Questionnaire (MSAQ; described in section 2.3.6.).
1
 The AAQ-II was 
not included in mediational analysis, primarily because an illness specific measure of 
acceptance was thought to be more appropriate for the current study. The AAQ-II 
can be seen in appendix 6.4. 
 
2.3.5  The Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire (CFQ) 
Gillanders et al. (2010) 
 
The CFQ (see appendix 6.5) is a 13-item self-report measure of cognitive fusion. 
Respondents rate items in terms of their truth on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = never 
                                                 
1
 The AAQ-II showed a strong correlations (rs = -.59, n = 125, p < .001) with the MSAQ, and the 
Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire (CFQ; rs = .74, n = 129, p <.001). Relatively strong covariance, 
evidenced by the high correlations, with the MSAQ and the CFQ was also contra-indicative of its 
inclusion in mediational analyses (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). 
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true, 7 = always true). The CFQ is based on a broad definition of fusion, focussing 
not only on the believability of thoughts, but also including items targeting: literality, 
entanglement, struggle, engagement and entanglement with thoughts, and taking 
action as opposed to thinking. 
 
Across four separate community based samples (total N = 1072) the CFQ has 
demonstrated good reliability (α = .86), and has also shown good one-month test-
retest reliability (r = .82, p < .001, N = 74). The CFQ has a theoretically coherent 
single factor structure, and correlates in expected directions with related constructs, 
including: experiential avoidance, distress, symptoms of depression, mindfulness, 
and satisfaction with life. Additionally, the CFQ has shown preliminary evidence of 
good reliability among clinical samples (N = 169, α = .87), and can distinguish 
individuals suffering high levels of psychological distress from healthy controls. 
 
High correlations (approximately r = .8) have been found between the CFQ and the 
AAQ-II, supporting the notion that psychological inflexibility (as measured by the 
AAQ-II) and cognitive fusion are highly related constructs. Gillanders et al. (2010) 
note that while the AAQ-II measures psychological inflexibility across different 
domains (i.e. cognition, emotion, memories and behaviours), the CFQ focuses more 
exclusively on the cognitive domain. 
 
2.3.6   The Multiple Sclerosis Acceptance Questionnaire (MSAQ) 
 
The MSAQ is a measure adapted from the CPAQ (McCracken et al., 2004) 
especially for this study. 
 
2.3.6.1 Rational for the adaptation of a MS specific measure 
 
The measures of appraisals (the ICQ and brief-IPQ subscales) relate directly to the 
experience of illness. In carrying out a comparison of the importance of cognitive 
appraisals to ACT processes, it would be a loaded comparison if the measures of 
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appraisals were specific to illness, while all measures of ACT processes were more 
generic. McCracken and Zhao-O’Brien (2010) have demonstrated that general 
acceptance (as measured with the AAQ-II) and illness-specific acceptance are 
overlapping but independent constructs, at least in relation to chronic pain. For these 
reasons, the adaptation of a MS specific measure of acceptance was deemed 
necessary to effectively test the hypotheses of the current research. 
 
2.3.6.2 Rationale for use of the CPAQ as a template for adapted 
measure 
 
The CPAQ was originally developed by Geiser (1992; as cited by McCracken et al., 
2004), but has subsequently been refined by McCracken (1999) and colleagues 
(McCracken et al., 2004). McCracken et al.’s (2004) refinements produced a 20-item 
measure, consisting of two subscales: activity engagement, and pain willingness. 
Activities engagement involves the pursuit of valued life activities while pain is 
being experienced, and pain willingness relates to recognition that attempts to avoid 
or control pain are often ineffective. The measure has good internal consistency, 
demonstrating α values of .82 for the activity engagement subscale, and .78 for pain 
willingness. McCracken et al. (2004) found individuals who scored higher on the 
CPAQ tended to report: superior physical and work related functioning, lower levels 
of emotional distress, less use of medication and health services, and less pain. As 
previously described, the CPAQ has been used (e.g. McCracken et al., 2005; Vowles 
et al., 2009) as a measure of treatment process in ACT interventions for chronic pain, 
and has demonstrated that changes in pain related acceptance appear to be active 
elements in effective treatment.  
 
Given its sound psychometric properties, the CPAQ was chosen as an appropriate 
condition specific measure on which to base a MS specific measure. While chronic 
pain and MS are by no means identical conditions, the two dimensional factor 
structure of the CPAQ (activities engagement and willingness) provides a 
theoretically sound working definition of acceptance for application in a MS 
population. The process of adjusting to MS in an effective manner does inherently 
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involve continuing to engage in personally valued activity as much as possible. In the 
course of engagement in such activity, symptoms and limitations of the condition are 
likely to be experienced, along with potentially upsetting cognitions relating to these 
experiences. Some willingness to have such experiences without attempts to avoid or 
control them may be adaptive. Of course, MS is sometimes inherently limiting, 
giving individuals no choice regarding whether to engage in activity or not, but this 
does not preclude the possibility of acceptance being a relevant and adaptive process 
in many situations. It is, of course, equally possible for chronic pain (and symptoms 
of other chronic health conditions) to reach such levels that further activity is 
impractical or unwise. 
 
2.3.6.3 Scale Adaptation 
 
The items for the MSAQ were initially adapted from the CPAQ through consultation 
between the principal investigator, his supervisor (who is an experienced ACT 
clinician) and various Clinical Psychologists and Clinical Neuro-psychologists based 
in participating NHS services, with extensive experience of working with PwMS.  
 
While many items were appropriately adapted by substituting the word ‘pain’ for 
‘symptoms of MS’, others needed more careful modification to be appropriate and 
sensitive to the disease specific limitations of MS. For example, item 15 of the 
CPAQ, “When my pain increases, I can still take care of my responsibilities”, was 
adapted to “When my symptoms of MS increase or relapse, I can still try my best to 
do the things I most care about”, as for some individuals it would be unfair to imply 
that it may be possible to take care of one’s responsibilities despite severe symptoms. 
 
While the CPAQ uses a seven-point Likert scale for participants to rate the items on, 
with values ranging from zero to six, the MSAQ uses an identically labelled seven-
point scale, but with the numeric label ranging from one to seven (1 = “never true”, 7 
= “always true”). This change was to make the Likert scale consistent with those of 
the CFQ, AAQ-II and Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS), to save participants the 
cognitive burden of switching to another slightly different scale. 
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2.3.6.4 Pilot Work and Scale Refinement  
 
The first version of the MSAQ was issued to 4 pilot participants (see section 2.4.1). 
The participants reported finding the items of the questionnaire to be appropriate, 
acceptable, and easily comprehensible. The only criticism of item wording was of the 
initial wording of item seven (“I need to concentrate on getting rid of my symptoms 
of MS”), because it is not necessarily possible to ‘get rid’ of MS symptoms. This 
item was changed accordingly (“I need to concentrate on doing all I can to reduce the 
symptoms of MS”). A more user friendly answering format (the same as the MSIS-
29, which was developed specifically for PwMS) was also adopted to be visually 
clearer and less cognitively taxing. 
 
The final items of the MSAQ can be seen in a table in appendix 6.6, where they can 
readily be compared with the original CPAQ items. The appendix also contains the 
scoring instructions for the questionnaire. A final version of the MSAQ, as issued to 
participants, can be seen in appendix 6.7.  
 
2.3.6.5  Correlation between the MSAQ and AAQ-II 
 
As previously stated, a Spearman correlation coefficient was calculated between the 
AAQ-II and MSAQ, showing a strong correlation (rs = -.59, N = 125, p < .001). This 
provides some preliminary evidence for the validity of the MSAQ as a measure of 
‘acceptance’ as conceptualised in an ACT model. 
 
2.3.7  The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) 
  Zigmond & Snaith (1983) 
 
The HADS (appendix 6.8) was originally developed (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) for 
use in a general medical outpatient setting, but has since become very widely used in 
 81 
both clinical and research settings (Herrmann, 1997). It is a brief, 14-item, measure 
with two subscales, measuring symptoms of anxiety and depression. The two 
subscales can be summed to give a total score of psychological distress.  
 
The HADS has good psychometric properties. In a large (N = 1792) UK sample 
(Crawford et al., 2001), the anxiety and depression subscales were found to have α 
values of .82 and .77 respectively, with the total score yielding a value of .86. The 
correlation between the subscales was found to be moderate in magnitude (r = .53). 
 
Being a brief measure, the HADS has a low item burden, and is easy to complete. 
Hence, it was considered suitable for use in this study. It has been used previous 
research with PwMS, including research investigating the relationship between 
illness representations and adjustment (e.g. Spain et al., 2007; Vaughn et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, one study found that cognitive impairment in MS does not affect the 
reliability and validity of the HADS (Gold et al., 2003).  
 
The interpretation of the HADS is generally based on cut-off scores. Though there is 
no absolute single set of cut-off scores which are used (Herrmann, 1997), the scores 
recommended by the original authors for each of the subtests are: mild = 8-10, 
moderate = 11-15, and severe = 16 or above (Snaith & Zigmond, 1994). A recent 
study (Honarmand & Feinstein, 2009) validating the HADS for use with PwMS 
recommended a threshold score of eight on either of the subscales as offering optimal 
sensitivity and specificity for detecting potentially clinically significant levels of 
symptoms of anxiety or depression. Hence, a score of eight was used as the threshold 
score beyond which symptoms of anxiety or depression of respondents were reported 
to their GP.  
 
2.3.8.  The Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS) 
  Diener et al. (1985) 
 
The SWLS (appendix 6.9) is measure of global life satisfaction. It is a very brief 
measure, consisting of only 5 items, and has a single factor solution.  The authors of 
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the scale (Diener et al., 1985) demonstrated it to have good internal consistency      
(α = .87) and moderate test-retest reliability (r = .82). Respondents rate the extent to 
which they agree with the five items (e.g. “I am satisfied with my life.”) on a seven-
point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
 
The SWLS was developed from a positive psychology tradition. For the current 
study, it was thought prudent to include an outcome measure associated with well-
being in addition to the HADS, which focuses on symptoms of negative affect. The 
inclusion of a more positively oriented outcome measure is perhaps particularly 
appropriate given that ACT constructs are under investigation. From an ACT 
perspective, the importance of acceptance and cognitive defusion are only important 
insofar as they enable individuals to engage in valued living, a concept which is 
surely theoretically linked to life satisfaction. The SWLS has previously been used as 
an outcome measure in ACT research (e.g. Johnston et al., 2010; Lundgren et al., 
2008), and in studies investigating the process of psychological adjustment to MS 
(e.g. Pakenham, 2005).  
 
Other more inclusive measures of QoL were considered for use as measures of 
adjustment, such as the World Health Organisation Quality of Life Assessment brief 
version (WHOQOL-BREF; The WHOQOL Group, 1998). Broader measures such as 
the WHOQOL-BREF, which enquire after more external variables such as housing 
conditions, may have introduced variance that would not be expected to be related to 
the cognitive processes under investigation. For the current study, it was thought to 
be more theoretically coherent to focus exclusively on measures of psychopathology 
(the HADS) and life satisfaction (the SWLS). Also, some items on the WHOQOL-
BREF appeared somewhat similar to items on the MSIS-29, which could have 
confounded results. 
 
2.3.9   Demographics 
 
Participants were asked to provide some basic demographic data: age, gender, years 
since diagnosis, relational status, and type of disease (relapse/remitting or 
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progressive in nature). This data was collected so these variables could be explored 
as possible covariates, and controlled for in analysis if necessary. The form used to 
gather this information can be seen in appendix 6.10. 
 
2.4   Procedures 
 
2.4.1   Conduct of pilot work 
 
Initial pilot work was carried out with four participants with diagnoses of MS known 
to Fife Rehabilitation Service. These participants were willing to read the 
information sheet, complete the consent form, complete the questionnaire pack, and 
provide some feedback to the principal investigator afterwards. Participants all found 
the information sheet and consent form clear and understandable. Reported times to 
complete the questionnaire pack varied between 15 and 45 minutes. One of the pilot 
participants suggested the answering format of some of the questionnaires could 
potentially be altered to be visually clearer, and less cognitively taxing. In line with 
their suggestions, the answering format of all questionnaires (except the HADS, 
which was used in its official licensed form) were adapted, so they were the same as 
the MSIS-29, which has a particularly user friendly response format developed 
specifically for PwMS. 
 
2.4.2   Identification of suitable participants 
 
Suitable participants (in relation to inclusion/exclusion criteria) were identified by 
any member of the direct care team (i.e. Doctors, Clinical Psychologists, MS Nurses, 
Physiotherapists, Occupational Therapists, Dieticians) working in participating NHS 
services. This occurred in two ways: 
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1)  At the request of the principal investigator, clinicians were vigilant for 
suitable participants among those attending services for an appointment in the 
course of their routine care. 
 
2)  Clinicians identified suitable participants among a database of patients, so 
research packs could be sent out to them by post. 
 
Clinicians identifying potential participants were aware of inclusion and exclusion 
criteria of the study, including the need for individuals to be of a sufficient cognitive 
ability to give informed consent and complete questionnaires in a meaningful way. 
The option of performing a brief cognitive screening of potential participants was 
considered to gain a more objective measure of their cognitive functioning, but such 
a labour intensive procedure was simply not feasible for the current research. The 
cognitive capacity of potential participants was made through clinical judgement by a 
member of staff who was familiar with them. Previous research (Gold et al., 2003) 
has found that even among PwMS with measured cognitive impairment the 
reliability and validity of self-report health measures (including the HADS) is not 
affected, so relatively mild cognitive impairment among some respondents in the 
current research would be unlikely to adversely affect results obtained.   
 
2.4.3   Approach of potential participants 
 
Participants were approached by a member of their direct care team during a routine 
appointment and asked whether they would be interested in participating in this 
research. They were given a brief verbal explanation of the study, and if they were 
interested in learning more, they were issued with a research pack containing the 
participant information sheet (appendix 6.11), the consent form (see appendix 6.12), 




Individuals were instructed to take the packs home with them so they could read 
them in their own time and consider whether they wished to participate. If they chose 
to participate, they could post completed questionnaires back in the pre-paid 
envelope. 
 
At two of the research sites (FRS and CRABIS) potential participants were also 
approached by having a research pack sent to them through the mail. The pack 
contained the participant information sheet, the consent form, the questionnaires, and 
a pre-paid envelope to return their responses if they chose to participate. The 
information sheet named the member of the direct care team (familiar to them) who 
had identified them as a potentially suitable participant for this research. The 
information sheet was clearly addressed as having come from the service which they 
attended, and was signed by a senior clinician in that service and the Principal 
Investigator. 
 
2.4.4  Data collection, data storage, and participant confidentiality 
 
Data was collected by participants simply sending the completed consent form and 
questionnaires back to the Principal Investigator in a pre-paid envelope. 
 
The consent forms contained participant identifiable information, while the 
completed questionnaires did not. Therefore, consent forms and completed 
questionnaires for each participant were marked with a unique code identifier, and 
stored in separate locked filing cabinets at the Principal Investigator’s base, so the 
data obtained from questionnaires remained anonymous. This anonymised data was 





2.4.5.  Response to the report of high levels of symptoms of anxiety or 
depression. 
 
Participants were made aware on the consent form that their General Practitioner 
(GP) would be informed of their participation if they chose to participate (appendix 
6.13). Additionally, it was explained that if their scores on either the anxiety or 
depression subscales of the HADS suggested potentially clinically significant levels 
of anxiety or depression, then their GP would also be informed of this (appendix 
6.14). In this eventuality their details would, of course, need to be retrieved from 
their consent form by use of the unique code identifier. Honarmand and Feinstein 
(2009) recommend a score of eight on either the anxiety or depression subscale of 
the HADS as having optimal sensitivity and specificity for potentially clinically 
significant levels of anxiety or depression. Therefore, if a participant’s score on 
either subscale exceeded eight, their scores for both subscales were included on the 
letter to their GP, so their GP could take whatever further action they deemed 
appropriate. 30.2 per cent of participants scored eight or above on the anxiety 
subscale, and 25.6 per cent scored eight or above on the depression subscale, so had 
their scores included on the letter to their GP. 
 
2.5    Statistical Analysis 
 
All statistical analysis was carried out with Predictive Analytics Software (PASW) 
version 17. 
 
2.5.1   Power analysis 
 
Previous research (e.g. Broadbent et al., 2006; Evers et al., 2001; Vaughan et al., 
2003; Vowles et al., 2007) has found moderate relationships between illness 
appraisals and outcome measures. Thus, it seemed reasonable to hypothesise 
moderate relationships between the variables in the current study. Power calculations 
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were conducted accordingly, for the ability to detect moderate effect sizes (i.e. 
Cohen’s d of 0.5 to 0.8). 
 
For the ability to detect moderate effect sizes, Green (1991) recommends the use of 
the formula N ≥ 50 + 8m for testing the overall fit of a regression model (where N is 
the number of participants, and m the number of predictor variables), and the formula 
N ≥ 104 + m for testing individual predictor variables within the model. The multiple 
mediation approach (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) used in this study employs regression 
coefficients for bootstrapping, so the formulas proposed by Green (1991) were 
deemed appropriate for conducting approximate power calculations. 
 
The eight predictor variables used for this study (MSIS-physical, two subscales of 
the ICQ, three subscales of the brief-IPQ, the MSAQ, and the CFQ), therefore 
suggested the use of approximately 114 participants based on the formula N = 50 + 
72 (yielding the greater number of participants of the two formulae). 
 
2.5.2.  Preliminary analyses 
 
Preliminary exploration of the data was conducted with the use of descriptive 
statistics, Pearson correlations, and independent sample t-tests. Transformations were 
carried out on data from certain measures to ensure that data used in preliminary 
analyses met parametric assumptions. 
 
2.5.3.  Testing of research hypotheses  
 
The main hypotheses of this study were tested with multiple mediational analyses, as 
described by Preacher and Hayes (2008). The essential principles underlying this 
approach, and the interpretation of statistical output produced, are hereby discussed. 
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2.5.3.1.  Underlying theory in testing models of mediation 
 
Panel A of Figure 6 illustrates a situation where variable X (the independent 
variable) has an effect on Y (the dependent, or outcome, variable), with no variables 
mediating the relationship. Panel B introduces a possible multiple mediation model 
where variables M1 and M2 mediate the relationship between X and Y. The 
abbreviations in Figure 6 and the ensuing discussion are defined as follows: 
 
a –  the effect of X on the proposed mediator 
b –  the effect of the proposed mediator on Y, controlling for a 
ab-  the product of a and b, the specific indirect effect of X on Y through a given 
mediator (a1b1 or a2b2 in Panel B) 
c –  the total effect of X on Y, not controlling for other paths 
c’-  the direct effect of X on Y, controlling for the indirect effects of the ab routes 
(i.e. c’ = c – a1b1 – a2b2) 
 
The total indirect effect through the mediators can be calculated by summing the 
specific indirect effects (a1b1 + a2b2), or by subtracting the direct effect from the total 









Figure 6: Illustration of a multi-mediation design  
(Adapted from Preacher & Hayes, 2004) 
 
The causal steps approach, proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986), has been the most 
popular in testing hypotheses of mediation (Hayes, 2009). Within this approach, 
multiple regression analyses or structural equation modelling would typically be used 
to test the following hypotheses: X significantly predicts Y (path c), X significantly 
predicts M (a paths), M significantly predicts Y controlling for X (b paths), and the 
effect of X on Y decreases substantially when the effects of the mediators are 
controlled for (i.e. c’ is substantially smaller than c). If these criteria are met, this 
would be interpreted as evidence of given variables acting as mediators (Preacher & 
Hayes, 2008). While still commonly used by researchers, the Baron and Kenny 
(1986) approach has been subject to criticism. It has been found to be low in power 
to detect significant effects (MacKinnon et al., 2002), and the actual intervening 
effect is not directly tested, but rather logically inferred from the testing of the four 
hypotheses listed above (Hayes, 2009). Sobel (1982) developed a technique to 
directly test the statistical significance of indirect effects, sometimes referred to as a 
‘product of coefficients approach’, but this method has been criticised for assuming 
that the sampling distribution of the indirect effect meets parametric assumptions, 














2.5.3.2.  The ‘bootstrapping’ method of multiple mediation analysis 
used in the current study 
 
Preacher and Hayes (2004; 2008) describe a method for directly testing the statistical 
significance of indirect effects in a multiple mediation model non-parametrically, so 
the normal sampling distributions of indirect effects are not assumed. Including 
multiple mediators in the same model (as opposed to running numerous simple 
models, testing single mediators) makes it possible to determine to what extent a 
given variable acts as a mediator while controlling for the effects of other variables 
entered in the model, reduces the risk of Type 1 errors due to the omission of 
significant variables, and enables a comparison of the different sizes of the indirect 
effects associated with each proposed mediating variable (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). 
 
 To provide a nonparametric analysis, Preacher and Hayes recommend 
‘bootstrapping’. Bootstrapping involves repeatedly taking small samples with 
replacement (i.e. the same case can be sampled repeatedly) from the original sample. 
Each of these smaller samples (called ‘bootstrap samples’) provides an estimate of 
the total and specific indirect effects (measured as regression coefficients) of X on Y 
in the original sample. The sample is effectively being treated as a population from 
which the smaller bootstrap samples can be taken (Field, 2009). Preacher and Hayes 
(2008) recommend taking at least 5000 bootstrap samples from the original data set. 
The values obtained from the bootstrap samples are then sorted from high to low, 
producing an ‘empirical approximation of the sampling distribution’ of given effects. 
A confidence interval (CI), typically of 95 per cent, can then readily be applied to 
these estimated effects, providing a ‘percentile bootstrap CI’ (Preacher & Hayes, 
2008). These 95 per cent CIs are then ‘bias corrected and accelerated’ (Efron, 1987), 
a process believed to improve the accuracy of confidence intervals (Briggs, 2006). 
All 95 per cent confidence intervals reported in the current study are bias corrected 
and accelerated. Put simply, the PASW output of this test provides 2 values (a lower 
and upper limit) between which a given effect is likely (with 95 per cent confidence) 
to lie in the original sample. If the value of zero is not contained within these two 
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values, this would suggest a given effect is statistically significant (i.e. the size of the 
effect is not zero) 
 
It is important to note that the estimates of specific indirect effects (i.e. the indirect 
effect attributable to a single mediator) are calculated conditional on the presence of 
other mediators in the model. The values therefore pertain to that mediator’s unique 
indirect effect beyond that accounted for by the other mediators. Each estimated 
effect would, therefore, be different if competing mediators in the model were 
changed.   
 
The output obtained from Preacher and Hayes’s (2008) macros also provides a list of 
pair-wise contrasts of specific indirect effects, providing ‘head to head’ comparisons 
of the relative magnitudes of the indirect effects of two potential mediator variables. 
These comparisons can be useful in comparing competing theories of mediation, 
such as the relative specific indirect effects associated with cognitive appraisals and 
ACT processes in the current study. For each bootstrap resample, contrasts are 
generated (by subtracting one variables’ specific indirect effect from the other), and 
the sampling distribution of this contrast is generated (by ordering them from high to 
low as before). Ninety-five per cent confidence intervals are produced to test the null 
hypothesis, that there is no difference between the two specific indirect effects. If 
zero is not contained within the 95 per cent confidence intervals, the null hypothesis 
can be rejected, suggesting a significant difference between the specific indirect 
effects (i.e. one mediator has a stronger specific indirect than the other).  
 
Directions for downloading PASW macro (the software necessary to carry out 
multiple mediation analysis) was obtained from Preacher and Hayes (2008). 
 
2.6.   Ethical considerations and approval 
 
Research packs contained a participant information sheet which was written in easily 
understandable language, with consideration for the fact that some respondents may 
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have some degree of cognitive impairment. Information sheets covered important 
topics in regard to their rights as research participants, including: that they were 
under no obligation to participate, that returned data would be treated and stored in a 
confidential manner (with the caveat of informing GPs of potentially significant 
scores on the HADS), and that they had the option of requesting a copy of research 
findings. Contact details were also given for the Principal Investigator, so he could 
be contacted if they required any help in completing the questionnaires, or if they had 
any questions. 
 
Approval was given for this research to take place by a NHS ethics committee, and 
local approval was subsequently granted by NHS Fife and NHS Lothian research and 





3.1  Participants 
 
While 145 individuals returned data, data was usable for only 133 individuals (see 
section 3.2.1), who served as participants in this study. 
 
The mean age of participants was 49, with a standard deviation (SD) of 10.8 years, 
and range of 21 to 75. Only three individuals were aged over 65. Seventy-two per 
cent were female, and 28 per cent male. 55 per cent reported experiencing a 
relapsing/remitting form of the disease, and 45 per cent a progressive form. The 
mean time reported since being diagnosed with MS was 11 years (SD = 8.5). In 
terms of relational status, 79 per cent were married or cohabiting, 13 per cent 
separated or divorced, 7 per cent single, and 1 per cent widowed. A majority of 
participants were recruited from FRS (87 per cent), 11 per cent from CRABIS, and 
just 1 per cent from each of SBIRS and DCN. 
 
3.2  Preliminary data exploration 
 
3.2.1  Treatment of missing data 
 
While no consensus view exists on what proportion of missing data on a single 
variable merits its exclusion from analysis, Cohen and Cohen (1983; as cited in Fox-
Wasylyshyn & El-Masri, 2005) recommend that up to 10 per cent missing data is not 
extensive, below this threshold it is appropriate for the variable to remain in analysis, 
and for the missing data to be treated (Fox-Wasylyshyn & El-Masri, 2005). No 
variable had more than 2.9 per cent (or four data points) of data missing, so all 
variables were retained for treatment. 
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Data was returned from 145 individuals for this study. Of these, eight individuals 
were excluded for missing five or more (5.1 per cent) data points. This conservative 
cut-off point was chosen to ensure high quality of data. For remaining participants, 
‘sample mean substitution’ was employed, replacing the missing value with the mean 
for that item across the whole sample (Fox-Wasylyshyn & El-Masri, 2005). Sample 
mean substitutions were employed for the majority of data primarily because they are 
readily calculated with commands in PASW. One limitation of replacing missing 
values with the sample mean is that the variance of a variable can be reduced, which 
can attenuate correlations with other variables (Roth, 1994). In some circumstances 
more sophisticated methods for replacing missing data are recommended, such as 
‘regression imputation’, which involves using individuals’ scores from other 
variables to predict missing values through regression analysis (Raymond & Roberts, 
1987). Previous research has suggested, however, that sample mean substitution 
tends to provide good representations of the original data as long the percentage of 
data points missing for an item is low, i.e. less than 10 per cent (Donner, 1982; as 
cited in Roth, 1994), or even 20 per cent (Downey & King, 1998). The maximum 
amount of data missing for any item in the current dataset was 2.9 per cent, which 
combined with the relatively large sample size, would suggest sample mean 
substitutions would be unlikely to adversely affect the quality of data. In the interest 
of thoroughness, descriptive statistics were carried out on the data set before and 
after conducting sample mean substitutions. This analysis showed that conducting 
sample mean substitutions made negligible differences to mean values and standard 
deviations for all variables. Simple mean imputations (discussed below) would have 
been a viable alternative to the use of sample means, though this would have been a 
moderately more labour intensive procedure since such commands are not available 
in PAWS.  
 
Missing data for the HADS had to be treated separately, because this was the only 
scale for which each individual data point was not entered into PASW, only the total 
scores for the anxiety and depression subscales were entered. Scoring was carried out 
manually for the HADS due to practicalities surrounding the reporting of scores to 
GPs. Four respondents were excluded for missing the HADS entirely (it was the final 
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page of the questionnaire pack). Four individuals missed either one or two data 
points on a HADS subscale (each subscale has seven items). In these instances, 
simple mean imputations were calculated, which involves replacing missing values 
with the mean of the available items on that subscale for the given respondent 
(Chavance, 2004). This technique is recommended as being appropriate when the 
proportion of observable data points exceeds 50 per cent (Ware et al., 1980; as cited 
in Chavance, 2004), a condition which was met for all four relevant individuals.  
 
3.2.2  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics were calculated to give the mean, SD, median and mode for the 
totals of the measures, as shown below in Table 1. For those measures which showed 




Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the questionnaires 
Measure Mean Standard 
Deviation 
(SD) 
Range of scores obtained Median Inter-quartile range 
Maximum Minimum 
MSIS-physical 64.49 17.60 100 20 - - 
ICQ-helplessness 15.18 4.94 24 6 - - 
ICQ- perceived benefits 13.84 4.42 24 6 - - 
IPQ-personal control 3.40 2.68 10 0 3 1, 5 
IPQ-concern 6.12 2.97 10 0 6 4, 9 
IPQ-understanding 7.23 2.39 10 0 8 5, 9 
MSAQ-willingness 35.13 9.95 57 12 - - 
MSAQ-activities 
engagement 
50.38 13.55 77 11 - - 
MSAQ-total 85.43 19.50 128 36 - - 
CFQ 38.77 13.04 74 12 - - 
HADS- anxiety 7.27 4.88 20 0 7 3, 11 
HADS- depression 6.58 3.93 18 0 6 3.5, 9 
HADS- total 13.81 8.11 37.00 0 12 7.25, 19 
SWLS 18.93 7.55 35 5 - - 
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Closer analysis showed that for the HADS, 42 per cent of participants scored eight or 
above on the anxiety subscale, and 38 per cent scored eight or above on the 
depression subscale, suggesting they may have been experiencing clinically 
significant symptoms of anxiety and depression respectively. GPs were informed of 
these scores accordingly. While norms available for the HADS in a MS population 
are limited, one study conducted by Dahl et al. (2009) explored possible ‘caseness’ 
of anxiety and depression in a MS population (using the same cut off scores on the 
HADS as the current study). It was found that 30.2 per cent of participants scored 
eight or above on the anxiety subscale, and 25.6 per cent scored eight or above on the 
depression subscale. This finding would suggest that levels of psychological distress 
may have been somewhat elevated in the current sample compared to other MS 
populations, though the results obtained by Dahl et al. (2009) were obtained in 
Norway (with a Norwegian version of the HADS), so a variety of factors could be 
responsible for differences. 
 
The mean of 64.49 (SD = 17.6) on the MSIS- physical for the sample is only slightly 
larger than the value of 61.0 (SD = 20.3) obtained by Hobart et al. (2004) in a large 
sample (N = 751) of members of the ‘Multiple Sclerosis Society’. This difference 
may be attributable to the current sample inherently including more individuals in 
need of some variety of professional input. Alternatively, the relatively high levels of 
depressive symptoms among the sample could have inflated perceptions of physical 
symptoms. 
 
The mean score of 38.77 (SD = 13.04) on the CFQ is close to the mean value of 40.2 
(SD = 11.04) obtained from non-clinical samples (N = 893), and appears 
substantially lower than the mean value of 59.7 (SD = 12.1) reported from a sample 
(N = 171) of individuals suffering from psychological disorders (Gillanders et al., 
2010). 
 
The mean SWLS score of 18.93 (SD = 7.55) is, unsurprisingly, lower than the mean 
score of 24.1 (SD = 6.9) obtained from an English adult (N = 111) population (Hayes 
& Joseph, 2003; as cited in Pavot & Diener, 2008). No mean scores are available for 
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the SWLS in a MS population, but the mean score of 19.7 (SD = 7.9) obtained by 
Putzke et al. (2001; as cited in Pavot & Diener, 2008) for a sample of married 
individuals with spinal cord injuries (N = 53), is similar to the mean score in the 
current sample. 
 
Unfortunately, Evers et al. (2001) did not report mean scores for the ICQ subscales. 
There is no previous research that reports mean scores for the subscales of the brief-
IPQ in a MS population.  
 
3.2.3  Reliability of scales 
 
Chronbach’s α values were calculated for the questionnaires to give a measure of 
internal consistency. These values can be seen below in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Internal consistency of questionnaires 
 




MSIS-physical 20 .94 
ICQ-helplessness 6 .91 
ICQ- perceived benefits 6 .84 
MSAQ-willingness 9 .79 
MSAQ-activities engagement 11 .89 
MSAQ-total 20 .87 
CFQ 13 .85 
SWLS 5 .85 
 
While no definite ‘cut-off’ value exists for Chronbach’s α, a value of .7 to .8 is 
generally considered acceptable (Field, 2009). Table 2 shows that all scales used in 
the current study, including the newly adapted MSAQ, showed acceptable levels of 
reliability. Values for the HADS could not be calculated, because only subscale total 
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scores were entered into PASW. Chronbach’s α could not be calculated for the IPQ 
subscales, because they are single item scales. 
 
While α values are reported in Table 2 for the MSAQ subscales, and the total score 
(comprised of the two subscales added together), in further analysis the MSAQ total 
score will be used, and referred to simply as the MSAQ. It was deemed appropriate 
to use the total score as a complete measure of MS related ‘acceptance’. 
 
3.2.4  Testing the normality of data 
 
While the multiple mediation techniques employed in the current study do not make 
parametric assumptions (as they are based on regression coefficients), the techniques 
employed in more preliminary analysis (Pearson correlations and independent 
sample t-tests) do require data to be normally distributed. Values of skewness and 
kurtosis, along with their respective standard error (SE), were obtained from 






Z-score values of greater than +/- 1.96 suggest that the data for a given measure is 
significantly differently (at the p < .05 level) from a normal distribution.  The z-score 
values for skew and kurtosis across all continuous measures used in this study can be 
seen in Appendix 6.16. The following measures produced z-score values which 
suggested they were not normally distributed: IPQ- understanding, MSAQ- 
engagement, AAQ-II, HADS, and ‘years since diagnosis’. Square-root 
value for kurtosis 
standard error of kurtosis 
= Z score for kurtosis 
value for skewness 
standard error of skewness 
= Z score for skewness 
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transformations were carried out on these measures, as described by Field (2009), the 
z-score values for which are also shown in Appendix 6.16. Z-score values suggested 
that the transformed data for MSAQ-engagement, HADS, and ‘years since diagnosis’ 
were normally distributed, so these transformed variables were used in all further 
parametric analysis. The AAQ-II, however, did not appear normally distributed after 
square-root transformation (or after ‘log’ or ‘reciprocal’ transformations). Hence, all 
correlations reported for the AAQ-II (in sections 2.3.4. and 2.3.6.) use the non-
parametric Spearman’s correlation. 
 
3.2.5 Testing for possible covariance between demographic and 
dependent variables 
 
Analysis was conducted to ascertain whether any of the demographic variables 
related to scores on the dependent variables (DVs). If demographic variables were 
found to be related to either DV, they would need to be included as covariates in 
mediational analyses to control for their effects. 
 
3.2.5.1 Assessment of ‘age’ and ‘years since diagnosis’ as 
possible covariates 
 
For demographic variables represented with interval data, Pearson correlations were 
calculated between them and the DVs, as shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Pearson correlations between demographic variables (age, years 
since diagnosis) and dependent variables. 
 
 Dependent/Outcome variables 
HADS SWLS 














* Correlation is significant at p < 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
Table 3 shows that none of the demographic variables correlated significantly with 
the HADS, so did not require inclusion as covariates in analysis involving the 
HADS.  
 
‘Age’ and ‘years since diagnosis’ both showed small, and statistically significant, 
correlations with the SWLS, supporting their inclusion as covariates in mediational 
analysis involving the SWLS. 
 
The demographic variables of ‘type of disease’, ‘gender’ and ‘relational status’ were 
represented as categorical variables, so their relationship with scores on the DVs 
were investigated with independent samples t-tests, as follows. Mean values and SE 
reported for the HADS are based on the square-root transformed data, so are lower in 
value than total HADS scores pre-transformation.  
 
3.2.5.2 Assessment of ‘type of disease’ as a possible covariate 
 
Individuals with a relapsing/remitting form of MS (M = 20.58, SE = 0.94) tended to 
score significantly higher on the SWLS compared to individuals reporting a 
progressive form (M = 16.96, SE = 0.97) of the disease, t (116) = 2.68, p < .01. This 
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result suggested that ‘type of disease’ required inclusion as a covariate in mediational 
analysis involving the SWLS. 
 
In the case of the HADS, individuals with a relapsing/remitting form of MS  
(M = 3.44, SE = 0.14) showed no significant differences in their scores compared 
with individuals reporting a progressive form (M = 3.52, SE = 0.16) of the disease, t 
(115) = -0.36, p = .72. This result suggested that ‘type of disease’ did not required 
inclusion as a covariate in mediational analysis involving the HADS. 
 
3.2.5.3 Assessment of ‘gender’ as a possible covariate 
 
While male participants (M = 17.53, SE = 1.13) tended to score slightly lower on the 
SWLS compared to female participants (M = 19.62, SE = 0.78), this difference was 
not statistically significant, t (130) = -1.44, p > .05. There was also no significant 
difference between male (M = 3.67, SE = 0.16) and female (M = 3.46, SE = 0.12) 
participants’ scores on the HADS, t (129) = 0.94, p = .35. These results suggested 
that ‘gender’ did not require inclusion as a covariate in mediational analysis for the 
SWLS or the HADS. 
 
3.2.5.4 Assessment of ‘relational status’ as a possible covariate 
 
Regarding their relational status, participants rated themselves as belonging to one of 
four categories: ‘married or co-habiting’, ‘separated or divorced’, ‘single’, or 
‘widowed’. A vast majority (79 per cent) of participants were married or co-habiting, 
while relatively low numbers were in the other three groups (see section 3.1.1.). For 
independent samples t-tests to be conducted, these three smaller grouping were 
combined into one group, which shall hereon be referred to as ‘single’. 
 
Participants who were married or co-habiting (M = 19.56, SE = 0.75) tended to score 
slightly higher than those who were single (M = 17.00, SE = 1.15) on the SWLS, but 
this difference was not significant, t (130) = -1.59, p = 0.13. There were no 
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significant differences in HADS scores between participants who were married or 
co-habiting (M = 3.53, SE = 0.11) and those who were single (M = 3.47, SE = 0.26), 
t (129) = -0.23, p = .82. 
 
These results suggested that ‘relational status’ did not require inclusion as a covariate 
in mediational analysis 
 
3.2.5.5    Summary of analysis for potential covariance between 
demographic and dependent variables 
 
Results suggested that ‘age’, ‘type of disease’, and ‘years since diagnosis’ would be 
appropriate covariates in mediational analysis with the SWLS serving as dependent 
variable, while no demographic variables were required as covariates in mediational 
analysis with the HADS as dependent variable. 
 
3.2.6 Testing for possible collinearity between predictor variables 
 
Pearson correlations were calculated between all predictor variables to test for 
multicollinearity, as shown in Table 4. Field (2009) recommends that very high 
correlations (i.e. of above approximately .9) may indicate significant collinearity 
between variables, which would be a contra-indicator for their inclusion in the same 
mediational analysis (Preacher & Hayes, 2008).
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IPQ-concern Pearson correlation 
Significance 














MSAQ Pearson correlation 
Significance 
      1 -.59** 
.00 
CFQ Pearson correlation 
Significance 
       1 
* denotes significance at p < .05 level (2-tailed) 
** denotes significance at p < .01 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 4 shows, with statistically significant correlations emboldened, that no 
correlations between predictor variables were high enough to suggest problems with 
collinearity. The highest correlation existed between the ICQ-helplessness and the 
MSIS-physical (r = .71, p < .001). All the measures that correlated significantly with 
one another did so in theoretically predictable directions.  
 
Encouragingly, the MSAQ demonstrated theoretically consistent relationships with 
other measures: correlating positively with IPQ- personal control (r = .32, p < .001), 
and correlating negatively with higher scores on ICQ-helplessness  
(r = -.62, p < .001), IPQ-concern (r = -.51, p < .001), and the CFQ  
(r = -.59, p < .001). It also showed a small positive correlation with ICQ-perceived 
benefits, though it did not reach statistical significance (r = .13, p = .12). The MSAQ 
willingness and activities engagement subscales demonstrated moderate correlations 
with each other (r = .33, p < .001). 
 
With the single exception of ICQ-perceived benefits, the CFQ showed significant 
correlations with every measure in expected directions, including the MSAQ. 
 
Overall, the results from correlational analysis supported the inclusion of all 
predictor variables in mediational analysis. 
 
3.2.7 Correlations among potential predictor variables and dependent 
variables 
 
Predictors in a mediation analysis, or regression analysis, should demonstrate strong 
correlations with the DVs. If a potential predictor shows significant correlations with 
other predictors, but not with the DVs, it could potentially suppress the effects of 
other predictors without demonstrating an additional specific indirect effect itself. 
Pearson correlations were carried out between all potential predictor variables, and 
the DVs, as shown in Table 5. 
 
 106 
Table 5: Pearson correlations between predictor variables and dependent 
variables  
 
 Dependent/outcome variables 
HADS SWLS 
























































* denotes significance at p < .05 level (2-tailed) 
** denotes significance at p < .01 level (2-tailed) 
 
Statistically significant correlations are shown in bold in Table 5. It is evident from 
Table 5 that almost all potential predictor variables correlated significantly with 
DVs, with three exceptions: ICQ-perceived benefits and IPQ- understanding did not 
correlate significantly with the HADS, and IPQ-understanding did not correlate 
significantly with the SWLS. It was, therefore, decided that ICQ-perceived benefits 
would not be included in mediational analysis with the HADS as DV, and IPQ-
understanding would not be included in mediational analysis with the SWLS as DV. 
Since the correlation between the HADS and IPQ- understanding failed to reach the 
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p < .05 level of statistical significance by a relatively narrow margin (r = -.16, p  = 
.068), it was decided that it would still be included in mediational analysis with the 
HADS as DV. Later supplemental analysis (see section 3.3.4.2.) showed that 
excluding the IPQ- understanding would have made no meaningful difference to the 
results and conclusions of eventual mediational analysis. 
 
3.2.8 Testing assumptions of regression analysis 
 
Since the mediation analysis (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) employs regression 
coefficients, it was considered prudent in the interest of thoroughness to test whether 
the data met the assumptions of regression analysis. 
 
Many of the assumptions of regression analysis described by Berry (1993; as cited in 
Field, 2009) were obviously met by the current study without additional analysis, 
including: use of appropriate variable types, non-zero variance in predictors, no 
perfect multicollinearity (see section 3.2.4.), and independence (i.e. each value of the 
DV comes from a separate entity). 
 
To test the assumptions of homoscedasticity and linearity, independence of errors 
(i.e. residual terms are uncorrelated), and normal distribution of error, additional 
analyses were necessary, as described by Field (2009). To access necessary 
commands in PASW, linear regression analyses were conducted: one with the HADS 
as DV, and one with the SWLS as DV. Inspection of scatter-plots (regression 
standardised residuals vs. regression predicted value) confirmed that the data met the 
assumptions of homoscedasticity and linearity. Values of the Durbin-Watson test 
confirmed independence of errors, with values close to 2 for the HADS (2.12) and 
SWLS (2.07). Inspection of histograms of standardised residuals, and normal 
probability plots, supported the assumption of normality of residuals. 
 
While all assumptions of regression were met, it is debatable whether this is actually 
required for the Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) method of mediational analysis. Most of 
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the assumptions exist to enable the use of estimated standard errors to construct 
confidence intervals and test statistical significance using normal theory (Shrout & 
Bolger, 2002), procedures which are not required for bootstrapping (K. Preacher, 
personal communication, 12 July 2011). 
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3.3 Testing of research hypotheses with multiple mediation 
analyses 
 
3.3.1 Mediation analysis with HADS as dependent variable 
 
Preacher and Hayes’s (2008) macro was used to analyse a multiple mediation model 
with the following variables: 
 
Independent variable: MSIS-physical  
Mediator variables:   ICQ-helplessness 
    CFQ 
    MSAQ 
    IPQ- personal control 
    IPQ- concern 
    IPQ- understanding 
Dependent variable:  HADS 
 
No covariates were necessary for this analysis (see section 3.2.5.). Results are based 
on bootstrapping, using 5000 re-samples.  
 
The indirect effects in this mediation analysis can be seen in Table 6. The two 
columns furthest to the right of Table 6 show bias corrected and accelerated 95 per 
cent confidence intervals, hereon referred to simply as 95 per cent CIs. 95 per cent 
CIs which do not contain zero between them are marked in bold, because in such 
instances it can be stated with 95 per cent confidence that a given mediation effect is 
not zero (i.e. it is significant). 
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Table 6: Results of multiple mediation analysis with HADS as dependent 
















-.0558 .0367 -.1251 .0190 
CFQ .0654 .0269 .0200 .1264 
MSAQ .0433 .0190 .0105 .0867 
IPQ-personal 
control 
.0157 .0101 .0002 .0400 
IPQ- concern .0105 .0121 -.0100 .0386 
IPQ- 
understanding 
-.0019 .0044 -.0178 .0030 
Total indirect 
effect 
.0772 .0444 -.0076 .1662 
 
 
3.3.1.1. Performance of the model as a whole 
 
A model summary (treating the model as a linear regression) produced an adjusted 
R
2
 = .61, suggesting that the 8 predictor variables accounted for 61 per cent of 
variance in the HADS. The F-ratio for the model reached statistical significance,  
F (7, 117) = 28.43, p < .001, suggesting the model accounts for significant proportions 
of the variance in HADS scores.  
 
The total and direct effects of the MSIS-physical on the HADS were found to be .12, 
p < .01, and .04, p > .05 respectively. As shown in Table 6, the total indirect effect 
through the mediators (the difference between the total and direct effects) had a point 
estimate of .0772, with 95 per cent CIs of -.0076 to.1662. Since these CIs cross zero, 
the total indirect effect does not appear significant. This is not problematic, as stated 
by Preacher and Hayes (2008), ‘It is entirely possible to find specific indirect effects 
to be significant in the presence of a nonsignificant total direct effect’ (p.882). In 
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such instances, it is possible that the relatively low magnitudes of specific indirect 
effects associated with certain variables are lowering the overall performance of the 
model, despite some variables having stronger specific indirect effects associated 
with them. 
     
3.3.1.2. Specific indirect effects of mediating variables 
 
As their 95 per cent CIs do not encompass zero, the CFQ, MSAQ, and IPQ-personal 
control appear to be the only significant mediators of the relationship between 
symptoms of MS and psychological distress, as measured with the HADS. 
 
Table 7 shows the results of pair-wise contrasts of specific indirect effects for 
analysis with the HADS as DV. As explained in section 2.5.3., these are ‘head to 
head’ comparisons of the relative magnitudes of the indirect effects of two potential 
mediator variables. Contrasts for which 95 per cent CIs do not contain zero are 
shown in bold, suggesting that these contrast are statistically significant, with one 
mediator having a stronger specific indirect effect than the other. 
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Table 7: Results of multiple mediation analysis with HADS as dependent 
variable: Contrasting the specific indirect effects of different 
mediating variables 
 Point estimate 










ICQ-helplessness vs. CFQ -.1212 .0485 -.2195 -.0321 
ICQ-helplessness vs. 
MSAQ 
-.0991 .0428 -.1845 -.0162 
ICQ- helplessness vs. 
IPQ- personal control 
-.0715 .0403 -.1484 .0080 
ICQ-helplessness vs. IPQ-
concern 
-.0663 .0441 -.1498 .0208 
ICQ-helplessness vs. IPQ- 
understanding 
-.0539 .0369 -.1230 .0211 
CFQ vs. MSAQ .0221 .0310 -.0303 .0947 
CFQ vs. IPQ personal 
control 
.0498 .0273 .0061 .1150 
CFQ vs. IPQ- concern .0549 .0280 .0054 .1177 
CFQ vs. IPQ-
understanding 
.0673 .0266 .0207 .1268 
MSAQ vs. IPQ- personal 
control 
.0276 .0213 -.0123 .0726 
MSAQ vs. IPQ- concern .0328 .0256 -.0160 .0860 
MSAQ vs. IPQ-
understanding 
.0451 .0186 .0128 .0873 
IPQ-personal control vs. 
IPQ- concern 
.0052 .0135 -.0217 .0329 
IPQ- personal control vs. 
IPQ- understanding 
.0175 .0107 -.0003 .0418 
IPQ-concern vs. IPQ- 
understanding 
.0123 .0132 -.0111 .0410 
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3.3.1.3. Pair-wise contrasts of specific indirect effects 
 
As shown in Table 7, six pair-wise contrasts appear to be statistically significant. The 
CFQ showed a significantly larger specific indirect effect than: ICQ-helplessness, 
IPQ-personal control, IPQ-concern, and IPQ-understanding. The MSAQ 
demonstrated significantly larger specific indirect effects than ICQ- helplessness and 
IPQ- understanding. These results will be discussed further in section 3.3.3. 
 
3.3.1.4. Assessing Hypothesis 1  
Cognitive appraisals will mediate the relationship between MS 
symptoms and symptoms of psychological distress. 
 
The results show relatively minimal support for hypothesis 1. ICQ- helplessness, 
IPQ-concern, and IPQ-understanding failed to show evidence of mediating the 
relationship between MS symptoms and symptoms of psychological distress. Of all 
measures of cognitive appraisal, only IPQ- personal control showed evidence of 
being a significant mediator of the relationship between MS symptoms and 
symptoms of psychological distress. While the 95 per cent CIs for the specific 
indirect effect of the IPQ-personal control did not encompass zero, the lower level 
limit (.0002) only missed zero very narrowly.  
 
3.3.1.5. Assessing Hypothesis 2  
ACT processes will mediate the relationship between MS 
symptoms and symptoms of psychological distress. 
 
The results clearly support hypothesis 2. The CFQ and MSAQ appeared to be the 
strongest mediators of the relationship between MS symptoms and symptoms of 
psychological distress. Both demonstrated significant specific indirect effects. 
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3.3.2 Mediation analysis with SWLS as dependent variable 
 
Preacher and Hayes’s (2008) macro was used to analyse a multiple mediation model 
with the following variables: 
 
Independent variable: MSIS-physical  
Mediator variables:   ICQ-helplessness 
    ICQ- perceived benefits 
    CFQ 
    MSAQ 
    IPQ- personal control 
    IPQ- concern 
Dependent variable:  SWLS 
Covariates:   Age 
    Type of disease 
    Years since diagnosis   
 
The indirect effects in this mediation analysis can be seen in Table 8. Results are 
based on bootstrapping, using 5000 re-samples. 
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Table 8: Results of multiple mediation analysis with SWLS as dependent 
variable: Indirect effects of potential mediators 
 








BCa 95% confidence 
intervals 
Lower Upper 
ICQ-helplessness -.0332 .0395 -.1128 .0436 
ICQ-  
perceived benefits 
.0042 .0100 -.0313 .0283 
CFQ -.0202 .0148 -.0620 .0000 
MSAQ -.0642 .0230 -.1140 -.0228 
IPQ-personal control -.0067 .0091 -.0302 .0072 
IPQ- concern -.0035 .0113 -.0191 .0264 
Total indirect effect -.1165 .0427 -.1988 -.0322 
 
 
3.3.2.1. Performance of the model as a whole 
 
A model summary produced an adjusted R
2
 = .51, suggesting that the 8 predictor 
variables and 3 covariates accounted for 51 per cent of variance in the SWLS. The F-
ratio for the model reached statistical significance, F (10, 99) = 12.31, p < .001, 
suggesting the model accounts for significant proportions of the variance in SWLS 
scores. 
 
The total and direct effects of the MSIS-physical on the SWLS were found to be -.17, 
p < .001, and .06, p > .05 respectively. As shown in Table 6, the total indirect effect 
through the mediators (the difference between the total and direct effects) had a point 
estimate of -.1165, with 95 per cent CIs of -.1988 to -.0322. These CIs do not cross 




3.3.2.2. Specific indirect effects of mediating variables 
 
Table 8 shows that the MSAQ was the only mediator that clearly demonstrated a 
statistically significant specific indirect effect. The upper limit of the 95 per cent CI 
for the CFQ was exactly on zero, suggesting it is borderline whether or not the CFQ 
should be considered a significant mediator of the relationship between MS 
symptoms and satisfaction with life. 
 
None of the measures of cognitive appraisals demonstrated statistically significant 
specific indirect effects. 
 
Table 7 shows the results of pair-wise contrasts of specific indirect effects for 
analysis with the SWLS as DV.
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Table 9: Results of multiple mediation analysis with SWLS as dependent 
variable: Contrasting the specific indirect effects of different 
mediating variables 
 
 Point estimate 











ICQ-helplessness vs. ICQ 
perceived benefits 
-.0373 .0412 -.1170 .0439 
ICQ-helplessness vs. CFQ -.0130 .0442 -.0950 .0786 
ICQ- helplessness vs. 
MSAQ 
.0310 .0487 -.0640 .1276 
ICQ-helplessness vs. IPQ- 
personal control 
-.0265 .0420 -.1082 .0572 
ICQ-helplessness vs. IPQ- 
concern 
-.0367 .0429 -.1214 .0479 
ICQ-perceived benefits 
vs. CFQ 
.0243 .0173 -.0044 .0646 
ICQ-perceived benefits 
vs. MSAQ 
.0683 .0231 .0251 .1164 
ICQ-perceived benefits 
vs. IPQ- personal control 
.0108 .0125 -.0105 .0393 
ICQ-perceived benefits 
vs. IPQ- concern 
.0007 .0146 -.0296 .0288 
CFQ vs. MSAQ .0440 .0287 -.0131 .1017 
CFQ vs. IPQ- personal 
control 
-.0135 .0174 -.0579 .0141 
CFQ vs. IPQ- concern -.0236 .0192 -.0697 .0081 
MSAQ vs. IPQ-personal 
control 
-.0575 .0249 -.1107 -.0132 
MSAQ vs. IPQ- concern -.0676 .0276 -.1248 -.0156 
IPQ- personal control vs. 
IPQ-concern 
-.0101 .0134 -.0397 .0145 
3.3.2.3. Pair-wise contrasts of specific indirect effects 
 
As shown in bold in Table 8, only three pair-wise comparisons of specific indirect 
effects appeared statistically significant, each one involving the MSAQ. The MSAQ 
had significantly stronger specific indirect effects associated with it compared to 
ICQ- perceived benefits, IPQ-personal control, and IPQ- concern. These results will 
be discussed further in section 3.3.3. 
 
3.3.2.4. Assessing Hypothesis 3  
Cognitive appraisals will mediate the relationship between MS 
symptoms and satisfaction with life. 
 
The results do not support hypothesis 3. No measure of cognitive appraisal showed 
evidence of a statistically significant specific indirect effect on the relationship 
between MS symptoms and satisfaction with life. 
 
3.3.2.5. Assessing Hypothesis 4:  
ACT processes will mediate the relationship between MS 
symptoms and satisfaction with life. 
 
The results support hypothesis 4. The MSAQ showed evidence of a statistically 
significant specific indirect effect on the relationship between MS symptoms and 
satisfaction with life, while the significance of the specific indirect effect associated 




3.3.3.  Assessing Hypothesis 5:  
In comparison to cognitive appraisals, ACT processes will tend to 
be stronger mediators of the relationship between MS symptoms 
and outcome measures. 
 
The results of both multiple mediation analyses support hypothesis 5. In analysis 
with the HADS as DV, all six statistically significant pair-wise comparisons involved 
one of the ACT measures demonstrating stronger specific indirect effects in 
comparison to a measure of cognitive appraisal. In analysis with the SWLS as DV, 
all three significant pair-wise comparisons involved the MSAQ demonstrating 
stronger specific indirect effects in comparison to measures of cognitive appraisal. 
 
Across all pair-wise comparisons of different mediators, no measure of cognitive 
appraisal managed to demonstrate significantly stronger specific indirect effects on 
the relationship between MS symptoms and outcome measure. 
 
3.3.4.  Supplemental analyses 
 
3.3.4.1. A note on inclusion of covariates 
 
As described in section 3.2.5, variables were only included as covariates in 
mediational analysis if they showed evidence of impacting upon the DVs. Both 
mediational analyses were, however, re-run with all five possible covariates included 
(age, type of disease, years since diagnosis, relational status, and gender), to ensure 
results were not attributable to the effects of omitted variables. 
 
Including all possible covariates did not alter the results or conclusions of analyses 
(in terms of overall performances of models, specific indirect effects of mediating 
variables, or pair-wise contrasts of specific indirect effects) in any meaningful way. 
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3.3.4.2 Results of simple mediation analyses 
 
As previously explained in section 2.5.3.2, for the multiple mediation analysis 
employed in this study, the specific indirect effects associated with given mediators 
are conditional on the presence of other mediators in the model (Preacher & Hayes, 
2008). The values, therefore, pertain to that mediators’ unique indirect effect beyond 
that accounted for by the other mediators. It was thought that it would be informative 
to run numerous simple mediation analyses (with a single mediator variable per 
analysis) to ascertain whether proposed mediator variables would appear to be 
significant mediators themselves, when no other competing variables were present.  
 
Simple mediation analyses were run with the HADS as DV, for each individual 
mediator variable included in the multiple mediation analysis. With the exception of 
the IPQ- understanding, every individual mediator variable had a significant indirect 
effect associated with it (with 95 per cent CIs not crossing zero), suggesting 
significant mediation of the relationship between MS symptoms and psychological 
distress. 
 
Similarly, simple mediation analyses were run with the SWLS as DV, for each 
individual mediator variable included in the original analysis. With the exceptions of 
IPQ- perceived benefits and IPQ- concern, every individual mediator variable had a 
significant indirect effect associated with it (with 95 per cent CIs not crossing zero), 
suggesting significant mediation of the relationship between MS symptoms and 
satisfaction with life. A summary of results obtained from simple mediation analyses 
can be seen in appendix 6.17. 
 
Since some potential mediator variables did not appear to be significant mediators of 
the relationships between MS symptoms and outcome measures when run in simple 
mediation analyses, the multiple mediation analyses of sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 were 
re-run with them omitted. Their omission did not alter the results or conclusions of 
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analyses (in terms of overall performances of models, specific indirect effects of 
mediating variables, or pair-wise contrasts of specific indirect effects of remaining 




4.1 Interpretation of findings 
 
4.1.1 Mediation of the relationship between symptoms of MS and 
psychological distress 
 
Results suggested that cognitive fusion, as measured by the CFQ, was the strongest 
mediator (with the highest point estimate of specific indirect effect, and 95 per cent 
CIs furthest from zero) of the relationship between symptoms of MS and 
psychological distress. Higher levels of cognitive fusion related to greater 
psychological distress in response to symptoms of MS. This result is perhaps 
particularly impressive given that the CFQ is not an illness specific measure, but 
relates more generally to individuals’ tendency to ‘fuse’ (see section 2.3.5. for 
elaboration, and appendix 6.5 for full questionnaire) with their thoughts. The MSAQ 
was the second strongest mediator of the  relationship between symptoms of MS and 
psychological distress, with higher levels of acceptance (i.e. a willingness to 
experience aversive states in the service of engaging in valued living, see appendix 
6.7 for full questionnaire) relating to lower levels of psychological distress in 
response to symptoms of MS.  These findings are consistent with an ACT 
conceptualisation of psychopathology (Hayes et al., 1999), previous research 
showing CFQ scores to correlate with psychological distress (Gillanders et al., 
2010), and research showing acceptance to be an important process in adjustment to 
chronic health conditions (see section 1.4.6.2.). 
 
The IPQ- personal control (“How much control do you feel you have over your 
illness?”) was the only measure of cognitive appraisal found to be a significant 
mediator of the relationship between symptoms of MS and psychological distress, 
though it appeared to be a weaker mediator than the ACT measures (with a lower 
point estimate of specific indirect effect, and 95 per cent CIs closer to zero). The 
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other measures of cognitive appraisal were not found to be significant mediators. In 
the cases of ICQ- helplessness and IPQ-concern, they became non-significant in 
multiple mediation analysis (when the indirect effect they shared with other 
mediators was taken into account), while they appeared to be significant mediators of 
the relationship between symptoms of MS and psychological distress when run alone 
in simple mediation analysis (see section 3.3.4.2). IPQ- understanding was not a 
significant mediator of the relationship between symptoms of MS and psychological 
distress, even when run as sole mediator in a simple mediation analysis. 
 
It is an interesting finding that IPQ- personal control was the only significant 
mediator among the appraisal measures. Perceptions of personal control over internal 
and external states have been highlighted as predictive of mental health, even in the 
absence of any actual control (Skinner, 1995). As outlined earlier (see section 
1.4.5.3.), Arch and Craske (2008) have discussed that while ACT does not advocate 
attempts to control internal states,  it is possible that ACT interventions (which 
involve ceasing attempts at control in favour of fully engaging with ones’ current 
experience) may have the somewhat paradoxical effect of increasing feelings of 
personal control and predictability of symptoms. The relationship between 
perceptions of personal control and ACT constructs may be an area worthy of further 
study. For example, individuals may feel they have more control over their illness 
with higher levels of acceptance. Indeed, IPQ-personal control and MSAQ are 
moderately correlated (r = .32, p > .001). 
 
4.1.2 Mediation of the relationship between symptoms of MS and 
satisfaction with life 
 
Results suggested that acceptance, as measured by the MSAQ, was the strongest 
mediator (with the highest point estimate of specific indirect effect, and 95 per cent 
CIs furthest from zero) of the relationship between symptoms of MS and satisfaction 
with life. Higher levels of acceptance related to greater satisfaction with life in the 
face of symptoms of MS. Interpretation of the specific indirect effect of the CFQ is 
more difficult, because the upper 95 per cent CI was exactly zero. With this result 
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being on the absolute borderline of statistical significance, it appears likely that 
cognitive fusion may also be a mediator of the relationship between symptoms of MS 
and satisfaction with life, with higher levels of cognitive fusion relating to lower 
satisfaction with life in the face of symptoms of MS. 
 
It appears theoretically coherent that acceptance should be the strongest mediator in 
analysis with the SWLS as DV. Satisfaction with life, as a concept, is related to 
‘valued living’ in ACT. The rationale of cultivating acceptance in ACT is to facilitate 
the living of one’s life in accordance with chosen values. The findings support the 
notion that in endeavouring to live a satisfying life while experiencing symptoms of 
MS, it is adaptive to be willing to experience difficult thoughts and feelings in regard 
to these symptoms, because they are likely to be triggered in a variety of situations. It 
appears that being relatively defused from (i.e. having low levels of cognitive fusion) 
such thoughts is also likely to be adaptive. 
 
It was surprising that none of the measures of cognitive appraisal were found to be 
significant mediators of the relationship between symptoms of MS and satisfaction 
with life. In the cases of ICQ- helplessness and IPQ-personal control, they became 
non-significant in multiple mediation analysis (when the indirect effect they shared 
with other mediators was taken into account), while they appeared to be significant 
mediators of the relationship between symptoms of MS and satisfaction with life 
when run alone in simple mediation analysis (see section 3.3.4.2.). It is possible that 
when the indirect effects associated with ACT processes are controlled for, the 
appraisal measures account for no significant additional specific indirect effects. 
ICQ- perceived benefits and IPQ- concern were not significant mediators of the 
relationship between symptoms of MS and satisfaction with life, even when run 





4.1.3 Comparing the roles of cognitive appraisals and ACT processes 
in the process of psychological adjustment to MS 
 
Results supported hypothesis 5, with ACT processes appearing to be stronger 
mediators of the relationship between MS symptoms and outcome measures. The 
ACT measures were the strongest mediators in both multiple mediation analyses. All 
statistically significant pair-wise comparisons involved one of the ACT measures 
demonstrating stronger specific indirect effects in comparison to a measure of 
cognitive appraisal. While some appraisal measures may have appeared to be 
significant mediators when run individually in simple mediation analyses, their 
specific indirect effects were non-significant when part of a multiple mediation 
analysis including ACT measures (with the single exception of IPQ- personal control 
remaining significant when the HADS was DV).  
 
The overall finding of ACT measures being stronger mediators of the relationship 
between symptoms of MS and outcome measures can be related to the core debate 
between CBT and ACT (see section 1.4.5). This debate centres on whether it is the 
content of thought that causes psychopathology and problems in adjustment to 
chronic health conditions, and thus should be the target of psychological treatment 
(e.g. Beck et al., 1979), or whether more contextual approaches (Hayes et al., 2011) 
that focus on the ways individuals relate to their experiences may also be 
appropriate. The current results support ACT processes as being more significant in 
the process of psychological adjustment to MS, in comparison to illness related 
appraisals allied to more traditional CBT. 
 
This raises the possibility that the way people relate to their thoughts and feelings 
regarding symptoms of MS may be a pivotal element of adjustment, rather than the 
presence of such thoughts and feelings. For example, it may be difficult for some 
people to avoid having thoughts about being helpless in regard to MS, having little 
personal control over it, or feeling concerned over its impact, but maybe such 
cognitions are not necessarily problematic if individuals are willing to experience 
them as mental events rather than ‘truths’, and are perhaps able to defuse from them, 
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in the service of continuing to pursue their directions for valued living. The results 
are consistent with this possibility. 
 
There are, however, factors in the measurement of acceptance in the current study 
that could possibly bias findings slightly in favour of acceptance, as measured by the 
MSAQ. Firstly, it was the only measure of mediation that was MS specific, rather 
than referring more generally to the experience of illness. Secondly, acceptance as 
defined in ACT inherently involves taking action in living ones’ life in valued 
directions. Hence, the MSAQ- engagement items refer to observable behaviour, 
rather than focussing on cognition and appraisal alone like other measures employed. 
Items which refer to engaging in valued activity are perhaps particularly likely to 
correlate with satisfaction with life, and reduced psychological distress. In terms of 
face validity, however, the items of both subscales of the MSAQ (see 6.7), do also 
appear to capture the more ‘cognitive’ element of acceptance, regarding how 
individuals relate to their experiences. 
 
4.2 Comment on design and methodology of study 
 
4.2.1 Relative strengths of current research 
 
The current study was well powered, using a representative sample of individuals 
attending NHS services with a diagnosis of MS. The sample had a broad range of 
ages, time since diagnosis, a mix of individuals with different disease types (i.e. 
relapse/remitting or progressive), and reasonably typical ratio in terms of gender 
(females are more commonly affected in a ratio of 3:2). All participants were clients 
known to NHS neuro-rehabilitation services, which may have biased the sample 
slightly towards individuals experiencing some difficulties in adjusting to their 
condition. This possibility is supported by the somewhat elevated scores on the 
HADS among the sample (see section 3.2.2).    
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The mediator measures in the current study were chosen carefully on the basis of 
underlying psychological theory. The measures of appraisal were all chosen to 
capture cognitions which have been highlighted by previous research and reviews of 
the literature (e.g. Dennison et al., 2009) to be relevant to adjustment outcome, while 
avoiding theoretical overlap with the measures of MS symptoms and adjustment 
outcomes. Thorough preliminary analysis was conducted to avoid collinearity 
between measures, test whether predictor variables correlated appropriately with 
DVs, and to assess whether demographic variables required inclusion as covariates. 
 
The inclusion of numerous potential mediating variables in analysis, along with 
covariates where appropriate, is a definite strength of the current study. Preacher and 
Hayes (2008) describe how including multiple mediators in the same model reduces 
the risk of biased parameter estimates due to omitted variables, which can occur if 
single mediators are run alone in numerous simple mediation analyses (as carried out 
in supplemental analysis of section 3.3.4.2). Put simply, if mediators are tested alone 
through simple mediation analyses, they may have effects attributed to them which 
are more due to latent variables absent from the model. While the spread of measures 
and covariates included reduced the ‘omitted variable problem’ in the current study, 
there are perhaps some latent variables which could have been beneficial inclusions, 
which shall be discussed shortly. 
 
4.2.2 Weaknesses and limitations of current research 
 
The current research relied exclusively on self-report measures. While measures of 
certain constructs (e.g. cognitive appraisals, cognitive fusion, or satisfaction with 
life) are highly subjective and thus appropriate for self-report measure, others would 
have benefited from being measured more objectively by a third party to avoid biases 
in individuals’ perception. MS symptoms would ideally have been assessed with a 
clinician administered measure such as the EDSS (Kurtzke, 1983), and levels of 
psychological distress could similarly have been assessed through a clinical 
interview, such as the Structural Clinical Interview for Axis 1 disorders (First et al., 
1994), based on diagnostic criteria of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV 
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(DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994). The details participants 
provided regarding their condition (time since diagnosis and disease type) would also 
have benefited from some kind of objective verification. Such procedures were, 
unfortunately, not possible due to practical constraints of the research.  
 
The absence of any measure of coping is a limitation of the current study. Coping is 
considered to be an important predictor of psychological outcomes by the SCM 
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) and the CSM (Leventhal et al., 1984), and has been 
shown to be related to adjustment outcomes among PwMS (Dennison et al., 2009). 
Adding a measure of coping to analysis would have provided a more inclusive range 
of variables known to be related to outcomes among people with MS. Including a 
fuller range of relevant psychological processes in the same analysis would have 
allowed a more meaningful comparison of the extent to which each mediates the 
relationship between MS symptoms and outcomes. The reasons for not including a 
measure of coping were both pragmatically and theoretically driven. Pragmatically, 
the inclusion of further measures would have increased the response burden for 
participants, and could potentially have impacted upon response rates. Therefore, 
only measures which were considered to be most theoretically relevant to the 
research aims were included. Previous research (e.g. Heijmans et al., 1998, Moss-
Morris et al., 1996; as cited in Vaughan et al., 2003) has suggested that illness 
representations demonstrate some direct influence on outcomes that is not mediated 
by coping strategies, and that they tend to be more strongly related to adjustment 
outcomes than coping strategies. The measurement of coping has also come under 
some criticism. For example, it has been argued (e.g. Coyne & Racioppo, 2000; 
McCracken & Eccleston, 2003) that the use of questionnaire measures which require 
respondents to reflect upon coping efforts in a general and somewhat abstract sense, 
gather no detail about the behavioural context of the coping or its subsequent success 
in regulating internal or external states, so yield information with relatively limited 
utility. Primarily, however, coping measures were not included because the current 
study aimed to take as exclusive a focus as possible on internal mental 
representations and appraisal, rather than observable coping efforts. Such a focus was 
considered to be suitable for directly comparing the roles of appraisals (aiming to 
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measure cognitive content), and ACT processes (aiming to capture the process of 
relating to internal experiences) in mediating the relationship between symptoms of 
MS and psychological adjustment. 
 
The adoption of an exclusive focus on appraisals and ACT processes to the exclusion 
of coping is, however, potentially highly problematic. Coping strategies are widely 
believed to be important variables in the process of adjustment to MS (Dennison et 
al., 2009). The inclusion of only a small number of psychological variables, when 
others are known from previous research to be potentially significant in the current 
context, may increase the likelihood of those variables appearing to be significant 
mediators. This narrowed focus somewhat limits the interpretation of results. The 
exclusive focus on appraisals and ACT processes may have biased the results 
towards confirming their significance in mediating the relationship between 
symptoms of MS and adjustment, while the possibility of evidence being gathered to 
disconfirm their significance (which could have been afforded by the inclusion of 
coping measures) may have been artificially limited. The items of the MSAQ do 
include some reference to observable behaviour. It is possible, therefore, that the 
MSAQ may capture some variance which could potentially have been shared with 
more behavioural measures of coping. It is possible that the inclusion of a coping 
measure could have changed the relationships among variables, or perhaps 
diminished the significance of ACT processes. The inclusion of coping would have 
provided a fuller and more comprehensive exploration of the process of adjustment 
to MS, which would have increased the depth of interpretation possible from the 
results. The omission of coping does, of course, constitute a major limitation of the 
current research, and very much limits the confidence with which ACT constructs 
can be considered to be significant mediators of the relationship between symptoms 
of MS and psychological adjustment.   
 
Perhaps the most significant limitation of the current study is the absence of any 
measure of cognitive functioning, when cognitive impairment (including processes 
of concentration, memory, reasoning and judgement) is a relatively common, and 
potentially disabling, symptom for PwMS (Mohr & Cox, 2001). The MS- 
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psychological subscale was not an appropriate measure in this regard, with only one 
item (“Problems concentrating?”) pertained to cognitive functioning, with all other 
items related more directly to mood. Unfortunately, relying on self-reports of 
cognitive impairment among PwMS is problematic. Benedict et al. (2003; 2004) 
developed the Multiple Sclerosis Neuropsychological Screening Questionnaire 
(MSNQ) to assist in screening for neuropsychological impairment. The MSNQ 
produces both self-report and informant-report scores. The authors found the 
informant-report version to correlate with objectively measured cognitive 
functioning. The self-report version, however, did not correlate with objectively 
measured cognitive performance, but rather correlated with symptoms of depression. 
Other studies have similarly found self-reports of cognitive impairment among 
PwMS to be confounded by depression and fatigue (Deloire et al., 2006), and that 
there is a lack of relationship between individuals’ perceptions of their cognitive 
impairments and their objectively measured cognitive functioning (Middletona, 
2006). While cognitive impairment in MS can be effectively screened with brief 
clinician administered tests, such as the symbol digit modalities test (Deloire et al., 
2006; Parmenter et al., 2007), this was not feasible due to practical constraints in the 
current research. It is debatable whether a self-report measure such as the MSNQ 
would have been a wise addition to mediation analyses, because its correlation with 
symptoms of depression may have confounded variance more appropriately 
belonging to the HADS.  
 
The measures of ACT processes, the MSAQ and the CFQ, have not previously been 
validated among PwMS. The MSAQ was a pilot measure, so the current study offers 
the only available evidence for its reliability and validity. The MSAQ total score 
demonstrated acceptable internal consistency in this study (α = .87). It also showed a 
strong negative correlation (rs = -.59) with the AAQ-II (Bond et al., in press), a 
measure of psychological inflexibility, and a strong negative correlation with the 
CFQ (r = -.59), providing preliminary evidence of concurrent validity. Factor 
analysis was not conducted with the MSAQ due to insufficient sample size, so it is 
unknown whether it replicates the two factor structure of the CPAQ, the measure 
from which it was adapted. Clearly, the MSAQ requires further validation in larger 
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samples of PwMS. Further research could investigate test/re-test reliability of the 
MSAQ, its sensitivity to detect changes in acceptance within individuals over the 
course of interventions, and its ability to predict later scores in adjustment outcomes 
(i.e. predictive validity) over the course of longitudinal research. As discussed further 
in section 4.3.1, it is also unclear at this stage of development to what extent the 
MSAQ successfully operationalizes an ACT consistent conceptualisation of 
acceptance, or whether it may also measure elements of acceptance as conceptualised 
in other models. Taken together, the limited evidence of reliability and validity for 
MSAQ requires that results obtained should be interpreted with caution. Therefore, 
this also limits the confidence with which results can be generalised to the wider 
population of PwMS, and the confidence with which any possible implications of the 
research can be stated.  
 
While the CFQ is at a relatively advanced stage of development, having 
demonstrated psychometric properties such as: good internal consistency; a coherent 
factor structure across different samples; correlations in expected directions with 
related constructs; and some utility in discriminating between healthy individuals and 
those suffering from psychological disorders (Gillanders et al., 2010); it is worth 
noting that data pertaining to development of the CFQ has not yet been published 
and subjected to peer review. The CFQ has not been validated previously for use in a 
MS population. In the current sample, the CFQ total score demonstrated acceptable 
internal consistency (α = .85), and showed a strong positive correlation (rs = .74) 
with the AAQ-II, a measure of psychological inflexibility, providing some evidence 
of concurrent validity. Other aspects of the validity of the CFQ in a MS population, 
such as its test/re-test reliability, its sensitivity to changes in cognitive fusion within 
individuals over time, or its ability to discriminate between PwMS suffering from 
psychological disorders and those who are not, are as yet unknown. Factor analysis 
was not conducted for CFQ in the current study, so it is unknown whether a single 
factor structure would be evident in this population. While Gillanders et al. (2010) 
report that the CFQ correlates with related constructs in predictable ways (see section 
2.3.5), it is striking that the CFQ correlated highly (r = .75) with psychological 
distress in the current study. While cognitive fusion is conceptualised as a core 
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process underlying psychopathology in ACT, such a high correlation does raise the 
possibility that the items of the CFQ could be seen as somewhat confounded with 
symptoms of anxiety or depression. This raises the possibility that the CFQ may not 
operationalize the construct of cognitive fusion in a MS population to the exclusion 
of other related constructs. These uncertainties surrounding the validity of the CFQ 
in a MS population carry the same limitations described above pertaining to the 
MSAQ; results regarding the CFQ must similarly be interpreted with caution. In 
summary, due to the uncertainty regarding the psychometric properties of the 
measures employed, the current results can lend only preliminary support for the 
possibility of ACT processes offering any new perspective on the process of 
psychological adjustment to MS, or for ACT interventions being potentially 
appropriate for PwMS.  
 
The inclusion of the MSAQ as the sole measure of ‘acceptance’ limits the 
conclusions which can be drawn regarding the role of acceptance in adjustment to 
MS. Including only one measure of acceptance has potential to introduce some bias 
to the findings, because any single measure of acceptance is, perhaps, inherently 
quite likely to be a significant mediating variable in the context of the current study. 
This may render the research hypotheses - regarding acceptance as conceptualised in 
ACT being a significant mediator of the relationship between symptoms of MS and 
psychological adjustment - very likely to be confirmed. The inclusion of an alternate 
measure of acceptance would have increased the breadth of analysis, and the scope 
for evidence being gathered to disconfirm acceptance, as conceptualised in ACT, as 
being a significant mediating variable. Such an addition would have significantly 
increased the scientific rigour of the current study, by increasing the scope for 
research hypotheses to be falsified.  The current study would have benefited from the 
inclusion of an alternate measure of acceptance, which was less grounded in the ACT 
model, so the merits of different conceptualisations of acceptance could have been 
directly compared. It is possible that the inclusion of an alternate measure of 
acceptance would have decreased the magnitude of effect sizes attributed to the 
MSAQ as a mediating variable, and offered a wider perspective on how ‘acceptance’ 
may be most usefully conceptualised in a MS population. In these regards, it would 
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certainly have been preferable to have issued participants with the ‘acceptance’ 
subscale of the ICQ, so this could have been included as a variable in mediational 
analyses. 
 
The IPQ subscales employed were all single items scales. While single item scales 
have some obvious advantages such as being quick and easy for respondents to 
complete, and may be appropriate and reliable in instances when the underlying 
construct being measured is homogeneous (Loo, 2001), they also have some notable 
limitations. They may not be able to meaningfully capture more complex constructs. 
When complex constructs are represented by single items, this may require 
respondents to make personal judgements regarding what information is irrelevant to 
their response, and how to weigh up the relative importance of information that could 
influence a final score (De Boer et al., 2004). This can introduce some ambiguity to 
interpretation of scores, as it can be unclear how respondents are interpreting the 
question. In the current study, for example, there could be variability in how 
respondents interpret the IPQ-personal control item. It could be answered in regard to 
their perceived control in literally influencing the disease process, feelings of control 
experienced in making practical adjustments in living with the condition, or how 
much control they experience over feelings of well-being despite experiencing 
symptoms of MS. The inclusion of multiple items to measure more complex latent 
constructs is widely believed to have various advantages. The inclusion of multiple 
items facilitates the calculation of internal consistency to support the validity of the 
measure in operationalizing the desired construct, and can increase responsiveness 
(Martinez-Martin, 2010). The random error of the measurement is also reduced by 
the inclusion of multiple items, resulting in more precise measurement (Gardner et 
al., 1998). Given the potential complexity of the constructs measured by single scales 
in the current study, it is debatable whether they were optimally captured by the 
brief-IPQ. The use of multiple items to measure these constructs, potentially through 
use of the IPQ-R (Moss-Morris et al., 2002), would have been likely to increase the 
reliability and validity of measurement of these illness representations, and would 




The choice to include only certain subscales of the brief-IPQ in analysis may be 
somewhat controversial. By excluding certain subscales, Leventhal et al.’s (1984) 
model of illness representations cannot be investigated as a coherent whole. As 
detailed in section 2.3.3, however, omission of certain subscales appeared necessary 
to avoid confounding with other measures, while other representations appeared to 
have low face validity for a MS population when represented by single item 
measures. The subscales included in analysis were selected on the basis of their 
relevance to the process of adjustment to MS demonstrated in previous research, and 
their contribution to an inclusive selection of illness appraisals when considered 
alongside those of the ICQ. The aim of the current research was not to solely 
investigate Leventhal et al.’s (1984) CSM, but to compare the roles of relevant 
illness appraisals, and ACT processes, in psychological adjustment to MS. In the 
context of this aim, it was deemed appropriate to select only the most relevant 
subscales. If all subscales had been included, this could potentially have been 
problematic for analysis. Multiple mediation analysis (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) 
considers each variable’s specific indirect effect (i.e. their unique effect beyond that 
shared with other variables). Therefore, as the number of variables in analysis 
increases, so does the amount of variance that is likely to be shared among variables. 
Having a greater number of appraisal measures in analysis would, therefore, be likely 
to decrease the chances of statistically significant mediating effects being detected. 
On this basis, it was considered prudent to keep the number of appraisal measures in 
analysis to a minimum. 
 
The current study employed only two outcome measures. Previous studies of 
adjustment to MS (e.g. Jopson & Moss-Morris, 2003; McCabe et al., 2004; Van 
Kessel et al., 2008; Vaughan et al., 2003) have included a wider range of outcome 
measures, including: QoL, sickness impact, self-esteem, work and social adjustment, 
fatigue severity, and engagement in activities of daily living. Wider measures of 
outcome were not included because: some would have been confounded with other 
measures (particularly the MSIS- physical), item burden would have been increased 
for participants and potentially have negatively impacted upon response rate, and 
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most importantly, an exclusive focus on subjectively experienced well-being was 
thought most appropriate for testing of the research hypotheses. The SWLS and 
HADS were thought to be appropriate choices for measuring positively and 
negatively valenced experiences of well-being. In focussing on subjectively 
experienced psychological well-being, a measure of more positive affect may have 
been a reasonable addition. A brief measure of social support / relational functioning 
could also have been a reasonable inclusion as a possible covariate.  
 
It should be noted that in the packs issued to participants, the questionnaires always 
appeared in the same order. It is possible that order of the questionnaires could have 
had an influence on the way in which they were completed by respondents. As 
described by McColl et al. (2003), the content of initial items provides the context 
for subsequent items, bringing certain concepts or ideas to the front of individuals’ 
minds, potentially impacting on the way subsequent items are interpreted and 
responded to. In the current study, for example, the first questionnaire was the 
measure of MS symptomatology (the MSIS). It is, therefore, possible that non-
illness-specific measures (the CFQ, SWLS, and the HADS) could have tended to be 
completed with MS symptoms to some extent ‘in mind’. McColl et al. (2003) also 
describe how fatigue can affect responding in a variety of ways, including 
respondents abandoning questionnaires, missing data (either accidentally or 
intentionally), or adopting habitual response patterns (e.g. choosing the same 
response for every item). This could introduce the possibility of data quality obtained 
from questionnaires presented later in the pack being slightly poorer in comparison 
to those presented earlier. Some researchers (e.g. Lucas, 1992) have suggested that 
questionnaires should be issued to respondents in a counterbalanced or randomised 
manner to avoid ‘order effects’, which would have been a wise addition to the design 
of the current research.   
 
It is important to note that while the results of the current study support the 
hypothesis of ACT processes as mediating the relationship between symptoms of MS 
and psychological adjustment, causality cannot be inferred from this cross-sectional 
study design. The indirect effects investigated in mediational analyses are the sum of 
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regression coefficients, which are correlational in nature. Causality cannot be 
inferred from correlation alone (Field, 2009). While the direction of the relationship 
between the variables can be hypothesised on theoretical grounds, it is possible that 
constructs effect each other in unexpected ways. For example, mood and satisfaction 
with life could have effects on appraisals of symptoms, acceptance, or cognitive 
fusion. Equally, psychological well-being could be impacting, either directly or 
indirectly, upon disease activity and symptoms of MS (Mohr, Goodkin et al., 2001; 
Mohr, 2002). Potential future research to explore casual chains will be discussed in 
section 4.4.1.  
 
4.2.3 Review of statistical analysis employed 
 
The method of statistical analysis in the current study was highly appropriate for the 
research questions addressed. As previously discussed (see section 2.5.3), the use of 
Preacher and Hayes’s (2008) method of multiple mediation analysis was used in 
favour of the popular but flawed (Hayes, 2009; MacKinnon et al., 2002; Shrout & 
Bolger, 2002) ‘causal steps approach’ proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986). Use of 
Preacher and Hayes’s approach allowed exploration of the extent to which a given 
variable acted as mediator while controlling for the effects of other variables entered 
in the model, reduced the risk of ‘type one’ errors due to the omission of significant 
variables, and enabled a comparison of the ‘relative magnitudes of specific indirect 
effects associated with all mediators’ (Preacher & Hayes, 2008, p.881). The use of 
‘bootstrapping’ to avoid assumptions of indirect effects being normally distributed is 
another advantage of the Preacher and Hayes method (MacKinnon & Fairchild, 
2009).  
 
Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) was considered as a potential alternate 
technique for data analysis. SEM allows the testing of hypothesised relationships not 
only among observed variables, but also latent variables that were not included in 
analysis (Fife-Shaw, 2000). It facilitates the exploration of complex, or ‘web like’, 
relationships among variables. In the current data set, for example, SEM techniques 
could have had the potential to elucidate relationships between the various predictor 
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variables, as opposed to simply estimating specific indirect effects of the IVs on the 
DVs. It is recommended, however, that SEM requires a minimum sample size of 
approximately 200 participants (Hoe, 2008), so such analysis would have been 
underpowered in the current study.  
 
4.3 The Multiple Sclerosis Acceptance Questionnaire 
 
The results of the current study appear promising for the newly adapted MSAQ. 
Chronbach’s α values were acceptably high for both the willingness (α  = .79) and 
activities engagement (α  = .89) subscales, as well as the total score (α  = .87), 
suggesting good internal consistency. The willingness and activities engagement 
subscales showed moderate correlations with each other (r = .33, p < .001). 
The MSAQ showed appropriately high correlation with the AAQ-II (rs = -.59, N = 
125, p < .001), supporting its construct validity as a measure of acceptance. High 
correlation with the CFQ (r = -.59, p < .001) is also supportive of the MSAQ’s 
construct validity, as there is strong theoretical overlap between acceptance and 
cognitive fusion. In relation to measures of cognitive appraisal the MSAQ also 
correlated positively with IPQ- personal control (r = .32, p < .001), and negatively 
with higher scores on ICQ-helplessness (r = -.62, p < .001) and IPQ-concern (r = -
.51, p < .001). All correlations occurred in theoretically consistent directions. 
 
As already discussed, in the current sample the MSAQ appeared to be a significant 
mediator of the relationship between symptoms of MS and measures of 
psychological adjustment. These results not only support the notion of illness 
specific acceptance being a significant psychological process in adjustment to MS, 
but also give preliminary support for the MSAQ being an appropriate measure of that 
process.  
 
The positive findings regarding the MSAQ appear to support the decision to base this 
MS specific measure of acceptance on the items of the CPAQ. Of course, it cannot 
be discerned from the current analysis whether the two subscale structure of the 
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CPAQ transfers to the MSAQ. Further research will require the use of factor analysis 
to discern the factor structure of the MSAQ, and how acceptance is best 
conceptualised and measured in a MS population.  Factor analysis and further scale 
development will require the use of larger samples. 
 
4.3.1 Potential Limitations of the MSAQ 
 
It is important to note that the MSAQ is a measure of acceptance as conceptualised in 
ACT, which is quite distinct from acceptance as defined in other models discussed in 
adjustment literature. In research conducted by Dembo et al. (1956; as cited in Li & 
Moore, 1998) acceptance was conceptualised as an adjustment to loss, which 
included recognising and deemphasising values which were in conflict with 
disability, resisting extending the concept of impairment to wider aspects of ‘the 
self’, and avoiding comparisons to others in areas affected by disability. More recent 
research has viewed acceptance of chronic health conditions as the end ‘phase’ of a 
potentially long process of adjustment. Antonak and Livneh (1995), for example, 
describe how the process of adjusting to disability can typically involve individuals 
passing through the following phases: ‘shock’, ‘anxiety’, ‘denial’, ‘depression’, 
‘internalised anger’ (directed towards the self), ‘externalised hostility’ (directed 
towards others), ‘acknowledgement’, and finally ‘adjustment’. Antonak and Levneh 
(1995) describe ‘acknowledgement’, the penultimate phase, as ‘intellectual 
acceptance’ of the implications of disability, and their incorporation into the self-
concept. The final stage, ‘adjustment’, is defined as ‘emotional acceptance’, when 
the implications of disability are affectively internalised into the self-concept and 
behavioural and social adaptations are made to facilitate living with disability. In this 
model, which is perhaps consistent with the conception of most health professionals, 
the word ‘acceptance’ is almost synonymous with ‘adjustment’, marking the end 
phase in a long and potentially difficult process of cognitive, behavioural, and 
emotional adaptation. Acceptance has also been discussed as the opposite to ‘denial’ 
(Eccles et al., 2011; Telford et al., 2006), as denial is an earlier stage in the 
adjustment process when the individual cannot face the implications of disability. 
Other measures of acceptance, such as the Acceptance of Chronic Health Conditions 
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Scale (ACHCS; Stuifbergen et al., 2008), discussed further below, have been 
developed with acceptance conceptualised more as an end phase in an adjustment 
process. 
 
The conceptualisation of acceptance captured by the MSAQ is based on that of the 
CPAQ (McCracken et al., 2004) from which it was adapted, viewing acceptance of 
MS as a willingness to experience difficult thoughts, feelings, and symptoms relating 
to MS in the course of engaging in personally valued activity, without attempting to 
control or avoid unwanted experiences. From the perspective of other models of 
adjustment, such as ‘phase’ models described by Antonak and Levneh (1995), this 
could appear a somewhat narrow definition of ‘acceptance’. For example, it could be 
possible for an individual to frequently experience distressing cognitions relating to 
their condition, with accompanying feelings of anger, injustice, and low mood, but if 
they carried on engaging in valued activity successfully without attempting to control 
these experiences, they could be viewed as exhibiting high levels of ‘acceptance’ 
according to an ACT model. Non-ACT practitioners could reasonably argue that 
such an individual may not have cognitively or emotionally ‘accepted’ the 
implications of their condition. Thus, the MSAQ may have little relation to 
acceptance as conceptualised in other models, as discussed by other professionals, 
and as commonly understood in lay conceptions. A willingness to experience 
unwanted symptoms, thoughts and feelings in the course of engaging in valued 
activity may have limited relation to an individual’s emotional and cognitive 
adjustment to the condition. It is unclear how these two conceptualisations (i.e. 
acceptance as defined by ACT, or acceptance as an end ‘phase’ of adjustment) may 
relate to, or overlap with, each other. It may be that individuals who could be 
described as being at the ‘end phase’ of an adjustment process are the same 
individuals who would appear as ‘accepting’ from an ACT standpoint, and that the 
MSAQ may inadvertently be measuring this underlying construct. Alternatively, it 
may be possible to have some dissociation between the two states, as in the 
hypothetical case example above. 
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From the current study it cannot be discerned to what extent the MSAQ exclusively 
captures acceptance as conceptualised by ACT, or whether it captures variance more 
appropriately attributable to individuals being at the later phases of an adjustment 
process, when their appraisals of their condition may have evolved in more adaptive 
directions. Of course, the items of the MSAQ could be viewed as measuring such 
‘appraisals’ to some extent. This distinction between acceptance conceptualisations 
is also made difficult by the MSAQ’s reference to engagement in valued behaviour. 
Observable value driven behaviour is an inherent element of acceptance as 
conceptualised in ACT so was a necessary element of the measure. Engagement in 
valued activity is also conceptualised, however, as indicative of individuals being at 
a later stage in an adjustment process by ‘phase’ models (e.g. Antonak & Levneh, 
1995).  
 
It is worth noting that conceptualising acceptance as an end ‘phase’ in an adjustment 
process may have some disadvantages. For some individuals, more ‘phase’ based 
conceptualisations of acceptance (Antonak & Levneh, 1995) may carry an 
implication that they need to have worked through an emotional adjustment process 
(so they ‘feel better’) before engagement in more behaviour consistent with valued 
living is possible, which could have the potential to hold back progress in 
rehabilitation. The MSAQ aims to measure an essentially behavioural 
conceptualisation of acceptance, whereby individuals are considered to be capable of 
engaging in ‘acceptance’ consistent behaviour while still experiencing unwanted 
mental events. Some individuals could experience such an ACT consistent 
conceptualisation of acceptance as being quite liberating. The MSAQ hopefully 
captures an ACT conceptualisation of acceptance more explicitly and effectively 
compared to other existing measures. 
 
One potentially interesting area of research would be to include the MSAQ in 
research alongside other existing measures of ‘acceptance’ of chronic illness. The 
ACHCS (Stuifbergen et al., 2008), for example, was developed to move away from 
previous definitions of acceptance as a process of adjustment to loss (Linkowski, 
1971), to one linked to more adaptive processes (see earlier quotations in section 
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1.3.2.2). Stuifbergen et al. (2008) cite a range of previous research as influencing the 
development of their scale, including work by ACT researchers in chronic pain (e.g. 
McCracken & Vowles, 2006) and that of more ‘phase’ based models (e.g. Antonak 
& Levneh, 1995). Their definitions of acceptance clearly differ from that of ACT, as 
do some items of the scale (e.g. ‘I’ve come to terms with my MS’, ‘I think of MS as 
just part of who I am’). The definition of acceptance employed by Stuifbergen et al. 
(2008) is based more on ‘phase’ based conceptions of adjustment which inherently 
involve change in cognitive content. The Ideas About Long-Standing Health 
Problems (IALHP) questionnaire developed by McDonald et al. (2011) is another 
measure of acceptance for individuals with chronic health problems. The IALHP 
appears to be based on theoretically diverse, and perhaps somewhat confused, 
definitions of acceptance, including: ‘Acceptance of chronic illness is conceptualized 
as the desire to take possession of one’s illness’ (p.416). The IALHP has three 
subscales measuring: outlook, confidence, and presence of inhibitors. Inspection of 
items suggests it has very little theoretical overlap with acceptance as defined in 
ACT, and again relates more to cognitive content. Comparison of the MSAQ with 
other measures of ‘acceptance’ of chronic health conditions, perhaps in analysis 
similar to that employed in the current study, could elucidate whether a more 
appraisal based (e.g. Stuifbergen et al., 2008) measure of acceptance could account 
for any variance in outcome beyond the more ACT consistent MSAQ, or whether the 
variance captured by the MSAQ is more appropriately conceptualised by alternative 
models of acceptance. 
 
It is perhaps important that researchers remain aware of the differences between an 
ACT conceptualisation of acceptance, and those of other models (e.g. Antonak & 
Levneh, 1995; Stuifbergen et al., 2008). It is striking that that some authors 
discussing acceptance in the context of questionnaire development (e.g. Evers et al., 
2001; McDonald et al., 2011; Stuifbergen et al., 2008) appear to move between 
definitions: for example describing acceptance the end phase of an adjustment 
process, before citing ACT studies as demonstrating the importance of this process 
for psychological outcome. In this context, it may be somewhat unfortunate that 
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ACT uses the term ‘acceptance’ (as opposed to alternatives such as ‘willingness’) 
when this risks causing conceptual confusion. 
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4.4 Implications and potential future research 
 
4.4.1 Potential future research 
 
The results of the current research suggest that the relevance of ACT processes in 
adjustment to MS are worthy of further investigation.  
 
As already discussed (see section 4.2.2.), the direction of causality among the 
variables measured cannot be discerned from the current research. More 
sophisticated designs are necessary to evidence causality of any mediational effect, 
including longitudinal design to show whether scores in proposed mediators at ‘time 
1’ predict scores in outcomes at ‘time 2’. The inclusion of process measures in 
intervention research is particularly useful in these regards, with process measures 
(e.g. of ACT processes, or cognitive appraisals) being completed at baseline, mid-
treatment, and post-intervention (Kraemer et al., 2002). Daily process studies (e.g. 
Tennen et al., 2000) could be fruitful in exploring the purported mechanisms of 
ACT, or indeed CBT, interventions in a MS population, potentially involving 
monitoring of fluctuations in: MS symptoms, cognitive processes (i.e. willingness, 
cognitive defusion, cognitive appraisals, mindfulness), mood, and engagement in 
values congruent activity. Experimental designs also have useful potential in 
gathering evidence for hypothesised causal chains (MacKinnon & Fairchild, 2009; 
Spencer et al., 2005).  
 
Of course, future studies of ACT interventions (delivered to individuals or groups) in 
a MS population would have the primary aim of investigating the efficacy of 
treatment. To date, only one very preliminary study has investigated the effectiveness 
of an ACT intervention in a MS population (Sheppard et al., 2010), and another one 
(Grossman et al., 2010) has investigated the impact of mindfulness training (see 
section 1.5.6.2.6 for details). The authors of these two studies both commented, in 
reference to ACT and mindfulness respectively, how such interventions could 
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potentially be highly appropriate for a MS population, given their broad focuses, and 
the notion that such interventions do not seek to change or challenge cognitive 
content (which may not be realistic or possible when faced with certain cognitions 
and challenges relating to MS). The results of the current study support the possible 
applicability of ACT, or indeed mindfulness, interventions in a MS population. In 
line with recommendations made by previous reviews of the ACT evidence base 
(e.g. Ost, 2008; Powers et al., 2009), studies of ACT interventions in MS populations 
should aim to employ as rigorous methodologies possible, including: representative 
samples, random assignment to treatments, inclusion of waiting list and/or 
psychological placebo control groups, comparison with a treatment of proven 
efficacy (such as CBT), use of reliable and valid outcome measures, reasonable 
numbers of therapists involved in trials (to avoid therapist effects) with good levels 
of experience, monitoring of treatment adherence, and control of concomitant 
treatments (Ost, 2009). 
 
Carefully conducted intervention research could potentially inform clinicians’ 
tailoring of interventions for given individuals. It could be possible, for example, that 
ACT and CBT interventions could be differentially effective for different presenting 
problems, or for individuals experiencing different types of the disease (i.e. 
relapse/remitting or progressive). It seems feasible that skills learnt from ACT 
interventions may be useful both for individuals who are relatively newly diagnosed, 
and those who are experiencing more marked disability. Another important question 
is how effective ACT and CBT interventions may be for individuals experiencing 
differing levels of cognitive impairment. 
 
As previously discussed (see section 4.3), further research could also aim to explore 
the reliability and validity of the MSAQ, conducting factor analysis to determine 
whether it replicates the two-factor structure of the CPAQ. The MSAQ could also be 
compared to other measures of ‘acceptance’ in chronic health conditions, such as the 
ACHCS developed by Stuifbergen et al. (2008), to explore the relative merits of 
different conceptualisations of acceptance. 
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4.4.2 Possible implications 
 
While the results of the current study give only very preliminary support for the 
relevance of ACT processes to psychological adjustment in a MS population, they 
raise interesting questions about how ACT interventions would potentially impact 
upon the care of PwMS in light of relevant policy documents (if further research 
provided support for its relevance and utility). 
 
The National Institute of Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) has produced 
guidelines for the management of multiple sclerosis in primary and secondary care 
(NICE, 2003), recommending that specialist neurological rehabilitation services 
should have a clinical psychologist as an integral member of the team. The 
guidelines state that PwMS who are experiencing significant symptoms of depression 
should be offered CBT ‘as part of an overall programme of depression management’ 
(p.37), and that psychologically based treatments should also be offered to 
individuals suffering from anxiety. These are obviously roles in which clinical 
psychology would be expected to take a lead, and in which ACT interventions are 
worthy of further exploration.  
 
It is also interesting to consider, however, how the practice of ACT could potentially 
impact upon a wider team approach. The NICE (2003) guidelines put emphasis on 
the multi-disciplinary team (MDT) working in collaboration with the client (and their 
family) to establish agreed goals to work towards with ‘an agreed common 
therapeutic approach’ (p.9). Clinical psychologists’ skill mix puts them in strong 
position to play an instrumental role in helping the MDT reach a formulation of 
clients’ problems that can inform a coordinated team intervention. ACT could 
perhaps be an appropriate framework on which to base such a team approach. ACT’s 
emphasis on exploring individuals’ directions for valued living, identifying 
unworkable action currently being taken (including evidence of experiential 
avoidance and cognitive fusion), before encouraging committed action in valued 
directions (Harris, 2009) appears quite compatible with the kind of approach a 
specialist neurological rehabilitation service may take in identifying and working 
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towards goals with clients. The relative simplicity of ACT formulations, and its 
ultimately behavioural emphasis, may make it a readily accessible common 
framework for MDT members to work with. 
 
An ACT informed approach to rehabilitation could impact upon how all MDT 
members understand clients’ experiences, and how they respond to clients in direct 
work. Within an ACT framework, there would perhaps be an increased appreciation 
among professionals that certain difficult thoughts and feelings that clients 
experience regarding MS are, to some extent, unavoidable. In some instances, 
attempts to challenge, discourage, avoid, or suppress these experiences may be 
unrealistic and counterproductive. Clinical Psychologists could potentially play a 
role in training other professionals to employ ACT based skills (i.e. acceptance and 
cognitive defusion exercises) with their clients to help them relate to their difficult 
experiences in new ways, to facilitate increased engagement in valued living. 
 
Both the NICE (2003) guidelines for MS and The National Service Framework for 
Long-Term Conditions (Department of Health, 2005) emphasise that the MDT team 
should provide support to the family and carers of PwMS. Again, ACT may provide 
an appropriate framework for supporting family members and carers to cope with 
stress related to caring for individuals with MS. Brief acceptance and mindfulness 
based interventions have previously been piloted among support staff caring for 
individuals with learning disabilities (Noone & Hastings, 2009; Noone & Hastings, 
2010), and were found to reduce levels of psychological distress. 
 
Of course, all the possible applications of ACT in the care of PwMS discussed here 
are highly speculative, given that this study offers only the most preliminary 
evidence of the relevance of ACT processes in this population. It is not the intention 
on the current discussion to ‘get ahead of the data’. It is, however, worthwhile to note 
the diverse areas of potential applicability for ACT in a MS population, which may 
be worthy of further consideration and research in the context of existing policy for 
the provision of care.    
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4.5 Summary and Conclusions 
 
The current study aimed to investigate the roles of ACT processes (acceptance and 
cognitive fusion) and cognitive appraisals in mediating the relationship between 
symptoms of MS and adjustment outcomes (satisfaction with life, and psychological 
distress). 
 
Through multiple mediation analyses (Preacher and Hayes, 2008), there was 
surprisingly limited evidence for cognitive appraisals acting as significant mediators, 
with only appraisals relating to personal control over one’s illness mediating the 
relationship between symptoms of MS and psychological distress. The measures of 
ACT processes, however, showed evidence of being stronger mediators of the 
relationships between symptoms of MS and both outcome measures. The newly 
adapted MSAQ appeared to perform well as a measure of MS specific ‘acceptance’. 
Further research may seek to explore the reliability and validity of the MSAQ in a 
larger population. 
 
The current results are consistent with the ACT constructs of ‘acceptance’ and 
‘cognitive fusion’ being significant psychological processes in adjustment to MS, 
mediating the relationship between physical symptoms of MS and psychological 
outcome measures. The results raise the possibility that the way people relate to their 
thoughts and feelings regarding symptoms of MS may be a pivotal element of 
adjustment, rather than the mere presence of such thoughts and feelings. The results 
support suggestions by other authors (Dennison & Moss-Morris, 2010; Grossman et 
al., 2010; Sheppard et al., 2010) that more ‘third wave’ or ‘contextual’ approaches 
(Hayes et al., 2011) such as ACT may be appropriate interventions in a MS 
population given the their broad focuses, and the notion that such interventions do 
not seek to change or challenge cognitive content (which may not be realistic or 
possible when faced with certain cognitions and challenges relating to MS). 
 
The cross sectional design of the current research makes it impossible to reach any 
conclusions about the direction of causality among variables, but these preliminary 
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results suggest that the relevance of ACT processes, and perhaps ACT interventions, 
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The Brief Illness Perception Questionnaraire 
 











The original items of the Chronic Pain Acceptance Scale, and the corresponding 




Original Item from Chronic Pain 
Acceptance Questionnaire 
(CPAQ) 
Adapted version of item for 
the Multiple Sclerosis 
Acceptance Questionnaire 
(MSAQ) 
1 I am getting on with the business of 
living no matter what my level of 
pain is 
I am getting on with the 
business of living no matter 
what my symptoms of MS 
are. 
2 My life is going well, even though I 
have chronic pain 
My life is going well, even 
though I have MS. 
 
3 It’s OK to experience pain Its OK to experience 
symptoms of MS. 
4 I would gladly sacrifice important 
things in my life to control this pain 
better 
I would gladly sacrifice 
important things in my life to 
control the symptoms of MS 
better. 
5 It’s not necessary for me to control 
my pain in order to handle my life 
well 
It’s not necessary for me to 
control my symptoms of MS 
in order to handle my life 
well. 
6 Although things have changed, I am 
living a normal life despite my 
chronic pain 
Although things have 
changed, I am living a 
normal life despite MS. 
7 I need to concentrate on getting rid 
of my pain 
I need to concentrate on 
doing all I can to reduce the 
symptoms of MS. 
8 There are many activities I do when 
I feel pain 
There are many activities I 
do when I experience 
symptoms of MS. 
9 I lead a full life even though I have 
chronic pain 
I lead a full life even though 
I have MS. 
10 Controlling pain is less important 
than any other goals in my life 
Controlling symptoms of MS 
is less important than other 
goals in my life. 
11 My thoughts and feelings about pain 
must change before I can take 
important steps in my life 
My thoughts and feelings 
about MS must change 
before I can take important 
steps in my life. 
12 Despite the pain, I am now sticking 
to a certain course in my life 
Despite MS, I am now 
sticking to a certain course in 
my life. 
13 Keeping my pain level under control 
takes first priority whenever I’m 
doing something 
Keeping my symptoms of 
MS under control takes first 




14 Before I can make any 
serious plans, I have to get 
some control over my pain 
Before I can make any 
serious plans, I have to get 
some control over my 
symptoms of MS. 
15 When my pain increases, I 
can still take care of my 
responsibilities 
When my symptoms of 
MS increase or relapse, I 
can still try my best to do 
the things I most care 
about. 
16 I will have better control 
over my life if I can 
control my negative 
thoughts about pain 
I will have better control 
over my life if I can 
control my negative 
thoughts about MS 
17 I avoid putting myself in 
situations where my pain 
might increase 
I avoid putting myself in 
situations where my 
symptoms of MS might 
increase. 
18 My worries and fears 
about what pain will do to 
me are true 
My worries and fears 
about my MS in the future 
stop me from living a 
fulfilling life now. 
19 It’s a relief to realize that I 
don’t have to change my 
pain to get on with my life 
It’s a relief to realise that 
my symptoms of MS don’t 
have to change for me to 
get on with my life. 
20 I have to struggle to do 
things when I have pain 
I have to struggle to do 
things when I experience 
symptoms of MS. 
 
 
Instructions for scoring the MSAQ (same as for the CPAQ): 
 
Activities engagement:  compute sum of items 1,2,3,5,6,8,9,10,12,15,19. 
 
Willingness: compute sum of reverse scores of 4,7,11,13,14,16,17,18,20. 
  








Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) 
 
Participants completed the official copyrighted version of the HADS. The items 
of the scale are simply listed here (with whether they relate to symptoms of 
anxiety or depression in brackets). Each item is responded to on a four point 
scale, with respondents rating the extent to which the item applies to them. 
 
I feel tense or 'wound up' (Anxiety) 
 
I still enjoy the things I used to enjoy (Depression) 
 
I get a sort of frightened feeling as if something awful is about to happen (Anxiety) 
 
I can laugh and see the funny side of things (Depression) 
 
Worrying thoughts go through my mind (Anxiety) 
 
I feel cheerful (Depression) 
 
I can sit at ease and feel relaxed (Anxiety) 
 
I feel as if I am slowed down (Depression) 
 
I get a sort of frightened feeling like 'butterflies' in the stomach (Anxiety) 
 
I have lost interest in my appearance (Depression) 
 
I feel restless as I have to be on the move (Anxiety) 
 
I look forward with enjoyment to things (Depression) 
 
I get sudden feelings of panic (Anxiety) 
 
I can enjoy a good book or radio or TV program (Depression) 
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Approximately how many years is it since you first experienced 




Relational status: Married or co-habiting 
(Please circle) 
   Separated or divorced  
    
Single 






Stage of MS:     relapsing    or  secondary 
(please circle  & remitting     progressive  





























Z-score values for skew and kurtosis of all measures 
 
 Z-score for data pre-
transformation 
Z-score for data post-
transformation 
Skew Kurtosis Skew Kurtosis 
MSIS-physical 
 
-1.04 -0.88 _ _ 
ICQ-helplessness 0.67 -1.92 _ _ 
ICQ-perceived 
benefits 
1.22 -1.10 _ _ 
IPQ-personal 
control 
1.80 -1.66 _ _ 
IPQ-concern 
 
-1.44 -1.89 _ _ 
IPQ-
understanding 
-3.82 0.14 -1.14 -1.93 
MSAQ- 
willingness 
-0.40 -0.30 _ _ 
MSAQ- 
engagement 
-2.18 0.24 1.65 0.39 
MSAQ- total 
 
1.46 0.20 _ _ 
CFQ 1.40 0.52 _ _ 
AAQ 4.17 0.03 2.14 -1.77 
HADS total 2.90 0.31 -0.86 0.43 
SWLS 0.42 1.73 _ _ 
Age -0.99 -1.08 _ _ 
Years since 
diagnosis 




Results of simple mediation analyses 
 
Results of simple mediation analyses with MSIS-physical as independent 
















.1364 -.0370 .0593 .2077 
ICQ-perceived 
benefits 
-.0043 .0083 -.0349 .0044 
CFQ .0956 .0373 .0275 .1727 
MSAQ .1163 .0282 .0662 .1781 
IPQ-personal 
control 
.0317 .0169 .0066 .0750 
IPQ- concern .0422 .0164 .0171 .0836 
IPQ- 
understanding 
0.0066 .0104 -.0393 .0060 
 
 
Results of simple mediation analyses with MSIS-physical as independent 
variable, and SWLS as dependent variable (age, type of disease, and years since 
















-.1300 .0337 -.1973 -.0635 
ICQ-perceived 
benefits 
.0092 .0126 -.0101 .0425 
CFQ -.0521 .0211 -.1002 -.0165 
MSAQ -.1005 -.1013 -.1529 -.0590 
IPQ-personal 
control 
-.0226 .0138 -.0589 -.0029 
IPQ- concern -.0199 .0132 -.0525 .0013 
IPQ- 
understanding 
.0051 .0088 -.0080 .0296 
 
 
